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Women’s participation in education today is unparalleled in history. Part of 
this is explained by general educational expansion in both richer and poorer 
countries since the 1950s. At present, some countries even experience a 
reverse gender gap in higher education.1 Yet, in the majority of the world, the 
share of women’s educational attainment systematically lags behind that of 
men, especially in South Asia, the Middle East, and in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Barro and Lee 2013). Some countries, such as Taiwan, have made incredible 
progress in the gender equalization of education, while other entire areas, 
such as West Africa, continue to lag behind in educational participation of 
women (UNICEF 2005). Why do some countries seem to be well poised 
to follow educational leaders in closing gender gaps in education, whereas 
others lag behind in this catch-up? This dissertation sets out to improve our 
understanding of factors that are relevant for explaining divergences in female 
education. Gaps in female education are always relative to male education and 
hence a wider understanding of the basic drivers of education is needed. As 
such, this research explores how gender equality in education fits within overall 
educational participation. 
      In addition, the relationship between education and women’s empowerment 
receives a central role, because access to education is often related to the level 
of empowerment. Empowerment is the expansion of people’s ability to make 
strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to 
them (Kabeer 1999). Education increases cognitive and non-cognitive skills, 
improves productivity and provides individuals with a greater planning capacity 
1      In 67 countries women outnumber men in higher education, and this pattern is spreading even beyond 
the high-income countries (Becker, Hubbard, and Murphy 2010). However, the concentration of the gender 
reversal in higher education may indicate that it may be a small proportion of (wealthy) women engage in 
education for a long period of time. 
1 INTRODUCTION
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(Sen 1999; The World Bank 2011).2 Education thus empowers by increasing 
agency, the capacity of women and men to make important life decisions 
independently. Cross-country empirical investigations show that in many 
countries, women’s agency compared to men s´ is lower; they lack decision-
making power, and hence are less empowered compared to men (see for 
thorough literature reviews: The World Bank 2011; Klugman et al. 2014). This in 
turn affects their access to resources like education and further development 
of their human capital. However, like Kabeer stresses in her work, an important 
aspect of the empowerment process is the context in which it takes place. 
Countless studies focus on education as a tool to increase agency. Yet, from 
a macro-perspective, relatively few studies focus on the issue that access to 
empowering resources like education are limited by the societal context and by 
historical gender norms. 
 
      There is a reversed causality in the relationship between women’s education 
and agency. Education enables women’s agency and empowerment, but at the 
same time, women s´ access to education is unequal. One of the goals of this 
dissertation, and of the wider project of which this research is part of, is to map 
women’s agency and their relative bargaining position to men.3 I zoom in on 
the family as an institution to provide information on the historical valuation of 
women. A deeper understanding of the root of women’s (dis)empowerment may 
help to explain current differences in educational attainment, and the difficulty of 
current development policy to increase girl’s participation in schools. 
Why should we care about the gender gap?
Its intrinsic justice can foremost defend gender equality in education. Women, 
as well as men, share the same basic human rights. Both are entitled to the 
same resources and similar levels of agency, the combination of which are 
called capabilities (Kabeer 1999; Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2003; Robeyns 2003; 
Kok 2015). Educational access and participation enable capabilities and is a 
fundamental entitlement for all individuals. Next to arguments of social justice 
and equity, gender equality in education generates economic and social 
benefits. 
2      Cognitive skills are educational directly measurable outcomes, like literacy attainment and 
mathematics scores. Non-cognitive skills proxy for a range of positive academic behaviors including study 
skills, time management, and social and academic problem-solving skills. 
3      This research is part of the project, “Agency, gender and world development 1850 – 2010”. 
http://www.cgeh.nl/agency-gender-and-economic-development-world-economy-1850-2000 
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      First, gender inequalities in education affect the human capital stock of a 
population, and thus the economic potential of a workforce. Human capital is 
defined as the knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied in 
individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic well-
being (Keeley 2007, 29). Macroeconomic growth models stress the inclusion 
of human capital as essential to sustained economic growth (Schultz 1961; 
Lucas Jr. 1988; Romer 1990).4 Gender inequality in education negatively affects 
long-term economic growth directly by lowering the average level of human 
capital (Klasen 2002). Contemporary economic growth is skill demanding, and 
when women receive less education then men, the full potential of the active 
economic labor force remains unutilized (Dollar and Gatti 1999; Klasen 2002). 
In addition, general rates of return to education are stronger when women are 
included, and women benefit individually by receiving stronger private returns 
from labor market participation (Psacharopoulos 1994). Indirectly, gender 
inequalities in education affect the potential for fertility decline, a hypothesized 
important influence on educational attainment (Becker 1991). 
      Third, next to economic benefits to gender equality in education, there 
are strong social benefits to women’s inclusion. Maternal education has been 
found to improve knowledge of health care (Barrera 1990) and household 
efficiency (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982). As a result, higher educational 
attainment for women is associated with lower child and maternal mortality, 
lowered age at marriage, and intergenerational returns to education (Schultz 
1988; Strauss and Thomas 1995). An important aspect of women’s education 
specifically is related to their role as mothers, and as key individuals in the 
intergenerational transfer of health, education and general well-being to their 
children (Currie and Moretti 2003; King et al. 1986; Schultz 1988; Strauss and 
Thomas 1995). Empirical evidence suggests that women are inclined to favor 
children in resource allocation behavior, relative to men (Doss 2012; Hoddinott 
and Haddad 1995; Thomas 1994; Glick and Sahn 2000; Currie and Moretti 
2003). In some instances, mothers are even predisposed to channel resources 
specifically to their daughters (Thomas 1994; Glick and Sahn 2000; Currie 
and Moretti 2003). Thus, when women receive more education, entire future 
generations may benefit. 
4      These studies focus on human capital as instrumental to economic productivity solely. 
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      Fourth, women’s gender inequality in education relates to their inequalities 
in other areas of life. Gender discrimination in education relates to inequalities 
in women’s political participation, and these political inequalities, in turn, are 
associated with low structural investments in women (Brown 2004; Dollar 
and Gatti 1999). Increasing women’s education can strengthen their position 
within the household and increase their relative bargaining power vis-à-
vis other family members (Jejeebhoy 1995; Handa 1996; Doss 2012). The 
capabilities approach, an approach to welfare economics now widely employed 
in development policy, stresses that the utilization of an individuals’ potential 
(capabilities), starts with increasing one’s knowledge and opportunities. 
Education can serve this goal (Jejeebhoy 1995; Sen 1999). Thus, education 
does not only increase the bargaining power of an individual within the 
household, it may also increase a person’s bargaining power to the other 
institutional structures at large. 
      In short, from a social, economic, and social justice perspective, there 
are many benefits to female education. Still, closing educational gender gaps 
proves to be difficult (Fiske and UNESCO 2012; The World Bank 2011). The 
next section deals with the different theoretical perspectives available on the 
proposed drivers of education and reasons for women’s exclusion.
 
 
Multiple academic fields engage in the discussion on the drivers and 
obstructions to (female) education. Education has been approached from 
an economic perspective, a social / conflict theory perspective and most 
recently from a new institutional economical perspective. As a starting point, 
the economic viewpoint has dominated this debate for the last fifty years. 
The economic perspective ranges from macroeconomic growth models 
to microeconomic household bargaining models that treat the family as an 
economic organization. Since endogenous growth models started stressing 
the capacity of human capital to increase labor productivity, education has 
become a vital part of explaining differences in economic growth (Becker 1965; 
Schultz 1975; Lucas Jr. 1988). The role of economic returns to education, either 
private or collective, is central. As industrialization and modernization progress, 
complexity in social and technological organization increases. Since the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain, new occupations required more elaborate skills 
1.1   Theoretical perspectives on the determinants  
        of (female) education
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and subsequently required longer years of schooling (Schultz 1988; Parrado 
1998; Galor and Weil 1999).5 
      An essential part of the economic perspective is the trade-off from child 
quantity (number of children) to child quality (higher educational attainment per 
child).6 It features prominently since Nobel Prize laureate Gary Becker applied 
economic theory to the private field of the family (Becker 1965; Becker 1991). 
Becker treats the household as an economic unit, which is geared towards 
maximizing returns to household investments. He claims decisions concerning 
education, childcare, labor participation and fertility are made as rational 
economic decisions. Thus, when increases in education will generate economic 
higher returns, households will try to increase such investment per child. 
Limiting the number of children in order to raise educational investments per 
child is one of the possible strategies.
      Becker’s trade-off theory has been attacked on many grounds, not in 
the least on the basis that different members within the household may have 
different preferences, and that conflicts over the allocation of household 
resources are more frequent than Becker’s theory suggests. Women especially 
might not share similar preferences as men (Spitze 1988; Barnett and Hyde 
2001). Nor is the relationship as economically straightforward as it may seem. 
Low skill demand and low wages may imply a large family size, but other 
preferences like personal leisure, female health, and spending more time per 
child are not accounted for. Japan, for instance, had a relatively long history 
of small family size, even before industrialization during the Meiji period (Saito 
2000; Drixler 2013). Still, the model is a key element of the Unified Growth 
Theory (UGT) as the key mechanism for the nineteenth and twentieth century 
shift from a situation of Malthusian stagnation toward sustained growth (Galor 
and Weil 2000; Galor 2005).7 According to UGT, as technological innovation 
raises returns to education, parents were incentivized to have fewer children 
5      In her dissertation, de Pleijt found the average amount of human capital had a positive impact on 
economic development in the pre-industrial era, but not during the Industrial Revolution. She identified a 
decrease in the average years of education and shows it were mainly the highly trained professionals that 
contributed to progress and industrialization (see eg. de Pleijt and Weisdorf 2014). 
6      In this context, quality is an instrumental term for the amount of education an individual has received, 
and has nothing to do with the quality of education received, or with the intrinsic value of a higher or lower 
educated individual. 
7     Malthusian stagnation is a situation where technological or other advances lead to population increase, 
but resources fail to keep up with population growth, therefore stagnating when a ceiling of subsistence is 
reached.
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while investing more in their education (Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav 
2002). As a result, parents demanded education, which incentivized states to 
increase educational provision and spending. 
      
      From an economic perspective, gender differences in education come from 
differences in the remuneration and demand for female labor. The expected 
returns to education are gender-specific and remittances towards female 
education are generally lower than male’s (Schultz 1993b). Limited access to 
the labor market and wage differentials, in combination with schooling costs, 
can limit girls’ revenues and can undercut investments in girls by prioritizing 
boys. Some authors suggest this situation stems from a natural division of 
labor within the household: men had a strength advantage and women’s role 
in reproduction forced her for some measure of time out of the labor market 
(Murdock and Provost 1973). Others suggest it were the dominant agricultural 
practices and the use of the plough that initiated such gendered divergences, 
which persisted over time (Alesina, Giuliano, & Nunn, 2013). Whatever the 
reason, when women spend less time on the labor market due to such domestic 
specialization, their earning potential and job opportunities were affected, which 
may discourage investment in female human capital (Becker 1985, 198). 
      But do such gender differences in education, remuneration and labor 
demand not change in the course of development? Development, technological 
innovation and modernization are argued to bring systematic predictable 
changes in gender roles (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 10). The rise of an 
economy that is less brawn-oriented and more brain-oriented promotes female 
educational attainment and labor force participation. UGT argues that as the 
economy becomes increasingly education demanding, women’s historical 
brawn disadvantage compared to men disappears. This could raise the relative 
wages and would make it more attractive to have less children and invest more 
in education (Galor and Weil 1996). As development progresses, women 
leave the labor market during the expansion of industrialization, as it did in 
the nineteenth century in the United States (Goldin 1990). Women return to 
the paid labor market again with the expansion of the service sector, either 
because there is no cultural stigma to new service occupations (Goldin 1994) 
or because women may have a comparative advantage in fields as home 
services (Ngai and Petrongolo 2014). In its core, the economic perspective 
offers a useful framework of the supply and demand for education. Nonetheless, 
education serves not only economic purposes. 
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      From a social perspective, classic Conflict Theory and social institutionalism 
have offered explanations for the advancement of education systems. They 
illustrate that existing motives for educational provision may have been non-
economic, and there is a complexity and conflict between actors and institutions 
on both micro and macro level. Conflict Theory shows schooling may be used 
as a tool for the reproduction of the ideology of the dominant classes and the 
imposition of that ideology on all other areas of society (Bourdieu and Passeron 
1990). Girls’ inclusion in education is necessary from this perspective as 
education allows for the reproduction of women’s role within society. Girls’ 
general access to schooling in combination with a severe ‘restriction of choice’ 
in discipline shapes female labor opportunities (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, 
229). Patriarchal notions towards women’s role in society were thus reproduced 
similarly to social inequalities such as class distinctions, with an education 
system that aimed at maintaining the status quo (Mannathoko 1999; Sikes 
and Measor 1992). In sum, conflict and competition between different classes 
and status groups led to greater educational expansion. Such conflicts and 
competition did not only happen within nations, but also between nations and 
different international actors. 
      Social institutionalism shows that educational development was the result of 
emerging global institutions, international organizations and the rise of a world 
culture in the period following the Second World War. Since the rise of mass 
education in the nineteenth and twentieth century, the state or polity was the 
main actor in the supply of the legal and physical infrastructure of education.8 
A body of work from the 1980s and 1990s relates the expansion of mass 
schooling during the nineteenth and twentieth century to the consolidation 
of national identity (Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985; Ramirez and Boli 1987; 
Soysal and Strang 1989). Countries outside Europe internalized the educational 
system to be able to integrate into the world order and to compete within an 
increasingly interconnecting world system. Female education is contextualized 
by the socio-cultural environment (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992; Meyer 
et al. 1997; Wiseman 2008). In this view, mass education is not driven from 
below, from specific local demands or needs, but is the result of a general 
ideological and institutional arrangement that structures modern societies top-
down. Governments sought to expand mass education for their own reasons, 
8      Mass education is an educational system that aims to ensure basic education to all children in society. 
These types of systems are generally set-up and developed by the state. A compulsory education law can 
be seen as a first initiative to set up a mass education system
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catalyzed by global pressures for competition and status. These motives would 
not always align with preferences of different societal groups and (religious) 
institutions, which could impose strong restrictions on the shape of mass 
education (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992; Ramirez and Boli 1987; Soysal 
and Strang 1989). Global pressures intensified after the Second World War, 
when gender egalitarian standards became an institutionalized component of 
global organizations like UNESCO.9 A world culture took shape that stressed 
gender equality in education and required governments to observe and 
identify gendered inequality (Wiseman 2008). In sum, governments face a 
complex bargaining process, which leads to a broadly similar result - a mass 
education system - yet each with a distinct historical and cultural contingent 
shape. Explanations provided by the conflict theory and social institutionalism 
perspectives provide a strong explanation ‘from above’ for the expansion and 
shape of mass education on a macro level. Yet, it is little informative on the 
workings at the micro and meso levels where women face cultural restrictions 
in access to school, which can be persistent notwithstanding international 
pressures. 
      New Institutional Economics (NIE) focuses on institutions as the ‘rules 
of the game’, which are understood as both the formal legal rules and the 
informal social norms that govern individual behavior and structure social 
interactions (North 1981; 1990). In this way, these institutions assign different 
(gender) roles to each individual. For instance, the family can be seen as such 
an institution. Within a family, women have a particular role assigned to them, 
with corresponding activities, responsibilities and access to resources. On 
the basis of the assigned role and social position, resources such as health 
or educational investment are made available, which can aid of frustrate the 
capacity to exercise decision-making. Furthermore, such gender differences 
generated by informal ‘rules’ shape women’s skills-set and participation in all 
domains of society (Mukhopadhyay, Hunter, and Milward 2013). 
      We know these ‘rules’ also as cultural norms. Cultural norms, values and 
preferences can be seen as informal institutions, as unwritten codes of conduct 
9      For example, the right to education for all has been recognized in Article 26 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 , and was specifically readdressed in the UNESCO Convention 
against Discrimination in Education (1966) and CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 1979). For and overview of these and other conventions see A Human 
Rights Based Approach to Education For All (UNESCO and UNICEF, 2007, 109). 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
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that underlie and supplement formal rules (Folbre 1994; North 1990). Cultural 
beliefs converge and become commonly known through the socialization 
process by which culture is unified, maintained, and communicated (Greif 1994, 
915). Culture thus forms an important, yet hard to quantify, informal institution 
that helps to explain the role women play in society, but also has consequences 
for macro-economic behavior. The role of persistent, informal institutions that 
operate at the micro-level is shown to be related to current-day economic and 
development outcomes (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013; Tabellini, 2010). By looking 
at cultural traits such as trust, individualism and collectivism, family ties, or even 
different agricultural methods and their implications for the gendered division 
labor, scholars try to capture the cross-cultural differences in beliefs and values 
regarding the appropriate role of women in society (Alesina and Giuliano 2013; 
Tabellini 2010; Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013). Throughout this dissertation, 
one institution in particular is considered extremely relevant for education: the 
family. The family, either the parents, or others involved in household decisions, 
makes crucial schooling decisions even before the child is at an age to decide 
for itself (Deng et al. 2014; Anderson, Case, and Lam 2001). 
      The institutional perspective, as pioneered by North, adds to both the 
economic and the social perspective. The economic perspective is limited in 
its explanation of growth and in its inclusion of gender, whereas institutional 
economics addresses the relation of property rights of different actors, and 
sometimes, women’s access to it. The social perspective excels in teasing 
out the nodes of class, gender, ethnicity and the opposing forces of the 
powerful and the powerless. However, the institutional perspective allows for 
similar conjunctions from a bottom-up view, instead of focusing on structural 
oppression. In those terms, new institutional economics is compatible with 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach, as it can pinpoint those rules 
and norms that obstruct an individual’s agency to choose (education). Lastly, 
the social perspective’s view on development as progressing from conflict is 
thoroughly negative. Subjects like altruism, democracy, civil rights, and other 
positive aspects of society are reduced to designs to control the masses, 
not as interests in preserving social order and stimulating wellbeing. In other 
words, the institutional perspective is better able to cope with the complexity of 
actors that are involved in determining education, can integrate aspects of the 
economic and social perspectives, and is better compatible with concepts of 
capability and agency, on top of being a less negative world perspective. 
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In the following section I will focus on teasing out the gaps in our understanding 
in concerning factors influencing educational attainment. What are the 
major determinants of educational attainment? And what effect do historical 
institutions have, especially on the gender balance in education? I focus on the 
factors that emerge from the literature as influential to educational participation. 
Such factors may be categorized into three different institutional settings. 
These are 1) the economy, concerning the impact of wealth and poverty and the 
regulations of the labor market; 2) the political domain, specifically institutional 
inclusiveness and legislative powers and, 3) cultural institutions, most 
prominently the family. From these, I collect major questions and pinpoint those 
factors of interest for this study. 
      The most important factor for educational attainment, both for boys and 
girls, is the level of wealth. Though it is a strong predictor of educational 
participation a few issues arise when studying the relationship between 
wealth and education. First, there are two related measurement issues in the 
relationship between educational expansion and income, namely the issue 
of reversed causality and of different outcomes at the macro and micro level. 
Second, there is the problem of a “poverty trap” in the relationship between 
education and income, where poor parents will continue a pattern of low 
educational investment in their children. Third, the relationship between income 
and education cannot be understood without the direct and opportunity costs 
to children s´ education. Fourth, the effect of wealth and income affects the 
educational attainment of both genders differently across societies. Female 
educational participation is thought to be related to the extent of female labor 
force participation and the stage of the economy. 
      First, the relationship between educational expansion and income suffers 
from reversed causality and of different robustness in outcomes at macro and 
micro level. Figure 1.1 shows a scatterplot between educational attainment in 
average years of education and GDP per capita. The relationship is fairly linear: 
as GDP per capita increases, so does average years of education. However, 
numerous studies show a reversed causality where increases in education 
are constructive to economic growth (Galor and Weil 1999; Cohen and Soto 
2007).
1.2   The determinants of educational attainment and the knowledge   
        gaps in our understanding
1.2.1  The economy: poverty and labor force participation
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Figure 1.1  Scatterplot GDP per capita and average years of education between 1850 
                 and 2010
Source: Clio-infra indicators (2014) www.clio-infra.net 
Note: Using 135 countries and 1188 observations 
      The issue of reversed causality is mostly a problem at the macro level. 
In addition to reversed causality, there is a general discrepancy in the 
relationship between income and education at the macro-level and the micro-
level. On the micro-level, the relationship is quite robust (Cuaresma 2008). 
For example, results from rural China in 1997, pinpoint household poverty as 
the main determinant of children’s dropout in school (Brown and Park 2002). 
Akyeampong (2009) finds that poor families fail to send their children to school, 
due to resource constraints and opportunity costs of children’s (domestic) 
labor. This is even when free and compulsory education is introduced, as in 
Ghana in 1995. For the US between 1972 and 1992, Acemoglu and Pischke 
(2001) find that income increases are associated with increases of attending a 
four-year college. Countless other studies find similar results (Clemens 2004). 
Conversely, at a macro level, the relationship between education and per capita 
income is not as robust, and the causation of the effect of rising income on 
education is questioned. While authors like  Schultz (1988) and Ram (1999) 
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show using cross-country evidence that demand for education rises with 
income per capita, most scholarly attention has focused on the relationship 
from expanding education to economic growth. A wide range of papers support 
this relationship (Lucas Jr. 1988; Cohen and Soto 2007; Acemoglu 2012), but 
it is at the macro level that the causality of the relationship is most disputed. 
Some authors found a limited correlation between growth and increases in 
educational attainment (Benhabib and Spiegel 1994). Others show the impact 
of education on growth is not the same in all countries (Temple 1999; Pritchett 
2001). Without going into the technical details of this component of the growth 
debate, the results of several decades of research show that human capital 
and income (whether national or personal) have a reinforcing effect. It also 
shows that education as a growth determinant explains too little of the variation, 
at least on the macro-level, to account for economic growth and vice versa 
(Easterly 2002). This indicates that other structural and institutional factors are 
important as well, for instance, policy, changes in parental preferences or the 
costs of children’s schooling. 
 
      Second, the relationship between education and income suffers from a 
‘poverty trap’. A large body of current-day literature shows that next to parental 
income, parental education is the most robust predictor of educational 
attainment (for a review see: Clemens 2004). Parental preferences change 
under influence of education. However, if educated individuals have a 
comparative advantage in raising educated children, then the poor will sustain 
a pattern of low educational investment their offspring. There may even be 
another feedback loop, wherein parents with low education generally display 
a preference for higher fertility, thus further diluting the resources to human 
capital investment for the next generation (Moav 2005). This equilibrium 
can exist even when skilled labor demand is high, because poor parents are 
constrained by their capacity to grasp educational opportunities and by the 
resources to do so. In addition, the direct and opportunity costs to children’s 
labor play a role in such decisions. 
      Third, though wealth may contribute to children s´ schooling, the costs 
of children’s education are a complicating factor, especially in the early 
stages of educational expansion. In her 2010 monograph, Humphries (2010) 
systematically analyzed over 600 autobiographies, providing a unique 
perspective on the costs of education within eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Britain. It shows that parents largely carried the direct costs of education, even 
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after public investment in schooling infrastructure after the 1833 compulsory 
education legislation. The direct costs were, however, massively dwarfed by the 
opportunity costs to children’s education. In a later article, Humphries (2013) 
shows the importance of child labor for the early phases of industrialization 
in Britain, Belgium, France, parts of Prussia, and the United States. Such 
findings are corroborated by other scholars for different European countries 
(Cunningham and Viazzo 1996) and for late twentieth century India (Weiner 
1991). A solution to direct and indirect costs to children’s education may be 
by increases in wages or by adjusting fertility, which will be discussed further 
below. 
 
      Fourth, evidence suggests women’s educational attainment is not readily 
explained by increases in income, but more by changing norms and the 
development of the tertiary sector that drives demand for skilled female labor. 
The 2012 world development report ties together an impressive amount of 
empirical work that shows that higher incomes by themselves do little to reduce 
gender gaps in education (World Bank 2011). Income shocks have gender-
differentiated impacts on education and whether they affect girls or boys 
depends on the underlying structure of the local economy. This local economy 
is shaped by the type of labor opportunities but also by cultural norms regarding 
women’s role in work and social life. 
 
      Boserup (1970) proposed an influential model on the relationship between 
education, female labor force participation and development. She argues there 
is a U-shaped curve in the relationship between female labor force participation 
and economic development. In the first stages of development, women work 
in home production. When production shifts to extra-domestic employment 
in factories and firms, women’s costs to employment are higher compared to 
men’s, as women generally carry the primary caregiving responsibilities. In this 
stage, men enjoy privileged access to education and new technologies and 
displace women from the labor force. However, she claims that as development 
progresses, women also gain access to education and technologies. With 
the development of the tertiary sector, commercial and service occupations 
integrate women into the labor market. As the economy becomes more skill-
intensive, the demand for a more educated labor force intensifies. Plus, 
women’s work becomes easier to combine with domestic responsibilities 
through technological improvements (e.g. the vacuum cleaner, the laptop and 
the contraceptive pill), and rearrangements in both timing and location of work 
23
(Becker 1991; Goldin and Katz 2000; Bailey 2006; Tam 2011). Goldin, and 
later Tam, substantiate the claims of the U-shape relationship between using 
longitudinal data for the U.S. from 1950 onwards (Goldin 1995; Tam 2011).
 
      The question is whether the U-shape theory is indeed a universal 
explanation for the relationship between women’s labor, development and 
educational attainment. Several authors found limited evidence for this U-shape 
in a wide variety of countries (Dilli, Rijpma, and Carmichael 2015; Verme 
2014). Do women indeed gain equal access to education as development 
progresses? The issue is that women’s limited access to education and labor is 
contextualized by the predominant culture. An example of how different norms 
alter the shape of the U-curve is the age at marriage. The U-shape reflects 
married women’s access to and participation in work, which makes the timing 
of the marriage important. Within Goldin’s example of the U.S., the family 
structure allowed women to educate and work freely before marriage in the 
upswing of the U-turn (the 1950s). Relative late marriage gave girls sufficient 
time to engage in such activities, in those places in the world where the age at 
marriage is lower, this obstacle must first be overcome. Another case in point 
is the male breadwinner model that spread throughout Western societies in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century that placed ideological and institutional 
constraints on women’s work outside the home (Horrell and Humphries 1997). 
The difficulties families faced when men were the sole providers illustrates the 
strength of such ideologies (Humphries 2013; Van Poppel, Van Dalen, and 
Walhout 2009). While we know of such cultural constraints, we are in need of 
a way to quantify such cultural differences affecting women’s engagement in 
employment and education.  
 
      In summary, wealth is an important driver of educational attainment, but 
more is needed that an increase in wealth to effectively raise girl’s engagement 
in education. What drives educational attainment is highly contextualized. Of 
importance is who builds the schools and who gains access to those schools. 
In addition, the cultural factors that play a role in the decisions surrounding 
women’s education are paramount.  
 
      Governmental institutions responsible for educational policy determine the 
shape and inclusiveness of the schooling system. A major question is whether 
there is a relationship between the inclusiveness of political institutions and 
1.2.2  Political institutions 
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educational participation. Since the late nineteenth century the nation state 
largely monopolized educational supply. Low schooling participation may be 
the result of poverty or other financial limitations, yet, it may also be the effect 
of state choices in the allocation of public funds. Inclusive political institutions 
may promote mass education because it is a redistributive policy of public 
expenditure. Inclusive political institutions uphold an inclusive legal framework 
and are therefore more likely to pass legislation in favor of (mass) education. 
Some authors find a strong link from the spread of political voice and the extent 
of enfranchisement to the rise of tax-based primary education (Lindert 2004; 
Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff 2009; Engerman, Sokoloff, and Mariscal 
2011).10 
 
      Despite a strong correlation between education and democracy, this does 
not preclude the potential of autocratic regimes to install mass education. 
For example, Japanese education expanded greatly after an oligarchic regime 
took power after the Meiji restoration in 1868 (van der Vleuten 2009). Lindert 
(2004) argues that fuller political rights tend to contribute to a higher education 
stock, but that several dictatorships in the 1880–1937 era, and similar 
communist dictatorships, did more to promote education than less oppressive 
autocracies or elitist democracies where fewer than half of adults were allowed 
to vote (Lindert 2004, 1:50). Meyer et al. (1977) argued that development 
strategies may vary across countries, but every national elite understands that 
the development process requires rational planning and technically trained 
personnel. Such explanations do not explain women’s inclusion in mass 
education. Political institutions were rarely gender inclusive and women’s 
enfranchisement only took off around the turn of the twentieth century. Whether 
the demand for increased educational opportunity for women will emerge 
automatically as countries democratize remains unclear.  
 
      An inclusive legal framework may aid female educational participation, in its 
most direct form by making education compulsory for both girls and boys. The 
effectiveness of compulsory education legislation, and related legislation limiting 
child labor, are debated. For example, in the history of the U.S., earlier research 
found compulsory schooling legislation and child labor laws to contribute 
little to the long-term trends in schooling due to lack of enforcement (Landes 
10     This in turn may lead to virtuous cycle effect as a higher human capital stock positively influences 
democracy and political institutions (Glaeser et al. 2004), though the latter direction of causality is
contested (Acemoglu et al. 2005). 
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and Solmon 1972; Eisenberg 1988). Factors like rising parental incomes and 
increases in the returns to schooling were hypothesized to have played a larger 
role. Conversely, more current research has shown that such legislation at 
the turn of the century did in fact significantly raise attendance rates (Angrist 
and Krueger 1990; Margo and Finegan 1996; Clay, Lingwall, and Stephens Jr. 
2012; Lingwall 2014a). Systematic cross-country evidence on the effectiveness 
of legislation directed at increasing children’s school attendance is lacking, 
especially with a historical and international scope. Where there is some work 
available, these are either single case studies (Cunningham and Viazzo 1996; 
Self 2011; Humphries 2013 ch. 5) or cross-country comparison focused 
on Western Europe (Murtin and Viarengo 2011). The effectiveness of such 
legislation depends on the determination of the government to include girls and 
enforce girl’s attendance as well as on the practical opportunities to do so. This 
latter relates to the national income, family income and children’s contributions 
to the household budget. In addition, it relates to the educational infrastructure, 
such as the availability of female teachers, an issue in those contexts where 
boys and girls need to be taught separately (Nurullah and Naik 1951, 392–95). 
      In short, there are some gaps in understanding the effect of inclusive 
institutions on educational participation and the effectiveness of legislation. 
Chapter 2 will deal with the effectiveness of legislation. The last institutional 
setting from which important drivers of educational participation emanate is the 
family.  
 
If evidence for the impact of income, legislation and inclusive institutions 
is mixed, what factor can be included to explain educational variation? The 
relation between educational attainment and the family makes sense intuitively, 
as education happens at a young age and it is the family that carries primary 
care responsibility. Family is a relevant area of investigation because it is 1) the 
area of bargaining processes for resources like education and 2) because the 
family as an institution transfers and perpetuates culturally determined gender 
norms. This latter makes it a useful way to get some grasp the illusive concept 
of cultural norms.  
 
      First, the family is the context where bargaining processes take place. One 
aspect of this bargaining process has already been mentioned above, namely 
the hypothesized relationship between the number of children and educational 
1.2.3   The family 
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attainment (the QQT). Demographers and economists are not in agreement as 
to why the QQT occurred. On the one hand, demographers argue that a rapid 
fertility decline in European countries, and some Western offshoots, in the late 
nineteenth century was the result of two centuries of child mortality decline, and 
later adult mortality decline. As a response, couples willingly adjusted family 
size, by means of delaying marriage and by controlling births within marriage 
(Reher 2011). On the other hand, economists argue that the future benefits of 
educational attainment set in motion such a transition, by providing incentives 
to limiting family size (Becker 1991; Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav 
2002). If this latter would be the case, one should be able to find a robust link 
between family size and educational attainment. Some initial evidence exists of 
this link in historical studies, but these are few, they are preliminary work, and 
they concentrate on Western-European countries only (Becker, Cinnirella, and 
Woessmann 2010; Klemp and Weisdorf 2011; Basso 2013).  
 
      Family members compete over resources, like education, in a bargaining 
process. The QQT is an example of an outcome of such a bargaining process. 
More specifically, while the entire family may be involved in the bargaining 
process, often the most important actors for educational bargaining are 
those that live in the same household. A household is defined as of one or 
more persons living together who make a common provision for food or other 
essentials for living and need not to be related (but often are). Not all household 
or family members have similar fertility preferences, especially in complex 
households (Bankole 1995), but neither do they have similar preferences in 
educational investment decisions. Mothers may have different preferences 
than fathers (Leibowitz 1977), and numerous empirical studies show that 
mothers tend to allocate a higher share of resources towards their children 
compared to fathers (Doss 2012; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Thomas 1994; 
Glick and Sahn 2000; Currie and Moretti 2003; Aslam and Kingdon 2012). 
For this reason, the stimulation of the bargaining position of girls and women, 
and specifically by means of increasing female education, are currently policy 
targets (The World Bank 2011, 104-117-323; Klugman et al. 2014, 53–56).11 
To make such targeting successful, there is increasing recognition that the 
family should be viewed as an institution that governs the bargaining position 
of women, as addressed by Amartya Sen (Sen 1987; Sen 1989). In Sen’s 
11    In addition, women’s increased education is associated with lower maternal and child mortality, better 
child nutrition and overall better child health (Behrman and Wolfe 1989; John C. Caldwell 1994; Aslam and 
Kingdon 2012; Makoka 2013).
27
(1989) article, he argues that institutional economic household models, like the 
QQT models by Becker (Becker 1964; Becker 1965; Becker and Lewis 1973; 
Becker 1985), avoid the problem of conflict within the family, downplay gender 
roles therein and therefore lack an understanding of the family as an institution. 
A low valuation of female status and the inability to make independent decisions 
within the family leads to an inferior bargaining position of women compared to 
men (Sen 1989, 70). Various empirical micro-level studies show that women’s 
status within the family and overall well-being can increase with women’s 
greater role in outside (remunerated) activities. However, gender roles within the 
family have historical origins. 
 
      In the past decade, the investigation of the family as an institution has been 
on the rise within the context of New Institutional Economics (Greif 2006; 
Greif and Tabellini 2011; Duranton, Rodríguez-Pose, and Sandall 2009; Tur-
Prats 2014). The family is a powerful institution, which is at the basis of the 
socialization process that communicates and perpetuates culturally determined 
roles. Cultural norms concerning family life determine gender roles. These, 
in turn, form social expectations about the appropriate role of women within 
society, with specific entitlements, duties and responsibilities. Gender roles 
in turn, determine the space of female agency within the family. Agency is 
defined as the capacity of an individual to make important life decisions, such 
as marriage, fertility and employment decisions and decisions concerning 
educational investment. For example, a nineteenth century Western-European 
woman had the space to choose her marriage partner or delay marriage. This 
meant she had time to engage in wage work and human capital formation (for 
example as a household servant) (Hajnal 1965; De Moor and Van Zanden 
2010). This would be unthinkable in the larger part of China at the same time 
(Engelen and Wolf 2005). Such common rules, norms, and behavioral patterns 
that systematically enhance or diminish the agency of family members, in 
particular women, can be regionally mapped and quantified in the form of ‘family 
systems’ (Kok 2015).   
      The use of family systems as a category of analysis is not new, yet using 
them to gauge female agency is a recent development.12 That family systems 
can carry gender aspects has been recognized. Mason (2001) discussed 
family systems and gender systems as separate but overlapping. Todd (1987) 
12    For a full review of the different elements that may underlie the make-up of family systems, see (Kok 
2015).
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observes from his global classification of family systems that those systems 
with a high authority of women show an association with the male literacy 
rate. Das Gupta (1999; 1995; 2009), also in cooperation with Basu (2001), 
shows that Asian family systems as clusters of patrifocal and traditional norms 
maintain son preference even in the face of modernization. This persistence is 
what may make family systems a useful historical tool of analysis. The normative 
underpinnings of such family systems alter very slowly, and its influence on 
political participation or even marriage patterns is still visible after centuries 
(Lynch 1991; Duranton, Rodríguez-Pose, and Sandall 2009). Consequently, this 
study will in part use these systems as institutions to explain persistent informal 
institutions like gender norms. 
The conceptual model for this dissertation is influenced by the framework of 
the 2012 World Development Report on the interactions between households, 
markets and institutions on gender equality in education (The World Bank 
2011). Their framework is explained by figure 1.2. As countries develop, 
economic structures change and new opportunities for women’s employment 
become available, which may incentivize households to invest in their girls. 
Increasing development can cause governments to raise investments in 
educational infrastructure, which helps to overcome some of the costs of 
educational access for households. When all these institutional settings work 
together, the gears start turning in figure 1.2, leading to a closing of gender 
education gaps. However, bottlenecks can appear in any of these channels, 
such as son preferences within the household, or a government that fails to 
supply or enforce education. Policy may lubricate the green gears that represent 
the household, political and market institutions.13 These green gears are 
interesting factors, as discussed in the literature above, which need to be taken 
into account in the analysis. However, a major area of interest in this dissertation 
is the impact of the grey gear of informal institutions on female education 
specifically. When they refuse to turn, could this hamper female educational 
participation?  
13     An example of oiling the households would be the conditional cash transfers used in more than 30 
countries worldwide, of which many explicitly target girls (The World Bank 2011, 10). 
1.3  Conceptual framework and research questions
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Figure 1.2 Gender educational outcomes result from interactions between households, markets 
                and institutions
Source: (The World Bank 2011, 11) 
With this rationale in mind, the main research question is the following:
1.    What caused increases in schooling in the world economy for the last        
       century-and-a-half, especially female schooling?
To answer this question, the following sub questions will be discussed:
A.   What is the role of institutional arrangements, specifically that of    
      legislation regarding children’s school attendance?
B.   How do different household structures affect educational outcomes?
C.   What influences women’s participation or exclusion in education? 
Before elaborating on how the chapters will tie together these questions in 
section 1.5, the next section discusses the data sources and methodology. 
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The methodology employed in the chapters is a mix of quantitative analysis 
at the macro and micro level and makes use, to some extent, of qualitative 
evidence. For the statistical analysis of chapter 2, 4 and 5 aggregated macro-
level data is analyzed using different types of panel analysis. The exact 
methodologies are explained in the chapters. While 2 and 4 are cross-country 
comparisons, chapter 5 is a case-study of India, to see whether proposed 
predictors at a macro-level still hold for the intermediate intra-country state 
level. Similarly, chapter 3 is a quantitative study at the individual level, though 
it compares outcomes across countries as well. Data to substantiate the 
chapters’ claims comes from large individual datasets that can be found online, 
most notably IPUMS, NAPP and Mosaic data.14  
 
      A large share of the data comes from the data-hub CLIO-Infra.15 The Clio 
Infra hub provides datasets for the most important economic, demographic, 
social and institutional indicators since 1500, with an emphasis on data since 
1800. The data comes from thematic collaborations between economic 
and social historians from around the world. The collected data have been 
standardized, harmonized, and are publicly available through the Clio Infra 
portal. As each chapter will elaborate on the specific datasets used, further 
elaboration here would be superfluous. Still, as the focus of the dissertation is 
on data surrounding educational outcomes, I elaborate on these specific data 
here. First I provide a definition of education as used in this dissertation.   
 
      The focus of this dissertation is on formal education, unless specified 
otherwise. Formal education refers to the institutionalized education that takes 
place in schools, universities and other institutes of learning. Students attend 
classes supervised by professionally trained teachers (Schugurensky, 2000).  
Literacy can be learned in school, but also through informal schooling. Informal 
schooling refers to schooling that takes place outside the formal educational 
institutions and programs. This includes on-the-job training and learning to read 
and write at home or at church. Formal and informal schooling contribute to a 
person’s human capital. The OECD defines human capital as the knowledge, 
skills, competencies and attributes embodies in individuals that facilitate the 
14     IPUMS: https://international.ipums.org/international/ (Accessed May 26 2016).
NAPP: https://www.nappdata.org/napp/ (Accessed May 26 2016).
Mosaic: https://censusmosaic.org/ (Accessed May 26 2016).
15    For information on the various datasets and indicators, see: www.clio-infra.eu (Accessed May 26 2016).  
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creation of personal, social and economic well-being. Much of the economic 
literature focuses on the productive capacity of human capital, as an explanation 
of different increases in national output next to increases in land, hours of work, 
and physical capital (Schultz 1961). Quantifying educational outcomes is a 
difficult task, as Mitchell’s below testimony illustrates. 
Of all the subjects on which statistical materials exist, none (not even crime) 
show less uniformity, both over time and between countries, than education. 
(Mitchell 2007). 
 
     Depending on the data available, I (or we) use literacy rates (chapter 3 and 
5), enrolment ratios (chapter 3), or average years of education (chapter 2 and 
4). There are some strengths and weaknesses to each indicator. The period 
since the 1850s witnessed the rise of mass and formalized education. After 
this period, governments started tracking the literacy skills and enrollment of 
their population in censuses and surveys. By scoring whether people report 
their age correctly, numeracy can be calculated from surveys and censuses as 
well. Numeracy, the ability to comprehend and apply basic numeric concepts 
becomes a less attractive way to measure educational attainment, when literacy, 
enrolment and average years of education are also available.16 Numeracy 
provides very only basic information about one’s abilities, and can reach a 
maximum level complicating comparability between countries. Literacy may then 
be a better indicator, because it requires more skill than basic numeracy. 
 
      In this dissertation, literacy is defined as the ability of individuals to read 
and write a short text. The most common ages after which literacy is measured 
is after 0 (total population), 5, 7, 12 and 14 and 15 years old, depending on 
the country. Maintaining a strict definition of literacy is difficult, as ages and 
measurements may vary. The problems of comparing literacy data across 
countries have been well documented since international literacy statistics 
were first presented (UNESCO 1953). Often, literacy data were based on 
the reporting of survey respondents of their own abilities, or those of other 
household members, often without substantiating such claims with actually 
reading or writing a short text. Such self-reported literacy abilities tend to over-
estimate literacy skills. Some census takers did require reading or writing a 
short text, for example in India (Gait and Risley 1901). Due to the efforts of 
16    Though it is a very valuable statistic for when other educational statistics are lacking (see: Crayen and 
Baten 2010). 
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UNESCO, and the focus on the eradication of illiteracy during the 1950s to 
1960s, literacy was one of the first indicators to be systematically collected and 
that provided some indication of formal education outside Europe (UNESCO 
1951; UNESCO 1953; UNESCO 1957).
 
      Basic literacy may be an important aspect of someone’s planning capacity, 
for instance as a tool to structure one’s thoughts. However, for the promotion 
of economic development in modern economies, more elaborate skills are 
required. In addition, once the literacy ratio reaches a 100%, one has a scale 
that is capped at an upper value creating distortions in the data. Therefore it is 
useful as a basic indicator of earlier time periods or lesser-developed countries, 
but less so for countries further along in the development process. If education 
is indeed transferred intergenerational, as current-day empirical work suggests, 
then parental literacy will influence educational attainment in offspring and lead 
to higher educational stocks in future generations. To provide an indication, 
around 1890, 20 to 40% of the non-European populations of 15 years and over, 
and 60 to 70% of Europeans were literate (van Leeuwen and van Leeuwen-Li 
2014; UNESCO 1953, 169–72). 
 
      When available, enrolment ratios inform on access to education. Enrolment 
ratios are calculated by taking the number of students at a particular 
educational level and standardizing this figure by the relevant school age 
population. The measure can be preferred over literacy ratios, as it measures 
access to formal schooling, whereas literacy can also be obtained by non-formal 
schooling. The measure informs on direct access to education, but can also be 
used to calculate average years of education of a population. 
 
      For the period of 1850 to 2010, chapter 2 employs the CLIO-Infra dataset 
on average years of education, which is a combination of a dataset by van 
Leeuwen et al. and the Morrisson-Murtin dataset (van Leeuwen and van 
Leeuwen-Li 2014; Morrisson and Murtin 2009). For gender-specific average 
years of education, chapter 4 makes use of the Barro and Lee (2013) dataset 
for 1950-2010. Both datasets used are for the population 15 years and over. 
Average years were calculated by using existing educational estimates in 
the census by age class to project education attainment, and thus years of 
education, backward and forward. Various scholars employ this method, and it 
is viewed by the literature to produce the most reliable educational estimates 
(Cohen and Soto 2007; Morrisson and Murtin 2009; Barro and Lee 2013). 
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However, pre-1950 data is compiled using a less precise method, the perpetual 
inventory method, linked to the census data of the 1960s. In this method, 
census or survey observations are used to estimate the educational stock of 
the population over age 15 as a benchmark stocks. Estimates of new students 
are approximated using information on school-enrollment ratios and population 
structure over time, and added to the stock with an appropriate time lag. It is 
less precise because unlike the estimates for the 1950-2010 periods, it does 
not make use of educational attainment by age category, but simply takes age 
15 and calculates education backwards and forwards on the basis of this 
benchmark. Also, it does not account for alterations in the educational systems, 
which is available for the period after 1950. The details of the measurement 
method are explained in (van Leeuwen and van Leeuwen-Li 2014).  
 
      There are some drawbacks to the data on average years of education. 
The number of average years of schooling is not informative on the quality of 
education, or on the educational distribution, for example when there is a select 
group receiving a very large proportion of education (university and higher). A 
measurement issue is that standardization before 1950 comes at the cost of 
individual country differences. For example, in reality the mandatory start and 
end ages of primary and secondary schooling differ per country, but these years 
are standardized to facilitate cross-country and historic comparison (mostly 6 
years for primary education). Many assumptions underlie current datasets of 
average years of education, and different assumptions and calculation methods 
may problematize the hypothesized effects on the outcomes. The details of this 
technical debate have been discussed at length (Barro and Lee 1996; Pritchett 
2001; Cohen and Soto 2007; Leeuwen 2007; Barro and Lee 2010) and will not 
be repeated here.  
 
      There are also major benefits to these datasets on average years of 
education. Unlike any other educational proxy, it allows for the systematic, 
cross-country, long-term measurement of education beyond basic schooling. 
Thus, they are highly suitable for historical analysis aimed at cross-comparisons 
of countries. As such, the reasons for selecting the two datasets are 
straightforward. The CLIO-Infra dataset has been shown to be the one with the 
widest coverage, the longest time span and the using most reliable estimations 
methods according to current literature (Cohen and Soto 2007; van Leeuwen 
and van Leeuwen-Li 2014). The Barro and Lee dataset is the only reliable 
source of average years of education differentiated by gender. The methodology 
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of both dataset is also roughly comparable, especially after 1950, making it 
possible to make comparisons on the basis of the two datasets.17  
Four consecutive studies were designed and implemented to answer the 
research questions as discussed in section 1.4. 
 
      Chapter 2 will focus on the impact of two factors of global educational 
attainment between 1800 and 2006. The first is legislation, considering both 
child labor legislation and compulsory education legislation. Such legislation 
affects the direct costs (the schooling costs) and indirect costs of children 
(opportunity costs to children’s work). The effect of the period in which 
legislation is passed will be scrutinized as well, both for national legislation, 
as well as international (mainly ILO) ratifications. Another competing factor of 
interest are male real wages. As paternal income is one of the best indicators 
of current-day educational attainment in developing countries (Clemens 2004), 
I investigate whether this is true for the nineteenth and twentieth century. 
Builders’ real wages are employed for this purpose, carrying information of 
those in the lower ranges of the income pyramid. Controlling for both legislation 
and real wages also allows for the opportunity to test whether children were in 
fact getting more expensive, due to the costs of education, or whether parents 
were better able to afford education. The chapter is thus geared at answering 
the question: what are the relative effects of child labor and compulsory 
schooling legislation, wages and educational attainment, in the period between 
1800 and 2006? 
 
      The third chapter, written with Auke Rijpma and Sarah Carmichael, focuses 
on the relationship between family size and educational attainment in the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth century. Do different household structures, 
especially household sizes, have an effect on the educational outcomes of 
children? We employ micro-data, with material from Western and Eastern 
Europe, the U.S. and Canada. We test the premise that if increasing returns 
of education are the prime driver of the QQT (Becker 1991; Galor and Weil 
1999; Galor and Moav 2002; Galor 2011), we should observe that educational 
attainment and family size were inversely related. In addition, we test for the 
influence of other family extensions and female bargaining power. 
17     That these datasets are comparable, but not integrated, is the result of effort of different scholars 
working and producing datasets at the same time. Possibly, these datasets can be combined in the future. 
1.5  Content of the dissertation 
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      The fourth chapter delves into the question whether historical family 
structures impose constraints on female agency and thus on female educational 
attainment specifically. I explore this relationship on a global scale using 
macro-level data, for 86 developing and middle-income countries in the period 
between 1950 and 2005. Do familial and historical norms and preferences 
concerning women relate to the gender gap in educational attainment? 
To answer this question, I provide a model for the linkage between family 
systems and the valuation of women as measured by different features, 
such as inheritance structures (bilateral, matrilineal and patrilineal), domestic 
residence patterns, and marriage structures. I then use these family systems 
to help explain the global patterns of female to male gaps in average years of 
education. In the model I control for other factors of interest, such as national 
wealth, female labor market participation, political involvement in education and 
different religious backgrounds. 
      Chapter 5 is a case study of India, written together with Selin Dilli and 
Sarah Carmichael. Again, we test the impact of historical family structures and 
women’s role in such structures on gender gaps. We use this case study to 
test whether results from the cross-country analysis hold for a national case 
study. Compared to chapter 4, this study is set up more comprehensive, as it 
includes various gendered outcomes. We test whether economic development 
and historical institutions have an impact on the long-term regional differences 
between gender indicators in India, such as the female to male literacy rate, 
between 1880 and 2010. We ask two questions: did gender inequality diminish 
over time or persist? And, what was the influence of economic development 
and historical institutions on regional disparities in gender equality over time? 
The chapter divides into two sections. In the first, we map regional patterns 
in different dimensions of women’s position and gender inequality in the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the second, we evaluate whether Indian 
society is becoming more or less gender equal over time, and whether there is 
a catch-up (convergence) visible in these gender indicators. We will look at the 
influence of economic development, as proxied by urbanization, and the impact 
of historical institutions, such as family systems, caste, religion and British or 
mixed Native-British rule.  
 
      Finally, in chapter 6, I summarize and discuss the findings of the different 
studies. I will attempt to integrate the results from the different papers to draw 
broader inferences about the importance of institutional arrangements and low 
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female empowerment on educational attainment in both poor and rich areas of 
the world. As this dissertation is based on a number of papers, some measure 
of repetition is inescapable. Moreover, I address the strengths and weaknesses 
of this thesis and outline the implications of the findings for future research.
      To provide a visual overview of these chapters, figure 1.3 illustrates what 
chapter relates to which topic and to the expected effects on educational 
attainment in general and gender gaps in education.
Figure 1.3 Chapter overview in relation to the research questions
Every circle displays an institutional setting of importance to educational 
attainment. Female decision-making power relates to the cultural institutional 
domain, where the main variable of interest are family norms regarding women. 
This power in turn relates to general educational attainment and gendered 
educational attainment, and may run via household size. 
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Table 1.1 provides and overview of these chapters, plus the chapter’s 
 research questions.
Table 1.1 Overview of the different chapters and specific research questions
CHAPTER TITLE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Chapter 1 Introduction
What caused increases in 
schooling in the world economy 
for the last century-and-a-half, 
especially female schooling?
Chapter 2
From laboring to learning: the 
effects of laws versus wages 
on children’s educational 
participation
What are the relative effects 
of child labor and compulsory 
schooling legislation or wages and 
educational attainment? (1800-
2006)
Chapter 3
Quantity versus Quality: 
Household structure, number 
of siblings, and educational 
attainment in the long 
nineteenth century
Do different household structures, 
especially household sizes, have 
an effect on the educational 
outcomes of its offspring?
Chapter 4
Mind the gap! The Impact of 
Family Systems on the Gender 
Education Gap in Developing 
Countries,1950-2005
Do familial and historical norms 
and preferences concerning 
women relate to the gender gap in 
educational attainment? 
Chapter 5
The best thermometer: a long 
run perspective on gender 
inequality in India 
Do regional disparities in gender 
inequality lessen, or is there a lack 
of convergence towards gender 
equality? What was the influence 
of economic development and 
historical institutions on regional 
disparities in gender equality over 
time?
Chapter 6 Conclusion and discussion
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For decades now, economic and social historians have struggled with the 
question why and how children left the labor market and spilled into mass 
education during the transition to an industrial economy. This question remains 
relevant as today’s international community struggles to overcome the hardships 
of child labor that remain common practice in many developing countries. 
Perceptions on child labor and schooling have witnessed an evolution over time. 
Child labor was not perceived as problematic until the first Industrial Revolution, 
in Britain between 1760 and 1840. In the period leading up the Industrial 
Revolution, children’s work was commonplace in every family, especially the 
poorer ones. During the Industrial Revolution, new Smithsonian divisions of 
labor expanded the number of unskilled jobs and with it, remunerated labor 
opportunities for children (Nardinelli 1990; Humphries 2010). At the same time, 
contemporaries (most famously Marx and Dickens) pinpointed child labor as an 
unwanted side effect of industrialization, being both exploitative and unhealthy 
for children.  
 
      This period set in motion a way of thinking about childhood, child labor, and 
the children’s right to education that is endorsed and propagated globally by a 
large share of the international community (Cunningham 1991; Heywood 2013). 
Currently, the International Labour Organization (ILO) defines child labor as 
work that deprives children of their childhood, their potential and their dignity, 
that is mentally, physically, socially or morally dangerous, and importantly, that is 
2   FROM LABORING TO LEARNING 
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harmful to their access and regular attendance to school.18 Organizations such 
as the ILO, UNICEF and UNESCO have worked on international legislation that  
guards children against the trials of child labor, and which promote childhood 
and schooling for all as an universal human right.19
      It is precisely the effectiveness of this type of legislation that has been 
the subject of a heated debate for at least two decennia. The debate’s major 
watershed is between those scholars that still find merit in legislation that 
curtails child labor and promotes schooling (Sanderson 1974; Weiner 1991; 
Hazan and Berdugo 2002; Doepke and Zilibotti 2003; Doepke and Zilibotti 
2005), and between those that see little relevance in such legislation and 
claim that instead, a rise in adult wages makes parents (voluntarily) withdraw 
their children from the labor force. In this latter argument, underlying reasons 
for the withdrawal might be of an altruistic nature, because of shifting parental 
preferences that lead parents to value their children as a ‘consumer durable 
product’ with their emotional value surpassing their economic value (Becker 
1991; Basu and Tzannatos 2003). Conversely, a perceived increase in 
productivity gains might makes families increase educational investment per 
child, with future remittances in mind (Nardinelli 1990; Moehling 1999; Kirby 
2013). As shown below, both sides have their weaknesses and strengths.
      The effectiveness of legislation is contested on two grounds. On the one 
hand, neo-liberal scholars emphasize that enforcement might be lacking or the 
laws might be implemented too late in the game, when children’s labor was 
no longer economically relevant. On the other hand, the liberal laissez-faire 
approach is criticized for turning a blind eye to the evils of child labor, such as 
its damaging long-term effects on a child’s human capital accumulation and 
future wages, and for displaying a foolhardy confidence in the workings of the 
market. Later, emphasis was placed on the income and economic opportunities 
of men. Families, no longer restricted by the constraints of poverty, could keep 
their children from working and to invest in their human capital. Ideologies 
surrounding the male breadwinner, female domesticity and new ideas about 
18    However, the ILO stresses not all activities are seen as harmful, such as helping the parents around 
the home and earning pocket money after school hours, because these kinds of activities are seen as a 
contribution to children’s development and to the welfare of their families, providing children with skills and 
experience.
19    The right to free education for example, is ratified by the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (UN General Assembly 1966, 993:8–9), expanded in the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child  and further developed by institutions such as UNICEF, see for example the report A human 
rights-based approach to education for all (UNICEF 2007).
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childhood further added to the perception that children needed to be in school, 
not in a workplace (Davin 1982; Heywood 2013). 
      A major reason for children not to participate in schooling is poverty. An 
impoverished family requires all family members to work, either at home or 
on the labor market. In addition, parents might simply not have the financial 
means to facilitate their children’s educational participation. It might be the 
case that families are stuck in a poverty trap, which is not necessarily related 
directly to the level of wealth in a country. Middle-income countries like Mexico 
still struggle with a child labor problem (UNICEF, The World Bank, and ILO 
2015). A large supply of child labor within a country drives down the wages for 
unskilled labor, contributing to the continuation of a demand for child labor.
      Legislation might help to push an economy out of a poverty trap where 
there is a high incidence of child labor, low human capital accumulation and 
low output per worker. Empirical evidence from developing countries suggests 
that compulsory schooling laws have an effect on children’s educational 
participation and their withdrawal from the labor market (Weiner 1991). 
Furthermore, empirical investigation suggests that in general, child work 
interferes with a child’s schooling, both in the overall educational attainment as 
well as in grade repetition (Psacharopoulos 1997; Basu and Tzannatos 2003).20 
      In a contemporary world where the international community meticulously 
implements international legislation to curb child labor and promote children’s 
education, knowledge on the effectiveness is paramount. Yet, despite 
international policy and discussions about policy, there does not appear to be 
any study on the effectiveness of restrictions on children’s work on education. 
There is some theoretical work (Doepke and Zilibotti 2003; Doepke and 
Zilibotti 2005) specifically relating child labor to fertility decline and Becker’s 
famous quantity-quality trade-off (QQT) (see also chapter 3). Some studies do 
investigate the impact of compulsory education (Angrist and Krueger 1990; 
Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Margo and Finegan 1996). However, the majority 
of these studies concern the U.S., or focus on western countries. 
      Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of legal child labor restrictions on 
their educational participation is lacking global comparison and a long-time 
20    This does depend on the type and intensity of the employment and skills can be acquired on the job 
(Humphries 2010 Introduction). 
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scope. Two major data lacunae have hampered the investigation. Firstly, a 
very limited amount of data on child labor is available, and the available data 
suffers from issues of both overestimation and underestimation.21 Second, 
no comprehensive dataset exists that includes both child labor laws and 
compulsory schooling laws. For the purpose of this paper, such a dataset has 
been build.
      This study includes both developed and developing countries, and 
uses both history and contemporary situations as a natural experiment for 
testing research questions on legislation and wages. Does legislation affect 
the schooling of children? Or do wages account for children’s educational 
attainment? The experiences of both types of countries are different for a variety 
of reasons. One is that child labor played a much larger role in industrialization 
for the forerunners of the industrial revolution (Britain, the U.S., Belgium 
etc.). Over time, the ‘maturing’ of industry, the changes in technology that 
require more skilled personnel and restructuring of the labor market advanced 
(Cunningham 2000), rendering child labor less vital to industry. Second is that 
the international community, in the form of the ILO, UNICEF and the World 
Bank, play a large role in pressuring governments to comply with international 
standard concerning children’s education and child labor. Third, over time, the 
returns to educational investment increased substantially as economies have 
become skill-intensive. As economic benefits of education today are more 
evident and widely recognized in comparison to the nineteenth century, the 
demand for higher education intensifies.  
      This paper addresses the relative value of both the legislative arrangements 
and the level of (unskilled) wages in determining the participation of children 
in schooling. The time range for this paper is 1800 to 2006, with data for 
100 countries across the globe. Thus, it addresses both the (prosperous) 
forerunners where child labor is a past apparition and universal schooling is the 
norm, and those countries that still struggle to combat child labor and schooling 
participation problems. In this paper, a novel dataset is introduced, containing 
legislation on child labor laws and compulsory schooling legislation between 
1800 and 2006. The goal is to test the effectiveness of legislation on the 
one hand and on the other the impact of male unskilled wages. Therefore the 
following questions are asked: does child labor legislation affect the schooling 
of children? Does compulsory schooling have an effect? Are rising wages the 
21    See Basu and Tzannatos (2003) for a discussion of these issues.
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reason for increasing educational attainment? In other words, is it coercion 
and punitive measures that drives educational attainment, or is it the voluntary 
withdrawal of children from the market by parents? 
Ample studies by historians, economists and other scholars discuss the 
effectiveness of legislation and wages on educational attainment. Each factor, 
child labor laws, compulsory education laws and the effect of wages more 
generally, are discussed below, and for every factor, I formulate hypotheses 
pertaining to the effects on educational attainment. 
Child labor legislation
There are a few mechanisms by which child labor laws may influence the 
schooling of children. The most straightforward way is because children need 
to be engaged in some type of activity, preferably one that provides useful 
skills. However, this in itself is a very weak incentive for families to send their 
children to school, especially when resources are insufficient and children’s 
opportunity costs to domestic labor are high. It might work in a situation where 
a child labor law is used to enforce the effectiveness of a compulsory education 
law. Conversely, when a compulsory schooling law is already in place, families 
yield to government pressures of compulsory education only if the possibility 
of children’s labor is eliminated. Still, the effectiveness of such legislation can 
be questioned, as the weak enforcement of compulsory education laws do not 
bode well for the enforcement of child labor legislature.  
 
      More likely, child labor laws affect schooling in a more indirect way. They 
can both influence fertility levels and unskilled labor wages. The first is an option 
for the long term. The legislation converts children into a financial burden to 
the household budget, instead of an addition. Every added child to the family 
can only work after a certain age, and parents can only supply subsistence to a 
limited amount of children. This increase in cost might incentivize parents to limit 
their fertility. The extent to which they may do so depends not only on economic 
considerations, but also on cultural and social preferences. A full discussion of 
these factors goes well beyond the scope of this chapter. The second manner 
by which child labor legislation may indirectly affect schooling is by raising 
2.2  Theory and hypotheses
2.2.1  How can legislation affect the schooling of children?
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unskilled wages. If children constitute a reasonable proportion of the unskilled 
labor force, their immediate withdrawal due to legislation might lead to a scarcity 
of unskilled labor, and drive unskilled wages up (Basu and Tzannatos 2003, 
150). Children’s labor becomes less essential to the households income and 
more resources become available to send children to school.  
 
      Early child labor laws, passed in the nineteenth century, may have had a 
limited effect on educational attendance. This was the period in which both the 
child labor laws and compulsory attendance laws were initially adopted, mass 
education systems were developed and educational attainment was rising. 
There are a few studies that highlight the ineffectiveness of initial legislation in 
the U.S. (Landes and Solmon 1972, 81). In later time periods, especially after 
the Second World War, adoption of child labor legislation was internationally 
institutionalized, lowering the implementation costs. In addition, one can argue 
that the cultural export of the notions of childhood and children’s right to 
education consolidated after the Second World War. In the latter part of the 
twentieth century, most nations have adopted an international child labor law 
and signed the Declaration of the Rights of the Child. To investigate whether 
legislation in earlier time periods had less effect on average years of education, 
the type of legislation is split per adoption period.
However, the effectiveness of a child labor law may differ depending on 
whether it is the result of international pressures or national legislative action. 
The effect of international legislation is hypothesized to be limited compared to 
nationally implemented legislation. Educational participation is aided, but not 
solely caused, by international pressures and imported educational initiatives 
must find national resonance. Doepke and Zilibotti (2009) found that types of 
international legislative action on child labor tend to lower domestic political 
support within developing countries for banning child labor, thus decreasing 
children’s opportunities for education (Doepke and Zilibotti 2009). Since the 
1910s, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has been advancing child 
labor legislation by implementing international treaties, which are subsequently 
ratified by nations themselves. The hypothesis tested in this paper is that ILO 
treaties are less effective than the national laws, because national legislation 
is driven more by internal processes and demands than international ones. In 
section three, I will provide a more in-depth discussion of the national and ILO 
treaties. 
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Both the direct and indirect mechanisms by which child labor laws affect 
children’s schooling are interesting in their own right. To keep the paper more 
focused, only direct mechanisms are covered in this paper. For child labor 
legislation specifically, three hypotheses can be drawn on the basis of the above 
observations:
Hypothesis 1.1  Child labor laws affect educational participation in a 
                         positive way. 
Hypothesis 1.2 Early legislation ratification is less effective than legislation  
         passed in later time periods (especially after the Second  
         World War). 
Hypothesis 1.3  International legislation is less effective than national   
         legislation.
Compulsory education
The premise regarding compulsory education is straightforward. I expect that 
compulsory education laws will increase children’s participation in schooling. 
Some studies show that compulsory education legislation did not lead to 
an immediate increase in enrollments in the West (Soysal and Strang 1989, 
277–88), nor outside of it (see for instance: Soylu 2011). However, Angrist 
and Kruger (1990) have found that compulsory schooling laws (in combination 
with child labor laws) had an impact on the dropout rate in the United States, 
with as much as 25 percent of potential dropouts remaining in school because 
of compulsory schooling laws (Angrist and Krueger 1990). Weiner (1991), 
shows that compulsory education is actually quite effective in diminishing child 
labor and getting children into school. Again, as with child labor laws, earlier 
legislation may have been less effective because of a lack of enforcement, 
whereas the later legislation might be the result of external pressures. 
 
      The historical time period of adoption might affect the effectiveness of 
compulsory legislation. For example, for the U.S., Lleras-Muney, (2002) finds 
that between 1915 to 1939 compulsory education was effective in increasing 
educational attainment, especially of those in the lower percentiles of the 
education distribution. In contrast, work on earlier time periods showed no 
such relation between education and compulsory attendance laws and years 
of schooling (Landes & Solmon, 1972), although this finding is contested as 
well (Lingwall, 2014a). School attendance laws adopted in later time periods 
are hypothesized to be more effective because of a higher likelihood that the 
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legislation is a formalization of social processes already in motion. Compulsory 
education laws may suffer from similar limitations over time as child labor laws: 
those countries that passed legislation in the nineteenth century were at the 
forefront of a new type of legislation. Those countries implementing legislation 
in the latter part of the twentieth century could pass legislation more efficiently, 
with international organizations and institutions like UNICEF and UNESCO to 
aid such transitions.
  
      The abovementioned paper by Lleras-Muney (2002) also finds that the 
posited relationships were effective in raising educational attainment for white 
but not black men and women. There is not much work on the specific effects 
of gender unequal legislation itself, most likely because of data limitations. In 
some (colonial) contexts, schools may be provided only for a very few, and may 
be restricted by gender or ethnicity, for example in Algeria under the French 
Colonial rule. I expect that average years of education only truly take off when 
the education system becomes universal. Intergenerational transfer of education 
is faster when mothers are educated (see also the introduction and chapter 4), 
so it follows that when both genders are included, average years of education 
will rise faster. Three different hypotheses can be drawn for compulsory 
education: 
 
Hypothesis 2.1  Compulsory education laws increase children’s 
   school attendance. 
Hypothesis 2.2 Early compulsory schooling legislation is less effective  
                         than legislation passed in later time periods (especially  
              after the Second World War).
Hypothesis 2.3 Universal legislation is more effective than 
   non-universal education.
Regarding both types of legislation, on child labor and on compulsory 
education, the political environment in which these laws are passed might affect 
their effectiveness. There is substantial evidence that inclusive institutions are 
important for growth, poverty reduction, development, well-being and schooling 
(Sen 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian, 
and Trebbi 2004; Rauniyar and Kanbur 2010). Inclusive institutions are those 
institutions that grant equal rights and entitlements, enable equal opportunities 
and allow for equal access to resources and services. These as opposed to 
exclusive institutions, also known as extractive institutions (Acemoglu and 
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Robinson 2014). Extractive or exclusive institutions are based on exclusionary 
policies, which consciously or unconsciously perpetuate negative stereotypes. 
For example, norms underpinning gender roles or discrimination against ethnic 
groups can be deep-seated and unconsciously perpetuated. This can often 
lead to unequal access to resources and services, like schooling (Rao and 
Walton 2004). The type of (compulsory) legislation can provide some indication 
of inclusiveness; for instance, the law may be delimited by ethnicity or gender. 
 
      However, the political climate may affect such legal inclusiveness. Inclusive 
political institutions can have a positive effect on schooling, because they 
promote redistributive policies of public expenditure and an accessible public 
sector. Mass education is such a redistributive policy (Lindert 2004). In other 
words: inclusive institutions tend to make education available to a broader base 
of the population than exclusive institutions would. The chance that legislation 
matches the schooling supply is thus more likely within the context of inclusive 
institutions. In addition, inclusive institutions allow people to express their 
preferences via the ballot. The need for this voter consent discourages inclusive 
institutions from passing legislation without a support base and allows for a 
stricter enforcement for those non-adherents because of greater public support. 
I thus expect that inclusive institutions will have a greater positive effect on 
educational attainment compared to extractive institutions.22 
 
2.2.2  How do wages affect children’s schooling?
In the words of Lindert: “Higher incomes unquestionably raise the share of 
children which are in school”(Lindert 2004, 1:35).23 As mentioned above, 
poverty is the strongest constraint to children’s schooling. The basic premise 
of many models of children’s education is that higher income for families will 
incentivize them to send their children to school. The provision of free mass 
education by the state overcomes credit constraints faced by families and local 
organizations in financing education (Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff 1998; 
Galor, Moav, and Vollrath 2009). However, even when the state’s provision 
is sufficient, poverty can still be a constraint. A body of empirical evidence 
shows that economic conditions and slow-changing parental education levels 
determine children’s school enrollment to a greater degree than education 
policy interventions (for a review, see: Clemens 2004). State provisions 
(legislation, proximity of schooling and public education spending) have only 
22    How inclusive and exclusive institutions are measured will be addressed in the data section. 
23    Income is measured as GDP per capita. 
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weak effects in contemporary developing countries, and both parental income 
and education are much more effective in guiding children to school. 
      Schooling comes at two important costs to families. The first are the direct 
costs of schooling. Even in settings where education is officially free, it is never 
without any expense, such as transportation costs, books fees but also some 
tuition fees (See e.g.: Tilak 1996). The second type of cost is the opportunity 
costs of children’s labor, which for poor families might represent a large share 
of the family income (Akyeampong 2009). Higher male wages would mean 
men are better able to support their family, which could make a child’s labor 
superfluous. Our last hypotheses is therefore framed as follows:
Hypothesis 3 Wages have a strong impact on the average years of 
education because of its direct influence on the family budget; families with 
more resources will send more children to school. 
When the above hypotheses are tested empirically, it is mostly as a cross-
section of a specific case in the contemporary developing world, with a limited 
time range, for example for Mexico (UNICEF, The World Bank, and ILO 2015). 
Less often, they are tested on a diachronic macro-level, and when available 
cross-national studies comprising a limited time span. This paper employs a 
panel level analysis with a long time scope. The analysis includes the measure 
of unskilled male real wages, and the existence of child labor and compulsory 
education legislation to measure the effect on average year of education. Before 
I continue with the specifications in section 2.4, the data is described to some 
detail in the next section.  
2.3.1 Data and sources
Child labor legislation
The compiled dataset on child labor and compulsory education legislation runs 
between 1800 and 2010. This dataset comprises 227 countries, of which 189 
countries have ratified a child labor law at some point. In 2010, there is data 
available on both child labor legislation and average years of education in 136 
countries. The data comes in two forms. The first is as a dummy for the year 
in which a country issued a child labor law. The second is as a continuous 
variable of the age after which a child was permitted to work, for which fewer 
2.3  Data 
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observations are available. For child labor laws, two types of legislation from 
two different types of sources were collected. The first are national child labor 
laws, which were collected from academic literature on the topic. It might be 
that some national child labor laws have escaped our attention, either due to 
language restrictions or due to oversight, but I hope to add to the data in the 
future.24  
 
      The second are international treaties, mainly those from the ILO.25 When 
I failed to find a national child labor law, but a country did sign such an 
international treaty, this treaty was used as the first child labor law available in 
the data. In addition, later treaties on child labor are included as well. Unless 
otherwise stated, I only use the very first child labor law for the purpose of our 
regressions, with some restrictions. These restrictions hold that the child labor 
law must actually limit child labor for a large majority of children in the working 
population, and not be limited to only a proportion of the country. Still, it has 
been difficult to assess what constitutes a real first child labor law. Often, first 
or second legislation relates to a few sectors, but these may proportionally 
contain a large share of the total amount of children (like for example factory 
work).26 The interpretation is based on the secondary literature in this matter, 
and sometimes only limited information is available, which may lead to a 
somewhat upwards bias of the first implemented child labor law. Data based 
on ratification of international treaties are considered less precise than data 
based on national laws, as it is possible that these treaties, although ratified, 
were never implemented. Figure 2.1 shows a frequency histogram for every 
first national child labor law in the dataset, while figure 2.2 shows only the 
ratifications of the first international charters. Note that all following figures are 
from the author’s database, unless otherwise stated. The earliest adopters of 
national legislation in the database are France (1841), Austria (1842), Sweden 
(1846), and Finland (1868).27 
24    We will make the dataset available on Clio-Infra.eu with an accompanying working paper. A full list of 
the literature will become available in an Excel-file. This will enable scholars to access and amend the data. 
25    Some other international treaties were included as well, such as the 1990 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. The UN provides the ratification or acceptance date per country; therefore dates of 
implementation may vary. See for the specific details per country: (UN Treaty Collection 2015).
26    For example in Russia in 18435 passed a law that restricted night work of children under 12, and the 
literature states it was badly enforced (Rimlinger 1989, 597). This restriction seemed to encompass not 
enough of the child work force, and was thus excluded. 
27     References in order: France (Pélissier, Supiot, and Jeammaud 2006, 12; Hobbs, McKechnie, and 
Lavalette 1999), Austria (Strasser 1992, 40), Sweden (Schrumpf 2009, 578), (Suviranta 2000, 29). Some 
earlier labor legislation was available as well, for example in Germany in 1839, but this corresponded only 
to Prussia, not to Germany proper/as a whole, thus it is insufficient by our standards to claim it as the first 
national child labor legislation for Germany. 
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Figure 2.1 Frequency histogram of first national child labor laws
Source: Author’s dataset. Unless otherwise indicated, all figures come from  
the author’s dataset.
Figure 2.2 Frequency histogram of ratifications of first international treaties  
on child labor (mainly ILO)
Note: The histogram shows only those ratifications where data on average  
years of education is available
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These histograms contain only the initial child labor legislation. It shows that 
national legislation was of implemented more frequent in the earlier time 
periods, and less so at the end of the twentieth century. In addition, national 
legislation was less frequent in comparison to the international legislation. The 
apogee of child labor legislation was late nineteenth century and again in the 
early twentieth century. International legislation develops later, spurred on by 
those nineteenth century legislative forerunners. International legislation exhibits 
three legislation waves: one between 1920 and 1940, one around 1960 and 
one between 1980 and 2010. 
Compulsory education
On compulsory education data was gathered for 157 countries. Controlling 
for all countries for which was data available on average years of education, 
the total amount of countries with observations dropped to 91 countries. The 
database contains the first year of compulsory education found in the scope of 
this research. It also records, when available, the ages of compulsory education. 
A list of the used literature and documents can be found in the sources and 
data appendix to this chapter. For this variable I have no data on whether it is 
implemented as an international treaty or as a national law, though most a lot of 
legislation before 1945 is national, whereas after 1945 international pressures 
accelerated the amount of internationally passed legislation. However, there 
is some data available on the universality of the law. In several cases the first 
compulsory education law was not universal. There is only limited data on 
this, but an attempt has been made to differentiate where possible. If the law 
is not universal, it might be limited according to sex, ethnicity or location, or a 
combination of both. I used all available types of legislation in the specification, 
unless otherwise stated. An additional issue is that colonial legislation 
complicated the assessment of whether a country’s compulsory education law 
was legitimate, or merely a paper tiger. Often though, restrictions were made 
on the basis of ethnicity, making education only available to offspring of colonial 
expats.
      Figure 2.3 shows the frequency histogram for the existence of a first 
ratification of compulsory education legislation. Two peaks are evident: one late 
nineteenth century and after the Second World War.28 Among the earliest of 
28    For example the 1774 Allgemeine Schulordnung in Austria made education compulsory for six years 
(UNESCO 1958, Vol. 2 Primary Education:113). 
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compulsory education legislation were Austria (1774), Greece (1834), Spain 
(1838) and Sweden (1842) (UNESCO 1958, Vol. 2 Primary Education:113, 
484, 908, 937). 
Figure 2.3 Frequency histogram of first compulsory education laws
Builders’ real wages
This paper uses the measure of builders’ real wages to capture general wages. 
A more common means to capture income is the national level of wealth (GDP 
per capita). However, there is a difference between the effects of the national 
level of wealth and wages. National wealth provides some indication of a 
nation’s capacity to build a mass education system, but it lacks information on 
the distribution of wealth and the fortunes of the lower strata of the income 
scale. Wages, especially unskilled wages, are able to capture such underlying 
information. Therefore, builder’s real wages are ideally suited for the purpose of 
this paper.
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       GDP per capita is also often used, which is caused by a lack of historical 
data on wages. However, this paper utilizes a new dataset by the CLIO-Infra 
project on real wages. The data comes from de Zwart, van Leeuwen, and van 
Leeuwen-Li (2014) who collected and standardized real wages for a large 
number of countries since 1820. The real wage is calculated on the basis of a 
basket of goods that reflects the consumption pattern of laborers. Allen devised 
a method that calculates a basket of goods based on a standard amount of 
caloric and protein intake, that can be used internationally and historically (Allen 
2001; Allen et al. 2011). By calculating average annual earnings divided by the 
cost of a poverty line consumption bundle for a family, one gets a subsistence 
basket (Allen 2001, 224–26). It captures to the number of times an unskilled 
building laborer is able to purchase the minimum required subsistence basket 
(de Zwart, van Leeuwen, and van Leeuwen-Li 2014).29 
 
       Data on GDP per capita is also used as a control variable. The data on 
GDP per capita comes from the CLIO-Infra project, which builds upon work by 
Angus Maddison. GDP per capita summarizes the value of all the goods and 
services produced in a society, or alternatively, the value of the total income 
earned. GDP per capita is an important indicator for measuring the economic 
performance of countries, though it says little about the distribution of that 
wealth.30 As figure 2.4 shows, there is a strong correlation over time between 
GDP per capita and real wages. The inclusion of GDP per capita in a model 
together with unskilled real wages may therefore interfere with another. Again, 
figure 2.4 demonstrates that this might be the case for the period until 1920, 
but after that the likelihood decreases. 
29     For a further elaboration of the real wages construction and a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach, see (de Zwart, van Leeuwen, and van Leeuwen-Li 2014) .
30     For a more detailed discussion on the indicator of GDP, please see the work by Bolt, Timmer, and van 
Zanden (2014).
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Figure 2.4 Correlation between real wages of builder laborers and GDP per capita, 1820s to 
2000s (Pearson correlation coefficient and upper/lower bound of 95% interval per decade)
                    
 Source: de Zwart, van Leeuwen, and van Leeuwen-Li (2014, 84)
Institutions
As mentioned above, the political orientation of the government might influence 
the provision of mass education and support base for legislation. Mass 
education is thought of to be the most strong in the fullest democracies, where 
the universal right to vote was both granted and practiced (Lindert 2004, 1:39, 
50). For our measure of political institutions, I make use of the polity2 variable 
(from Polity IV) as used by Foldvari and Buzasi (2014), available at CLIO-Infra. 
Polity IV shows the aggregate measure of political regimes on a -10 (fully 
authoritarian) to +10 (fully democratic) scale. This composite index is based 
on six component variables: 1) the regulation of chief executive recruitment; 
2) the competitiveness of executive recruitment; 3) the openness of executive 
recruitment; 4) executive constraints; 5) the regulation of participation; and 6) 
the competitiveness of participation. To make the interpretations more intuitive, 
I reclassified them into five new categories: full democratic, democratic, open 
anocracy, closed anocracy, and autocracy.31 Anocracies are those governments 
that mix democratic and autocratic features (semi-democracies).32 However, I 
31    This reclassification was on the basis of a classification used by the creators of Polity IV for mapping 
polity. See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
32    For the exact buildup and discussion of the different aspects of this measure, please see Foldvari and 
Buzasi (2014).
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want to stress that the index combines measures that do not directly relate to 
participation in terms of voting by citizens, but rather assesses the inclusion and 
competition between political groups as its main feature. 
Spousal age gap and religion
One family factor of interest when it comes to educational participation is the 
bargaining power of mothers. Female bargaining power relates to investments 
in children’s schooling and empirical evidence suggests that women, relative 
to men, tend to favor children in their resource allocation behavior (Doss 2012; 
Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Thomas 1994; Glick and Sahn 2000; Currie 
and Moretti 2003). A measure to control for this is the age gap between 
husband and wife, known as the spousal age gap. A lower spousal age gap 
is associated with higher female bargaining power (Casterline, Williams, and 
McDonald 1986; Carmichael, De Moor, and van Zanden 2011; van der Vleuten 
2016). Data for the spousal age gap comes from Carmichael (2011). The 
spousal age gap is calculated by subtracting female age of marriage from the 
male age of marriage. Age at marriage is measured using singulate mean age 
at marriage (SMAM): the average years of single life among those who marry 
before age 50. John Hajnal (1953) created this measure to calculate marriage 
ages from census data, and more recently it has been used as an indicator of 
female empowerment (Carmichael 2011; The World Bank 2011).
 
      Religion is another control factor that might influence educational 
participation. For sub-Saharan Africa, pre-colonial Islamic influence was 
allegedly the single most important predictor of early twenty-first century 
literacy rates (Frankema 2012). Protestantism is thought of to promote literacy 
skills because of the valuation of reading the Bible (Becker & Woessmann, 
2009). For Western Europe, Peter Lindert finds that Catholicism can be both 
beneficial or detrimental to educational attainment (Lindert 2004). Norton and 
Tomal (2009) find strong negative links between female educational attainment 
and the proportion of Hindu and Muslim adherents in a country. Our interest is 
mainly in whether the effects of legislation and wages still hold when religion is 
accounted for. Data on religion comes from (Barro and McCleary 2003). They 
provide proportions of adherents per religion for three cross-sections in time: 
1900, 1970 and 2000. Because I assume these proportions are not subject to 
intense fluctuations, I interpolated for the entire period, and up until 2010. The 
major religions of interest are Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Hinduism and 
Secularism (non-religious).
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2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 introduces the descriptive statistics for all variables used. 
Average years of education and legislation
How do child labor laws and compulsory education relate to the data on 
average years of education? Figure 2.5 shows the first child labor and 
compulsory education legislation against the average years of education for 
some selected countries. 33 Theoretically, it would make sense that child labor 
laws are no longer necessary after the implementation of compulsory education, 
and compulsory education legislation would therefore be passed after child 
labor legislation. As is evident from this graph, this is not the case. Whether a 
country starts out with a child labor or a compulsory labor law is quite arbitrary, 
even in implementation of such laws in the forerunner countries. For example, 
Argentina, Spain, Japan and the U.S. had a compulsory education law before 
a child labor law, whereas China, the Netherlands and Russia had a child labor 
law before implementing compulsory education. This might indicate diversity in 
the effectiveness of compulsory educational legislation. Furthermore, though 
33   These countries encompass 70% of the world’s population and are the base-line countries for any 
CLIO-Infra dataset. See https://www.clio-infra.eu/.  
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics
 N mean sd min max
Average years of education 15,312 4.071 3.409 0.01 13.61
Child labor law 29,954 0.383 0.486 0 1
Compulsory education law 29,954 0.508 0.5 0 1
Log male unskilled wages 9,578 2.596 1.01 -3.599 5.89
Political system 18,820 3.888 1.419 1 5
Spousal Age Gap 9,025 3.565 1.664 -6.428 11.94
Log GDP per capita 12,672 7.794 1.005 5.315 10.67
Catholic adherents (%) 18,237 28.61 34.99 0 100
Protestant adherents (%) 18,237 12.66 22.34 0 99.5
Muslim adherents (%) 18,237 21.99 34.11 0 100
Hindu adherents (%) 18,237 2.342 10.52 0 88.1
Non-Religious adherents (%) 18,237 4.989 10.39 0 64.4
Minimum child labor age 11,492 12.97 1.985 7 18
Minimum age mandatory schooling 12,101 6.508 0.877 5 10
Number of countries 100
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the connection is quite weak, the implementation of any compulsory education 
legislation seems to coincide with increasing average years of education. Again, 
this is not the case for all countries, such as in Germany.
Table 2.2, the correlation matrix, illustrates something similar. The correlation 
matrix shows that in fact, the very first legislation (first child labor law and 
first compulsory education law) has a very small negative link to educational 
attainment. Though it might seem counterintuitive, this signs means that at the 
time of implementation average years of education were low because mass 
education systems needed to be installed. The dummies (child labor law and 
compulsory education law), which run from the first child labor law to the 
present, do have a statistically significant positive correlation with average years 
of education, albeit a somewhat weak one (0.26 and 0.35). 
Figure 2.5  Average years of education against the first child labor and compulsory  
                 education legislation 
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Figure 2.5  Average years of education against the first child labor and compulsory  
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The existence of legislation of any kind has a very weak, yet positive, correlation 
to wages. The correlation between the very first legislation (first child labor 
law and first child labor law) and wages is even negative (-0.36 and -0.5), but 
low numbers of observations might underlie this. This means that legislation is 
not implemented at a time at which wages are particularly high. However, the 
relationship wages – education is quite strong (0.76), which is remarkable. The 
analysis in the following section will delve deeper into these relationships.
2.4.1 Analysis of direct effects of legislation and real wages
The full regression model including all controls is specified as (1):
The yit refers to the average years of education in country i at time t. The 
parameter      refers to the set of dummies, either for the presence of a child 
labor law, or the presence of a compulsory education law. Both dummies can 
change over time when legislation is introduced. The parameter      refers to 
builder’s real wages in country i at year t. The full model includes the following 
controls:      refers to set of continuous controls. These are the log of GDP 
per capita, the spousal age gap, the proportion of religious adherents and the 
aggregate measure of political regimes (polity). This latter was reclassified 
into the following categories: 1) fully democratic; 2) democratic; 3) open 
anocracy; 4) closed anocracy; and 5) autocracy. The      is the error term. Not 
all specifications include all controls, for two reasons. The first is that the log 
GDP per capita is highly correlated with one of our main variables of interest, 
the unskilled wages (0.74). Because I am more interested in this latter, I chose 
to estimate the specification without GDP per capita. The results of these 
models with the inclusion of GDP can be found in the Appendix (and will be 
referred to as such). In addition, especially for the period pre-1900, limited data 
is available for the spousal age gap, and only data on religion since 1900. In the 
estimations separated by time period, these controls were dropped.  
 
      I employ a fixed-effects (FE) analysis to control for country-specific time 
invariant effects that may impact both the predictor and outcome variables 
2.4  Analysis  
(1)
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(Wooldridge 2009 Ch 14).34 A Hausman test was performed as to whether the 
error terms were correlated, in which case a random-effects specification would 
have been appropriate, but a significant Hausman test showed that fixed effects 
were preferred.35 
 
       Models 1 to 3 in table 2.3 below show specification (1) with the dummies 
for legislation. All specifications illustrate that the presence of either child labor 
or compulsory education legislation has a direct impact on average years of 
education, even when controlling for wages. On the other hand, the levels of 
unskilled wages have a significant impact as well. With the addition of the 
spousal age gap and the political controls (model 4) or religion (model 5), these 
findings still hold, only at a somewhat lower significance level for compulsory 
education. Adding log GDP per capita in the last column makes the effect of 
unskilled real wages disappears, but the effect of the log GDP per capita is 
strong and significant. The high correlation between the log GDP per capita 
and builder’s real wages likely undermines the explanatory power of real wages. 
Again, the child labor law dummy and the compulsory education law dummy 
still remain significant with the inclusion of log GDP per capita. This provides 
some first evidence for our hypothesis 1.1 and 2.1 that both types of legislation 
are effective in increasing average years of education. The hypothesis that 
unskilled male wages have an effect on average years of education (H.3) can 
also be confirmed. Neither one of these effects excludes the other one; all three 
predictors seem to have an independent effect on average years of education. 
 
       With the inclusion of polity in model 4, the dummies for child labor or 
compulsory education legislation remained significant. In addition, in all models 
show that the fullest democracies have a significant and higher average years 
of education compared to democracies, and autocracies and anocracies have 
lower average years. Additional unreported tests showed that both types of 
legislation remained significant in specifications with only democracies (type 1 
and 2), but also in specifications with only anocracies and autocracies (types 3 
to 5). This leads us to believe that having a compulsory education law or a child 
labor law is more important than the political entity that decrees it.36  
34    Another important assumption of the FE model is that those time-invariant characteristics are unique 
to the individual and should not be correlated with other individual characteristics.
35     The significant Hausman test indicates the differences in the coefficients were systematic (chi2(13) = 
1145,98; P=  0.0000).
36   Neither splitting the sample nor using interaction terms resulted in a clear pattern where inclusive 
institutions have legislation that is more effective. These results are available upon request. 
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      The spousal age gap has the expected negative effect, with an age gap 
increase of one year, the average years of education are likely to decrease by 
almost 0.36. The addition of religion in model 5 seems to have almost no effect 
on average years of education. Only the proportion of nonreligious adherents 
and Muslim adherence has a positive effect, and protestant adherence has a 
negative effect. This latter disappears when GDP per capita is added. All in all, 
table 2.3 shows that real wages do not lose significance after the inclusion of 
legislation and vice versa throughout almost all specifications. This provides 
some first evidence in support of our major hypotheses. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Av. yrs. 
of ed.
Av. yrs. 
of ed.
Av yrs 
of ed
Av yrs 
of ed
Av yrs 
of ed
Av yrs 
of ed
Child labor law 3.372***
(0.144)
2.491***
(0.174)
1.716***
(0.237)
1.280***
(0.270)
1.359***
(0.322)
0.587***
(0.176)
Compulsory ed. law 1.883*** 1.451***
(0.200)
0.807***
(0.252)
0.570*
(0.290)
0.361***
(0.135)
Log male unskilled 1.524***
(0.179)
1.157***
(0.198)
0.661***
(0.163)
0.0350
(0.0945)
Spousal Age Gap -0.358***
(0.115)
-0.294***
(0.0878)
-0.243***
(0.0616)
Full Democracy 1.481***
(0.322)
0.358
(0.254)
-0.0995
(0.153)
Democracy (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Closed Anocracy -1.068***
(0.309)
-0.952***
(0.297)
-0.544***
(0.176)
Open Anocracy -0.553*
(0.324)
-0.568**
(0.231)
-0.484***
(0.167)
Autocracy -0.801***
(0.264)
-0.989***
(0.250)
-0.711***
(0.205)
Catholic -0.0630
(0.0513)
-0.000703
(0.0252)
Protestant -0.0850*
(0.0487)
-0.0395
(0.0302)
Muslim 0.198***
(0.0616)
0.121***
(0.0438)
Hindu -0.0984*
(0.0583)
-0.0440
(0.0391)
Nonreligious 0.176**
(0.0755)
0.0738***
(0.0265)
Log GDP p. capita 2.286***
(0.145)
Constant 2.116***
(0.0834)
1.381***
(0.134)
-1.676***
(0.449)
1.859*
(0.970)
4.322
(3.146)
-13.50***
(2.092)
Observations 15,312 15,312 7,500 4,017 3,738 3,692
R-squared 0.348 0.416 0.577 0.610 0.688 0.868
Number of countries 141 141 116 100 100 100
Table 2.3 Estimates for legislation and wages on average years of education
Robust standard errors in parentheses      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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How do these three variables compare to one another in magnitude of impact? 
Table A2.1 in the appendix shows the standardized coefficients for the exact 
models in table 2.3, which allows us to compare the impact of the coefficients. 
It mainly shows that the coefficients of both types of legislation have a 
comparably moderate impact on average years of education. The unskilled male 
real wages has a somewhat larger coefficient compared to the laws. In other 
words, the unskilled male real wages have a stronger impact on average years 
of education than both types of legislation. Table A2.4 shows the robustness 
check of the results by estimating the baseline model again while keeping the N 
constant. The results remain similar. 
Timing period of legislation
The overall significance might be accounted for by which period in time 
legislation was passed. I split the time periods into four periods: 1800-1900, 
1901-1950, 1951-1980 and 1981-2006.37 Table 2.4 shows the impact of our 
main variables of interest per period, but only in those countries that ratified 
a child labor or compulsory education law in that period. Models 1 to 4 show 
the periods in which child labor laws have been implemented. For example, 
the U.K. implemented its first effective child labor law in 1833, so this country 
is categorized in the period 1800-1900, and is left out for the other periods. 
Models 5 to 8 show the periods when compulsory education was passed.38 
This measurement allows for an assessment of the impact of schooling 
per period, but means a need to drop some independent variables.39 Also, 
because I am interested in the effect of unskilled real wages on average years 
of education, the log GDP per capita is dropped in further specifications. 
This is due to the strong correlation with real wages, which causes issues of 
multicollinearity. However, the models have been performed again with log GDP 
per capita in the Appendix.  
37    The two periods after 1950 were initially one period, in which both types of legislation were significant 
(p<0.01).  Because a large share of the legislation, especially for child labor, was passed in this period, I 
decided to split them up. 
38    This variable is set up as follows: every country that passed a law in the period 1800-1900 received 
a 1 in this category, and a 0 in all the others. This means these countries are excluded for other periods. 
Unfortunately, because of the sometimes large year gaps between passing child labor laws and educational 
laws, especially in the first period, I was unable to fit them in simultaneously in the model. 
39    Especially for the first period (1800-1900) the data on some of the other dependent variables are 
limited especially those on spousal age gap. To be able to test the effects of child labor and compulsory 
education laws on education I chose to remove some dependent variables for specifications per time 
period. 
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Table 2.4  Impact of legislation and wages on average years of education, 
                per period of ratification
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Columns 1 to 4 show the period of first ratification of a child labor law, and column 5 to 
8 show the period in which a first compulsory education law was passed. A country can only 
occur one in columns 1 to 4 and 5 to 8. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Period first child labor law Period first compulsory education law
VARIABLES Av. yrs. 
ed. 
1800-
1900
Av. yrs. 
ed.
1901-
1950
Av. yrs. 
ed. 
1951-
1980
Av. yrs. 
ed. 
1981-
2006
Av. yrs. 
ed. 
1800-
1900
Av. yrs. 
ed. 
1901-
1950
Av. yrs. 
ed. 
1951-
1980
Av. yrs. 
ed. 
1981-
2006
Child labor 
law 
0.574* 
(0.329)
1.610*** 
(0.321)
1.860***
(0.211)
2.206**
(0.945)
1.766***
(0.308)
1.678***
(0.287)
1.098**
(0.420)
1.477***
(0.269)
Compulsory 
ed. law 
1.356*** 
(0.433)
1.332***
(0.390)
1.182***
(0.212)
2.020*** 
(0.327)
0.469 
(0.672)
1.120*** 
(0.261)
2.001***
(0.374)
1.693*** 
(0.507)
Log male 
unskilled 
wages 
1.364*** 
(0.285)
1.174***
(0.294)
0.724*** 
(0.128)
1.890** 
(0.683)
1.546*** 
(0.296)
0.897*** 
(0.281)
0.790*** 
(0.187)
0.632** 
(0.259)
Full 
Democracy
1.909***
(0.332)
2.125** 
(0.841)
-0.205 
(0.651)
0.310 
(0.251)
1.922*** 
(0.365)
0.495 
(0.316)
-1.653 
(1.170)
1.756*** 
(0.455)
Democracy (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Closed 
Anocracy
-0.698* 
(0.359)
-2.005*** 
(0.572)
-1.002** 
(0.465)
-0.895* 
(0.476)
-1.251*** 
(0.435)
-1.335*** 
(0.422)
-1.235 
(0.915)
0.0325 
(0.261)
Open 
Anocracy
0.161
(0.646)
-1.689*** 
(0.362)
-0.751* 
(0.389)
-0.290 
(0.529)
-0.0442 
(0.506)
-1.120*** 
(0.305)
-1.332* 
(0.707)
-0.0238 
(0.493)
Autocracy 0.213
(0.477)
-1.662*** 
(0.513)
-1.059*** 
(0.284)
-0.175 
(0.518)
-0.146 
(0.669)
-1.240*** 
(0.360)
-1.440** 
(0.533)
0.140 
(0.261)
Constant -0.632 
(0.987)
0.274 
(0.892)
0.216
(0.391)
-2.123 
(1.615)
-1.061 
(1.296)
0.325 
(0.692)
0.668 
(0.583)
-0.467 
(0.288)
Observations 2,197 2,031 1,852 434 2,500 2,478 814 691
R-squared 0.648 0.654 0.753 0.630 0.669 0.626 0.710 0.692
Number of 
countries
24 31 44 9 34 43 18 11
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Male unskilled real wages have a strong and robust association with average 
years of education in all models and time periods. The diminishing significance 
of the log male unskilled wages is most likely due to a low amount of 
observations, as the difference between model 4 and model 8 indicates. Both 
types of legislation are equally significantly related for almost all time periods, 
with the exception of the earliest. Model 1 shows that in the earliest period, 
the child labor law has a significant effect, but at a 10% level. Compulsory 
education seems to have been insignificant in the same period, 1800-1900, 
whereas it is significant (p<0.01) in all periods afterwards. This indicates that 
introducing compulsory laws in the earliest period had limited institutional 
power, especially compared to child labor legislation or the effects of increasing 
unskilled real wages. This is in support of hypothesis 2.2; that the early 
compulsory schooling legislation was less effective than legislation passed 
in later times, as this predictor is significant in later time periods. Child labor 
legislation was significant in all periods, although somewhat less (p<0.1) in 
the earliest period, thereby falsifying hypothesis 1.2. However, I re-estimated 
the model to include GDP per capita in appendix table A2.2. Here, the effect 
of child labor laws remains effective in all but the first time period (from 1800-
1900). 
Type of legislation 
Thirdly, I hypothesized that not only the time period of legislation (H1.2 and 
H2.2), but also type of the legislation (H1.3 and H2.3) plays a role in its effect 
on average years of education. For child labor laws there is some information 
on national versus international laws. For compulsory education, the data is not 
split up in international and national legislation, but limited data exists on the 
universality or exclusionist nature of the regulation. 
  
       Table 2.5 show how national and international child labor laws influence 
average years of education. Models 1 to 3 show the national child labor laws 
and models 4 to 6 show the international child labor laws. Both national and 
international child labor legislation appears to be important for all periods. Real 
wages show up as significant as well, but notably not in the period before 1945. 
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Table 2.5 Estimates on the nature of child labor laws: national laws vs. international treaties, 
              before and after 1945
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
National legislation International legislation
VARIABLES Av. yrs. 
ed. Total 
period
Av. yrs. 
ed. Period 
before 1945
Av. yrs. 
ed. Period 
Before 1945
Av. yrs. 
ed. Total 
period
Av. yrs. 
ed. Period 
before 1945
Av. yrs. ed. 
Period after 
1945
Child labor law 1.053***
(0.286)
0.882***
(0.219)
0.353***
(0.0131)
1.365***
(0.318)
2.726***
(0.0911)
1.278***
(0.313)
Compulsory ed. law 1.510***
(0.224)
1.013***
(0.295)
1.318***
(0.220)
1.075** 
(0.455)
0.275***
(0.0213)
0.959**
(0.385)
Log male unskilled 
wages 
1.043***
(0.226)
0.350
(0.308)
1.045***
(0.295)
1.088***
(0.212)
0.169
(0.1000)
0.861***
(0.175)
Full Democracy 1.092*
(0.567)
1.281
(0.821)
-1.893***
(0.429)
0.950***
(0.340)
0.0188
(0.0876)
0.449
(0.370)
Democracy (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Closed Anocracy -0.524**
(0.228)
-0.808***
(0.213)
-0.728*
(0.381)
-1.278***
(0.394)
0.262*
(0.154)
-1.063***
(0.400)
Open Anocracy -0.255
(0.306)
-0.415
(0.440)
-0.178
(0.375)
-1.064***
(0.299)
0.310***
(0.0642)
-1.019***
(0.317)
Autocracy -0.177 -0.573* 0.0251 -1.132*** 0.300*** -1.329***
(0.335) (0.329) (0.515) (0.377) (0.0720) (0.401)
Constant -0.690 1.614* 0.805 0.837 2.235*** 1.965***
(0.769) (0.861) (0.759) (0.766) (0.346) (0.673)
Observations 1,634 816 818 3,279 444 2,835
R-squared 0.536 0.511 0.352 0.415 0.454 0.317
Number of 
countries
62 30 47 96 29 96
66
To estimate the impact of legislation with another measure of wealth, the log 
GDP per capita was included in the estimates, in table A.3 in the Appendix. 
This adds greatly to the R2, and shows that national legislation in the period 
before 1945 is not significantly related to average years of education.40 
However, the international type legislation is.41 Hypothesis 1.3 can thus be 
rejected: international legislation is in fact more effective, at least for the 
pre-1945 period, for the earlier periods than national legislation is. There is 
significant overlap with the list of countries passing national legislation and 
international legislation before 1945 (see footnote 40 and 41). This indicates 
that an (ineffective) national law predates the international one. International 
pressures therefore seem relevant for such countries to expand enrolment and 
curb child labor.  
  
       In terms of compulsory education, there is data on the inclusiveness of 
compulsory education. Though the N of non-universal categories of compulsory 
education is very limited, they were testable using a dummy where the baseline 
category is universal compulsory education. Table 2.6 reports the findings of 
testing the different types of inclusiveness of education laws, which includes 
political controls in model 1 and the spousal age gap and religion in model 2. 
Model 1 shows that compared to universal compulsory education, having no 
compulsory education law has a significant effect. However, so do the other 
categories. When only men are included, the association between average 
years of education and the dummy is strong, compared to having no compulsory 
education. This is most likely due to the installment of education in the late 
nineteenth century and the laws implemented by the forerunners, which often 
started as male-only. Noteworthy is the negative association between limited 
ethnic compulsory education and average years of education. This variable 
most likely captures colonization, and this negatively influences the increase in 
average years of education, thus retarding human capital development in these 
countries. Location, indicating that only a limited area of the country was  
included in the legislation, has the same negative association, as do the other 
combinations of limitations. 
 
40     These countries include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., the U.S. and Uruguay.
41     These countries include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, 
Columbia, Denmark, Finland, friends, Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., Venezuela.
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      These results warrant caution as there is only a very limited number 
of observations available for these specifications. The significant impact 
disappears once other controls are added in model 2. In model 2, schooling 
legislation with limits on gender and ethnicity still have a significant impact 
compared to universal education. Unskilled male wages have a significant 
impact on average years of education in both models. When in model 3 the 
log GDP per capita is introduced, the effect of real wages disappears again, 
but that of child labor laws remains significant. In addition, the category of no 
compulsory education becomes significantly negative in comparison to the 
universal education category. 
Table 2.6 Compulsory education laws by different types of inclusiveness 
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed.
Child labor law 1.582***
(0.210)
1.338***
(0.321)
0.560***
(0.170)
No compulsory ed. -1.233***
(0.242)
-0.493
(0.297)
-0.336**
(0.136)
Universal comp. (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Only men comp. 0.450**
(0.212)
0.627**
(0.272)
1.096***
(0.151)
Ethnicity comp. -2.488***
(0.308)
-0.815***
(0.272)
-1.364***
(0.124)
Limited location -0.715**
(0.332)
0.561
(0.379)
0.212*
(0.127)
Limited sex and location1 0.126
(0.281)
0.368
(0.352)
-0.00592
(0.180)
Limited ethnicity and location 1.333***
(0.284)
- -
Limited sex, ethnicity and 
location
-0.496**
(0.219)
- -
Log male unskilled wages 1.157***
(0.155)
0.668***
(0.164)
0.0409
(0.0940)
Full Democracy 1.299***
(0.339)
0.385
(0.258)
-0.0868
(0.156)
Democracy (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Closed Anocracy -1.350***
(0.306)
-0.964***
(0.293)
-0.517***
(0.177)
Open Anocracy -0.808***
(0.273)
-0.588**
(0.232)
-0.516***
(0.165)
68
Autocracy -0.825***
(0.285)
-1.003***
(0.249)
-0.724***
(0.206)
Spousal Age Gap -0.290***
(0.0888)
-0.244***
(0.0620)
Catholic -0.0647
(0.0510)
-4.94e-06
(0.0251)
Protestant -0.0870*
(0.0485)
-0.0400
(0.0303)
Muslim 0.196***
(0.0615)
0.119***
(0.0435)
Hindu -0.114*
(0.0613)
-0.0484
(0.0380)
Nonreligious 0.177**
(0.0764)
0.0734***
(0.0267)
Log GDP per capita 2.293***
(0.145)
Constant 0.998*
(0.508)
5.050
(3.236)
-13.16***
(2.091)
Observations 6,515 3,738 3,692
R-squared 0.638 0.690 0.870
Number of countries 109 100 100
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All in all, these specifications show that legislation does in fact matter for 
promoting average years of education, although arguably less before 1945 
than after. Some evidence supported the first two hypotheses concerning 
child labor. Child labor legislation had a positive influence on average years 
of education and early legislation was less effective in later time periods. 
Child labor legislation before 1900 seemed to have had a limited effect and 
instead, GDP per capita was significant. For compulsory education, the first 
two hypotheses were also confirmed. Compulsory schooling laws and average 
years of education were positively associated, but not for all periods, especially 
in 1900-1950. 
 
      Hypothesis 1.3 was rejected. Both national and international legislation 
were of importance, but it was international legislation that remained important 
for all periods, where national legislation matters most in the post-WWII era. 
Before the Second World War, between 1919 and 1937, many countries 
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ratified conventions that ranged from limiting the minimum age of young 
persons in industry (ILO, C005, 1919) and their non-industrial employment 
(ILO, C033, 1932). It is interesting that the delimitation on the age at work 
these children, often to around 14 years, seemed to have had such an effect 
on their educational participation. In terms of the impact of the universality 
of compulsory education legislation (H2.3), the hypothesis can be rejected. 
Legislation calling for universal education proved no more effective than those 
of non-universal education, or those selective by gender or specific location; all 
these types had a positive effect on average years. The exception was when 
education was exclusionary by ethnicity, which was the case in some sub-
Saharan countries such as Zimbabwe and Togo; this had a negative effect on 
the mean years of schooling.  
 
       In terms of wages, hypothesis 3 (H3) can be confirmed: unskilled builders’ 
real wages have a direct effect on average years of education. The effect 
of unskilled real wages is repeatedly significant, but less robustly so than 
legislative implementation, especially after 1950. Thus, H3 is substantiated, 
albeit less robust then H1.1 and H2.1. The standardized table showed that 
compared to the two types of legislation, the effect of builders’ real wages 
on average years of schooling was somewhat greater. It was unaffected by 
the other controls, but it dwindled when GDP per capita was introduced. 
Sporadically, some evidence was found of independent effects of wages 
and GDP per capita in the earliest periods, but generally, as soon as GDP 
per capita enters the specification, the significance of wages disappears or 
diminishes greatly. This was expected, because of their close correlation.  
The results were somewhat less robust after 1950 (at a 5% level instead of a 
1%). This might be caused by the consolidation of the mass education system 
and the integration of education as an integral part of life. In such a case, 
parents will be less inclined to withdraw their children in response to wage 
shocks. In addition, in all specifications full democracies tend to have higher 
average years of education whereas anocracies and autocracies tend to have 
lower average years of education. Nevertheless, anocracies and autocracies do 
not systematically perform worse. An overview of all hypotheses is provided in 
table 2.7.
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Table 2.7 Hypothesis overview
       Hypothesis
True 
or 
false
1.1   Child labor laws affect educational participation in a positive way +
1.2   Early child labor legislation is less effective than legislation passed   
        in later time periods (especially after the Second World War). + /-
1.3   International legislation is less effective than national legislation -
2.1   Compulsory education laws increase children’s attendance of    
       children to school +
2.2   Early compulsory schooling legislation is less effective than 
        legislation passed in later time periods (especially after the
        Second World War).
+
2.3   Universal legislation is more effective than non-universal education -
3.0   Wages have a direct impact on the average years of education +
2.4.2 Robustness check
To check the robustness of the results, I estimate the baseline model again 
using a continuous variable for both types of legislation. Instead of a dummy, 
I use the minimum age which child labor is permitted and the minimum 
mandatory school-going age. This robustness check is meant to ensure that 
the findings are not driven by measurement error. The model is specified as 
followed: 
          (2)
It is the same model as (1), but now instead of using dummies               refers 
to the age after which a child is legally able to work and the minimum age of 
compulsory schooling in country i at year t. Data on these variables are available 
for fewer countries, especially for mandatory schooling. Sources often fail to 
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report the age at which children are allowed to work, or the years at which 
schooling is compulsory, hence a lower amount of observations. The results are 
reported in table 2.8. It shows that without controls (model 1 to 3), the age at 
which children are allowed to work, the minimum age of compulsory mandatory 
schooling and the unskilled real wages are all significant predictors of average 
years of education. With the addition of the spousal age gap and the polity 
measures (model 4), there are no major changes in the legislation or wages 
variables. The addition of religion (model 5) lowers the level of significance, 
especially for minimum age of compulsory schooling, but this is still significant 
at a 10% level. Adding the log GDP per capita removes all significant effects 
of the log male unskilled wages. It does the same for minimum mandatory 
schooling age, but not for the minimum age at which child labor is permitted.  
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Table 2.8 Estimates for legislation and wages on average years of education, with continuous    
  variables for legislation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed.
Min. age at which child 
labor permitted
0.889***
(0.0596)
0.861***
(0.0566)
0.646***
(0.0750)
0.463***
(0.0783)
0.279**
(0.108)
0.108**
(0.0487)
Min. mandatory school-
going age
2.083***
(0.678)
1.966***
(0.679)
1.606***
(0.514)
0.407*
(0.226)
0.254
(0.193)
Log male unskilled 
wages 
1.290***
(0.233)
0.933***
(0.207)
0.479***
(0.151)
0.00667
(0.100)
Spousal age gap -0.302*
(0.154)
-0.217**
(0.106)
-0.205***
(0.0752)
Full Democracy 1.380***
(0.278)
0.209
(0.225)
-0.104
(0.164)
Democracy (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Closed Anocracy -0.656
(0.470)
-0.974***
(0.314)
-0.580**
(0.228)
Open Anocracy -0.642*
(0.349)
-0.681**
(0.275)
-0.583**
(0.222)
Autocracy -0.741**
(0.362)
-1.095***
(0.295)
-0.859***
(0.290)
Catholic -0.0349
(0.0597)
0.00118
(0.0408)
Protestant -0.0694
(0.0557)
-0.0481
(0.0445)
Muslim 0.129
(0.0909)
0.161***
(0.0604)
Hindu -0.252***
(0.0801)
-0.0261
(0.0477)
Nonreligious 0.261***
(0.0948)
0.0740
(0.0635)
Log GDP per capita 2.152***
(0.203)
Constant -6.057***
(0.780)
-18.84***
(4.282)
-18.94***
(4.156)
-11.82***
(3.571)
0.556
(4.443)
-14.64***
(3.636)
Observations 8,779 7,025 3,943 2,789 2,724 2,698
R-squared 0.319 0.330 0.444 0.551 0.729 0.854
Number of countries 135 127 91 80 80 80
 Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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      The question is why the minimum age of mandatory schooling loses 
significance when the log GDP per capita is added, but the minimum child 
labor age remains significant. One possible explanation is that in countries 
with low GDP per capita families may have fewer resources to send children 
to school. Minimal mandatory school-going ages are generally lower than the 
minimal age at which child labor is permitted. Children may comply with the 
minimal mandatory schooling age, because they are too young for the formal 
labor market in any case. However, they may drop out early when they reach 
an age at which the labor market can accommodate them (between 10 and 14 
years). A minimal age at which child labor is permitted may pressurize families 
to let this age segment of children stay in school, thus increasing the average 
years of education.  
Predicted values against the actual values
To visualize the fit of the model, I estimate how the predicted values of average 
years of education hold up against the actual years of education. The prediction 
is based on the fixed effects model without any controls. Figure 2.6 shows this 
fit for 25 countries that constitute 70% of the world’s population.42 The match 
seems fairly reasonable and the estimated trend follows that of the average 
years of education quite well. Some odd leaps can be found in the predictions, 
mainly because of the jumps made in real wages around the Second World 
War. 
Figure 2.6 shows that in some countries the average years of education is 
lower than predicted by this basic model, such as Argentina and even the UK. 
Other countries such as Germany and China, perform relatively better than one 
would expect on the basis of this model. The reasonable overall fit is in line with 
the hypotheses tested: these three predictors all have an important effect on 
average years of education.  
42    Used in all the CLIO-Infra sets as the basis for every dataset. www.clio-infra.eu. 
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Figure 2.6   Visualization of the modeled values vs. the actual values of average years of      
      education over time
In conclusion, the bad reputation of the effect of legislation, both of compulsory 
education and child labor legislation seems uncalled for: in a cross-country 
comparison over the period 1800-2006, and even when differentiating by time 
period and legislation type, there seems to be a positive association between 
legislation and average years of education. It underscores longitudinal studies 
by Angrist and Krueger (1990) and Lingwall (2014) on compulsory school 
attendance laws. Our analysis runs counter to that of, for example, Eisenberg 
(1988) who finds little evidence that minimum age restrictions on child labor in 
the U.S. between 1880 and 1930 had an effect.43 As table 2.7 above shows, 
most of the posed hypotheses are verified. The major surprise was that when 
controlling for GDP per capita, international legislation turned out to be more 
effective than national legislation in the pre-1945 period.  
43     Although it had relatively little influence on the occupation choices of children and concludes that 
these restrictions contributed little to the long run decline in child labor. However, the basic premise is that 
early child labor laws were ineffective. 
2.5  Discussion and possible explanations 
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       How can we interpret the above findings? A major question of interpretation 
is that of the enforcement of these laws. From numerous case studies, it has 
been shown that especially these child labor laws were seldom enforced. 
Though the data used are those data of which the legislation constituted a 
large proportion of working children, enforcement practices remain hard to 
assess. The finding that the earliest and national child labor legislation was less 
effective in increasing average years of education could reflect this enforcement 
issue. Then again, international legislation was more effective. On a country-
level, governments may have several incentives to stifle children’s work and to 
enforce children’s schooling. A contemporary argument is that if child workers 
in developing countries out-produce richer countries because of their relatively 
low labor costs, not only can these countries not compete, but it also lowers 
the earning capacity of local adults. However, there is relatively little evidence to 
substantiate such claims (Bourdillon 2010, 80) Another possibility is that mass 
education was used as tool to consolidate the nation-state, receive a certain 
prestige from participating in, and effectively enforcing, such laws. In addition, 
governments were increasingly aware of the need for an educated work force to 
compete in an increasingly globalized world order (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 
1992; Meyer et al. 1997).44 The results show that anocracies and autocracies 
do not perform systematically worse than democracies (not the fullest 
democracies), which indicates that all types of governments felt such pressures. 
This is in support of Lindert, who shows that though fuller political rights tend to 
contribute to higher education, this is not linearly so. For instance, communist 
regimes are a notable exception with generally low political rights and high 
average years of education (Lindert 2004, 1:50). 
 
      Next to such macro level incentives, there is a micro-level aspect as well: 
how did families respond to legislation curbing child labor? The evidence points 
in the first place to the importance of real wages and to GDP per capita. In 
other words, when families started to be able to afford children’s education, 
average years of education increased. The relationship between wages and 
education was shown to be consistently robust, through all periods and 
notwithstanding the introduction of political and cultural controls. This confirms 
the thesis that in explaining the relationship between wages and education, 
poverty plays a central role, as does the opportunity costs for children’s work. 
To be able to go to school, children must be free of employment, or be able 
44   The authors mention that the ‘core’ (initiating) countries performed better than others in enforcing such 
legislation.
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to work part-time. Impoverished families may need children’s labor to meet 
subsistence needs. 
 
       One of the most influential models on child labor is based on this 
assumption that poverty is the driving factor (Basu and Tzannatos 2003; Basu 
and Van 1998). Two assumptions form the basis of this model. One is that 
children’s non-work (schooling and leisure) is a luxury good, but families do 
not make their children work unless circumstances compel them to do so. 
The second assumption is that adult and child labor are substitutes, meaning 
that adults can perform all tasks that children perform.45 In combination, these 
assumptions mean that when parental wages fall below a family’s subsistence 
consumption, children will be enlisted to work for wages on the labor market. 
When wages go up, families withdraw their children from the labor market. 
There are a few empirical studies that substantiate this claim (Edmonds 2003). 
 
       However, historically, increases in real wages have not always followed 
the same timeline as the decline of child labor (Cunningham and Viazzo 1996). 
Increasing wages may actually expand the demand for child labor, as wage 
differences between children and adults makes child labor cheap, as long as 
adult labor and child labor are substitutable. Technological innovation may make 
them non-substitutable and an increase in male wages may make children’s 
income redundant. At the same time, the question is whether the male’s 
wages were sufficient, as some author’s doubt they were so (Van Poppel, 
Van Dalen, and Walhout 2009). The answer may lie in the nature of children’s 
work. Current-day studies suggest that children’s work complements rather 
than substitutes men’s employment and that children’s low-cost work is in 
part because it is less productive labor (Freije and López-Calva 2001; see for 
a short review: Bourdillon 2010, 80–82). This complementary nature means 
families may devise strategies that allow children to both go to school and still 
work.46 Children’s labor becomes less essential to the households income and 
more resources become available to send children to school.
 
      Several theories suggest possible survival strategy adjustments on the part 
of the family. The most prominent one is the switch from a “high quantity” of 
45     There is a persistent conviction that small hands would be better suited to work on tasks like looming. 
However, recent evidence has refuted this (Bourdillon 2010, 27; ILO and IPEC-SIMPOC 2007, 20–22).
46     Which, in turn, may be why compulsory education legislation is better to enforce than child labor 
legislation (Basu 1999, 1115). 
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children (the number of children) to “higher quality” of children (higher human 
capital investment per child) (Becker and Lewis 1973). Low-income households 
may apply such a strategy when they are forced by legal sanctions to curb 
children’s labor, although at first they may oppose such legal restrictions, 
because it endangers their economic household strategy (Doepke and Zilibotti 
2003). Chapter 3 investigates this premise and finds limited evidence for a 
QQT throughout a selection of 14 countries. Yet, other strategies are available 
to (large) families as well. Lingwall found for the U.S. between 1880 and 1920, 
though compulsory education laws had positive effects on school attendance, 
they also resulted in decreased school attendance and increase labor force 
participation of older children whose schooling was no longer compulsory, and 
whose additional income was used to fund the education of younger siblings 
(Lingwall 2014b). 
 
      Such strategy adjustments were in all likelihood aided by a rise in the 
economic value of education, for example because of organizational or 
technological change that requires skilled labor and makes adults and 
child labor unsubstitutable. The industrial revolution propelled such new 
technological innovations, which in turn raised the returns to education. Some 
caution of such claims is prudent. Empirical evidence suggests that educated 
individuals have a comparative advantage in raising educated children, which 
might create a poverty trap, in which the poor continue to choose high fertility 
rates with low investment in children’s education (Moav 2005). In other words, it 
is uncertain that the economic value of education would be sufficiently obvious 
to all layers of society, and thus withhold families from having fewer children and 
invest more in education. 
 
      The effectiveness of legislation, as shown in this paper, might be another, 
possibly more feasible, external shock affecting (short-term) family decisions 
towards schooling and fertility. Child labor and compulsory education legislation 
makes having a large family costly, and could provide an exogenous ‘push’ 
because having a large amount of children simply became too expensive. 
Strategy adjustments may not have led directly to a lower fertility, but to a higher 
educated generation, in turn leading to a decrease in fertility. There is some 
other evidence for this as well, for example, Murtin (2013) showed that primary 
schooling was a robust determinant of the fertility transition. 
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       The above interpretation is on the basis of almost exclusively economic 
arguments, and this represents only part of the considerations to schooling. 
Both the historical time period of ratification and the entity that decreed 
legislation were found to be of importance in the analysis, which indicates that 
the effectiveness of legislation is context-specific and that the playing field 
changes over time. That the average years of education increased was also 
due to a shift in cultural values in parts of the world, and the successful export 
of these values in later times. The nineteenth century witnessed a shift from 
children as a useful economic buffer to the working-class family, to children as 
“economically useless but emotionally priceless”, in both working – and middle-
class families (Heywood 2013). Romanticism fostered an image of childhood 
as dependent and in need of protection (Davin 1982; Cunningham 1991). 
This combined with thoughts on the need for education of children, which had 
already been increasing in influence in the West since the Enlightenment.47 
Where in the early nineteenth century, child labor was often commended as 
necessary for building character and discipline, in the late nineteenth century 
children’s economic assistance was framed as parental exploitation, keeping 
children away from school. At the time, the goal of many child labor laws was in 
fact not the eradication of child labor, but an attempt to regulate working hours 
in such a way that a minimum of education could be achieved (Zelizer 1985). 
  
       At the same time this shift in the notion of childhood and the value of 
education tied in with another cultural shift in the late nineteenth century, that 
of the male breadwinner model. Rising male wages meant a husband could 
earn a “family wage”, which enabled wives and children to enjoy either leisure 
or schooling. The family wage may have been a necessity as well, as work 
opportunities for women and children disappeared and their dependence on 
husbands and fathers increased. Both theoretical paths seem viable, as we 
have seen that child labor legislation was effective (dependence), as were male 
real wages (family wage). 
 
      Legislation is most likely to be supportive to certain processes already at 
work in society and the economy. Put in other words, without support from 
below, legislation is most likely to fail in promoting education, even when 
enforced. The above shifts explain some of the trends for mainly the west, 
47     Children needed to be educated either because they were tainted with ‘original sin’, a thought both 
the Protestant and Catholics shared.  But it could also be because their mind was - of Locke’s words - a 
tabula rasa which could be molded in the right form (Heywood 2013). 
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but only for part of “the rest”. A reason for the effectiveness of international 
legislation may be due to the export of cultural values and economic systems 
that promote or require a certain level of education. In the late nineteenth 
century, taking part of international conventions and installing a mass education 
system increased national prestige in the interstate world system (Ramirez and 
Boli 1987). Our analysis provided some first evidence for the effectiveness 
of child labor legislation on schooling, meaning that the introduction of this 
legislation was not a matter of prestige alone. For example, states discovered 
that mass schooling could contribute to the formation of national identity (Stoer 
and Cortesão 2007, 223; van der Vleuten 2009). UNESCO played a significant 
role in promoting education, since the 1945 because by collecting national 
education data it became painfully visible what countries remained behind. 
 
      These are but some interpretations of the found associations. They hold 
for a majority of countries, but not for the entire world. A case where child 
labor legislation is less effective is in India. Weiner (1991) and Basu (1991; 
2001) show that in the Indian setting, it is poverty that drives children into work. 
Because of the “socio-economic” circumstances, it is nearly impossible to drive 
up male wages enough to provide for entire families. The state cannot afford to 
set up a complete welfare system either, and thus families remain dependent on 
children’s wages. However, though child labor is not abolished in this setting, it 
is heavily curbed to exclude children from the most dangerous occupations and 
promote schooling.48 These practices are reminiscent of some states in the U.S. 
over a century ago, where child labor and compulsory education laws served 
similar purposes (Zelizer 1985, 61). 
  
In the end, there is merit in both the argument that schooling is furthered 
by legislation, and the argument that claims increasing wages and wealth 
increased educational participation. To answer the question asked in the 
introduction, is it coercion and punitive measures that drive educational 
attainment, or is it the voluntary withdrawal of children as a result of higher 
income: it seems to be a bit of both. Throughout almost all specifications, 
legislation on child labor and compulsory education has proved an effective 
means of – eventually – raising the average years of education in a country. 
48    Weiner (1991) argues that compulsory education legislation is more effective here than child labor 
legislation, because it is easier to enforce. 
2.6  Conclusion
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However, unskilled real wages were less robust to the inclusion of our control 
variable, most importantly GDP per capita. I showed that builders’ real wages 
could still have an independent significant effect from GDP per capita, but this 
was not the case in all specifications. In the future, it would be interesting to 
compare these wages with other groups (skilled workers) and differentiate by 
gender. Average years of education are an aggregate measure of education, 
which limits the capacity to measure immediate responses to legislation or real 
wages. Though both measures have an effect over time, they are less likely to 
have an immediate effect on household decisions towards schooling, but more 
likely to have an intergenerational effect. For a family, the foregone costs to 
child labor need to be compensated in one way or another, for which several 
strategies are available. The next chapter will discuss a prominent strategy: 
the trade-off from a high number of children, to a lower, educated number of 
children.  
 
       As is the result of any study, these answers lead to many new questions, 
providing fuel for further research. Two questions in particular would be worth 
closer examination. Firstly, the effects of child labor legislation on schooling via 
fertility could be explored more in depth. Ending child labor may make having 
a large family a sub-optimal and costly choice, and might tip the scales in favor 
of limiting fertility and investing in education, à la Becker. In short, legislation for 
child labor may make children too expensive. Similar work has been done for 
compulsory education, but not yet for child labor (Murtin 2013). 
 
       Secondly, the analysis would benefit from a division by gender, both 
within the dependent variable of education, and the independent variable 
of real wages.  Children’s labor has been shown to compete with women’s 
work in terms of temporary and unskilled work (Bourdillon 2010, 81). High 
fertility could thus substitute female labor participation and could be a safer 
short-term strategy in comparison to investing in human capital. In the case of 
Belgium 1800-1914, De  Herdt (1996) suggests that higher wages for adult 
women than for children may have been a reason for the greater participation 
of adult women in the Belgian labor market. The relationship with women’s real 
wages, children’s education (especially of girls) and legislation would thus be 
interesting to develop further. Hopefully in the future, new data will become 
available to tests such ideas.  
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QUANTITY VERSUS QUALITY: HOUSEHOLD      
STRUCTURE, NUMBER OF SIBLINGS, AND 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE LONG 
NINTEENTH CENTURY
Written with Auke Rijpma and Sarah Carmichael as chapter 4 in J.L. van Zanden, A. Rijpma and 
J. Kok (Eds.), Agency, gender, and economic development in the World Economy, 1850-2000: 
Testing the Sen Hypothesis.49  
 
      In chapter 2 I looked at schooling using macro-data. This study will use 
micro-data to analyze what strategies households may apply when being 
faced with a choice of schooling on the one hand, and limited resources on 
the other. We zoom in on a specific strategy: the trade-off from child quality to 
child quantity as modeled by Becker (Becker 1960; Becker 1991; Becker and 
Lewis 1973). Becker postulated the existence of the quantity-quality trade-off 
(the QQT), implying that parents, given a limited set of resources, face a choice 
between investing in child quantity (the number of children) or child quality (e.g. 
education).50 This model is popular amongst economists, particularly those 
working on Unified Growth Theory (UGT). It puts the QQT centre-stage as 
an essential mechanism in the nineteenth and twentieth century shift from a 
situation of Malthusian stagnation toward sustained growth (Galor, 2005; Galor 
& Weil, 2000). Technological innovation during the later phases of the Industrial 
49    Accepted for the Gender and Well-Being book series at Ashgate (ed. Christina Borderias). 
50    In this model, parents derive utility from their children. Under budget constraints households then 
maximize utility by investing in a combination of quantity and quality. If we turn to the evolutionary biology 
literature then pursuing a quality or quantity strategy does not have to be a conscious choice but is rather 
driven by environmental factors. The environment dictates whether pursuing a quantity or quality strategy 
will best ensure the passing on of one’s genes to the next generation.
3.1  Introduction 
3  
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Revolution is supposed to have raised returns to education (O’Rourke, Rahman, 
and Taylor 2013), which made it attractive for parents to have fewer children 
while investing more in their education. Unified Growth Theory thus models 
the connection between the transition to modern economic growth and the 
demographic transition. 
 
       In Western Europe the demographic transition occurred 100-150 years 
ago, which means data is difficult to acquire for most countries. This makes 
testing the model challenging and the empirical findings for more recent data 
are mixed (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005; Qian 2009). However, with 
the recent surge in large-scale collaborative historical data projects (Ruggles 
2012), microdata has become available to test the existence of the QQT using 
historical data from before, during or directly after the demographic transition of 
various countries.  
 
       Other than the implications of Unified Growth Theory a further two 
reasons exist for exploring the existence of the QQT in the context of the 
demographic transition. The first is that with the advent of compulsory schooling 
and high levels of government schooling subsidy, the link between parental 
fertility decisions and investments in child quality are altered. The costs of 
children increase due to compulsory schooling. The second is that in a post-
demographic transition era fertility in general is much lower, giving less scope 
for variation in the variable of interest. 
 
       While this paper focuses on household influences on children’s education, 
the context these households operate in is also very important. For example, 
recent research suggests that the introduction of child labour laws substantially 
increased costs per child, though the enforcement of these laws was not 
successful in all countries (Doepke and Zilibotti 2005). Compulsory schooling 
also increased the cost of children, not only because of their forgone income, 
but also because of the costs that accompanied formal education, such as 
books or travel expenses (see: van der Vleuten 2009; Humphries 2010, 319). 
Compulsory schooling thus put pressure on families to limit their size.  
 
      This chapter, therefore, explores the existence of the QQT in pre-1920 
micro-data across a variety of contexts. We define the QQT as the idea that 
children of families with a greater number of offspring will be less educated 
than those with lower numbers of offspring. The underlying idea is to see if 
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common denominators can be identified that determine if the trade-off occurs. 
Additionally, we explore which other determinants of educational outcomes exist 
at the household level. To the best of our knowledge, this approach has not been 
applied before, with most historical studies limiting themselves to one country. 
 
      One determinant of particular interest is how decision-making power is 
distributed in the household, with specific reference to the position of women. 
The hypothesis is that societies with an improved bargaining position for women 
will exhibit a greater tendency to switch from quantity to quality of offspring.  
The literature suggests that the relative power of spouses may have an effect 
on average years of schooling. Recently, Diebolt and Perrin (2013) have 
developed a growth model to show that female empowerment is an important 
factor in determining fertility and the investment in the education of offspring. 
The bargaining position of mothers in particular, is thought to have a positive 
influence on the educational attainment of children and, above all, daughters 
(Thomas 1990; 1994). Other household members may also be important 
for decisions regarding children’s education. For example, extended family 
members in the household may also matter, e.g. the presence of aunts, uncles or 
grandparents (Duflo 2003; Ragsdale 2004). 
 
      Overall, we find mixed evidence for the QQT. In some samples we find it 
while in others we fail to. In order to try and explain when it does and does not 
occur we turn to a number of country level variables that capture the position 
of women and economic development. There seems to be a relation between 
economic development and the likelihood of a QQT existing and its strength. 
At the micro-level, upward extensions to the household (grandparents) appear 
to be beneficial for children’s enrolment. Indicators of a strong position of the 
mother, such as literacy or occupational status, can also have a positive effect.
 
       The chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature 
on the QQT and other household-level influences on fertility and human capital 
formation. After a discussion of the data and methods, the results are presented. 
The final section concludes.
Since schooling usually happens at a young age, educational decisions are, to 
an important extent, determined in the households children grow up in. It is in 
3.2  Determinants of children’s education
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the context of the household that resources and time need to be reserved for 
the education of children. In his work on the economics of the family, Becker 
famously asserted the existence of a quantity-quality trade-off (Becker 1960; 
Becker 1991; Becker and Lewis 1973). The QQT, according to Becker, means 
that parents face a choice between having fewer children, and investing more 
intensely in the human capital of those fewer children or alternatively, choosing 
to produce quantity (more children) over quality. Becker has proposed a number 
of explanations for the choice between quality over quantity and its relation to 
parental income, including preferences for child quality, increasing opportunity 
costs of (child rearing) time, and the fact that if parents want to treat their 
children equally, increases in quality must apply to all children, thus increasing 
the price of additional quality at a higher number of children (Becker and Lewis 
1973).51
 
       Numerous contemporary empirical studies have provided support for 
Becker’s models (Hanushek 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980; De Moor and 
van Zanden 2008; Steelman and Powell 1989; see: Steelman et al. 2002 for a 
review).52 With reduced fertility, human capital investment per child increases. 
Many growth models stress the importance of technological development and 
human capital in stimulating the shift from investments in quantity to quality. 
Parents are motivated to limit fertility and increase the amount of human capital 
per child because of the increasing expected returns to education, due to more 
rapid technological change (Galor and Weil 2000).53 An alternative explanation 
is that women will face higher opportunity costs to child rearing if their 
participation in the labour force increases. Again, technology plays a role in this 
by weakening the male strength advantage and thus increasing female labour 
force participation (Galor and Weil 1996). 
 
      The importance of both education and fertility decline for economic growth 
and development makes the study of the quantity-quality trade-off especially 
51     This is a fairly stringent assumption in the face of variations in the way given children are valued i.e. if 
younger or male children are treated differently from their siblings. In the absence of strong preferences on 
child quality and/or income effects, the QQT at the individual level would breakdown if not all children are 
treated equally. This makes a comparative approach, such as the one included in the paper, all the more 
valuable.
52     Outcomes of ‘quality’ are not only educational by nature; they can also be health or social status 
attainment but in general, in the economic literature, quality has been defined in terms of educational 
investments (see Carmichael, Störmer and Rijpma 2015 for an attempt to bring together the economic 
approach with evolutionary biology, where the emphasis of the QQT is more on health and survival).
53     The benefits here are construed in terms of utility for the parents, not necessarily remittances.
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relevant for developing countries. However, the empirical record on the trade-off 
in developing countries yields mixed results. For instance, Vogl (2013)  looks 
at micro data for 48 developing countries and finds evidence for changing 
preferences in terms of the quality and quantity of children. Other results 
corroborate such findings (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 1997; Jun 2013; Li, 
Zhang, and Zhu 2008). In contrast, Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) look 
at Israeli microdata for 1983 and 1995 and systematically fail to find evidence 
for a trade-off. Several other scholars failed to find a strong relationship (Black, 
Devereux, and Salvanes 2005; Lu and Treiman 2008; Buchmann and Hannum 
2001 for a review).  
 
     Historical studies exist that provide evidence for the link between family size 
and educational attainment, though data requirements make this challenging. 
These include macro-level studies on Prussia between 1816 and 1867 (Becker, 
Cinnirella, and Woessmann 2010) as well as micro-level investigations such 
as England 1700-1830 (Klemp and Weisdorf 2011), Spain 1900-1920 (Basso 
2013) and the Netherlands 1812-1883 (Vandezande, Matthijs, and Kok 2011). 
The trade-off was also found for a number of different cities, i.e. Antwerp 
1846-1920 (Van Bavel et al. 2011)54, and different cities in Prussia 1875-1910 
(Galloway, Lee, and Hammel 1998). Fernihough (2011) studies Dublin and 
Belfast for 1911 and found a significant effect of sibship size on the probability 
of school enrolment in both localities. However, Clark and Cummings (2015) 
fail to find a QQT effect for England between 1750 and 1879. The historical 
record provides an important testing ground for exploring whether the trade-off 
occurs. Moreover, to assess the plausibility of UGT, it is important to explore 
the existence of the QQT in historical societies. Looking at countries during the 
period in which their demographic transition occurred, could shed light on the 
determinants of the trade-off.  
       
       Besides the number of siblings a given child has, the sex of those siblings 
can also matter, particularly in a situation of son preference. In such a context 
parents will not limit fertility, but instead keep expanding the family until the 
desired sex composition is reached. Lee (2008) looks at South-Korea in the 
1990s and finds evidence of son preference. Using the sex of the first child 
as an instrument, he shows the detrimental effect of a larger sibling size on 
54     We note that this paper investigates the relationship between family size and intergenerational social 
mobility, as measured by skill level of the occupation of the next generation. 
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educational attainment.55 Using historical data, Vandezande, Matthijs and 
Kok (2011) find that in Netherlands between 1850 and 1920, investment in 
boys’ education was no greater than that for girls, measured in terms of their 
literacy. They do find that older sisters seem to help younger sisters. Once 
again, empirical studies on the last 25 years show varied results. Some find 
no evidence of sibship composition affecting the limitation of fertility and 
educational attainment (Kaestner 1997; Hauser and Kuo 1998), whereas others 
do (Butcher and Case 1994; Zeng et al. 2012; Yamauchi and Tiongco 2013).
 
       As the above demonstrates, the inverse relationship between child quantity 
and quality is not a straightforward one. Its embedding in different cultural 
contexts influences its existence or presence. The relationship is confounded 
when different family attributes are introduced, such as the birth order, the sex 
ratio of the sibship and whether the family is nuclear or complex. Bras, Kok, 
and Mandemakers (2010), for instance, find a relationship between sibship size 
and occupational status attainment for the Netherlands in the period 1840-
1925. However, they also show that sometimes the impact of a large family on 
attainment may be neutral or even positive. One of the possible explanations 
they give for this is the security provided by extended (kin) networks. 
 
      Besides siblings, therefore, other extensions of the family might also have 
an impact on the educational attainment of children. An extended family could 
include a variety of upward (grandparents) and lateral kin extensions, such as 
aunts, uncles, but also cousins and nephews or nieces. It is difficult to assess 
the impact of these additional household members, because co-residence 
occurs for different reasons. For families with limited resources, doubling-up 
with other family members provides the possibility of economies of scale and 
improves the household’s scope for division of labour. Grandparents, aunts 
and uncles can provide childcare or contribute in other ways to the family 
budget (Duflo 2003; Jamison et al. 2002). Related to this is the ‘grandmother 
hypothesis’, the idea that post-reproductive women positively support the health 
and education status of their grandchildren (Duflo 2003; Gibson and Mace 
2005; Parker and Short 2009). Children from poor families might benefit from 
these additions to the household because more resources are available. 
 
55     When son preference is present, those families with more daughters in earlier phases of fertility end 
up with a larger number of children (Lee 2008).
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      However, when these kin cannot contribute to the household economy, 
due to age or infirmity, they may act as a drain on resources. In addition, the 
inclusion of young lateral extensions such as cousins, nephews and nieces 
may drain household resources. Globally as well as historically, families and 
households come in a wide variety of forms. The question arises whether 
different patterns of co-residence will have different effects on the educational 
outcomes of their offspring. 
 
      Women bear the bulk of the opportunity costs of fertility, which might result 
in a disparity in fertility preferences within the household. Diebolt and Perrin 
(2013) use this idea to develop a growth model that suggests that the position 
of women within the household matters for the shift from quantity to quality. 
Studies from development economics also indicate that differences in female 
bargaining power within the household might be a fruitful factor to explore 
further, as various studies show that the household position of women directly 
impacts fertility behaviour (Mason 1987; Jejeebhoy 1995; Alvarez 2011). A 
substantial literature on household bargaining power underlines the importance 
of resource distribution and the relative position of household members in 
resource allocation. It has been shown that, relative to men, women tend to 
favour children in their resource allocation behaviour (Handa 1994; Hoddinott 
and Haddad 1995; Thomas 1990; 1994; Thomas, Strauss, and Henriques 
1991; Doss 2012). A stronger position of women in the household can thus 
positively influence children’s education.
 
       Moreover, a stronger position for women in the household allows women 
to build their own human capital stock, for example by accumulating skills from 
working outside the home. In turn, women with higher human capital are better 
able to negotiate the limitation or postponement of fertility (Jejeebhoy 1995). 
Maternal education has been shown to have a positive impact on children’s 
nutrition and health (Behrman and Wolfe 1989; Glick and Sahn 2000; 
Schultz 1993a), thus lowering child mortality rates. The relationship between 
mother’s and children’s education seems to be more robust than that of 
father’s education. There is historical evidence to support the above premises. 
For Prussia between 1816 and 1867, Becker, Cinnirella, and Woessmann 
(2010) show the link between women’s education and their fertility before the 
demographic transition and find a strong negative effect. Baizan and Camps 
(2007) look at the effects of female education and professional achievement 
on fertility decline in Spain over the period 1920-1980, and find that women’s 
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education had a very significant impact on fertility decline. A strong position of 
women in the household seems, therefore, to be conducive to higher resource 
allocation towards children. 
 
       To test the position of women within the household with limited historical 
data, marriage patterns can be used as an indicator. Delayed marriage – which 
coincides often with the delayed onset of childbearing – is associated with 
decreased fertility and greater human capital investment (Field and Ambrus 
2008). A small spousal age gap – the age difference between husband and 
wife – may indicate a situation with relatively high female bargaining power 
compared to a marriage where girls are married to men many years their senior 
(Carmichael 2011; Carmichael, De Moor, and van Zanden 2011).56 
 
       On the basis of the above we formulate the following hypotheses. First, we 
expect sibship size to be inversely related to educational attainment, meaning 
that a higher number of siblings within a household will be associated with 
a lower likelihood that children will be enrolled in school, or less likely to be 
literate. Second, the sex composition of a set of siblings may inhibit the QQT 
in a situation of son preference. We therefore explore whether the number of 
sisters or brothers have different effects on educational outcomes than the 
number of siblings in general, and whether being male increases or decreases 
the chance of being enrolled. Third, we expect that a stronger female position, 
as indicated by a lower spousal age gap or mother’s educational attainment, 
will lead to higher educational investment per child and lower fertility. Lastly, we 
hypothesise that the presence of extended kin within the household can either 
be detrimental or beneficial to educational attainment of children.
To explore these hypotheses without running into issues of ecological fallacy, 
micro-data is needed (Guinnane 2011). To this end, we use census micro-
data. This is not the ideal data with which to study the QQT. To test the sort 
of hypotheses we set out above, longitudinal microdata (life-course or family 
reconstitution data) providing completed fertility would be best suited. This can 
show exactly how many children a couple had, rather than merely showing how 
many children were present at the time of the census. Longitudinal data can 
56     It must be kept in mind, though, that the majority of our datasets come from regions west of the Hajnal 
line so might not provide enough variation in order to say anything meaningful about this. The literature cited 
here use data at the level of the region or country where different mechanisms may be at work than at the 
microlevel.
3.3  Data
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provide a range of outcomes to measure child quality. For example, besides 
literacy longitudinal data can provide information on status attainment at a 
later age (conditional on parental status attainment), thus giving much more 
encompassing information than the snapshots of a census. Nonetheless, 
data on level of schooling and official enrolment are rarely found in family 
reconstitution data. 
 
      There are examples of historical, longitudinal microdata (an overview of 
the possibilities of historical microdata in Ruggles 2012). However, they are 
of a far more limited number than the micro-census data we use here. While 
census microdata does not allow for the same detailed analysis of fertility as 
longitudinal data, its wider availability means it is possible to include a much 
broader sample of countries. The data used here therefore allows us to look at 
a far wider range of national contexts, thus giving a bird’s eye view of in what 
contexts the QQT occurs. This would not be possible with longitudinal data.
The aim of this paper is thus to bring together as many examples of pre-1920 
census data at the microlevel as possible in order to test the QQT in a range 
of societies. At the very least, we require microdata that gives information on 
household size and a measure of education of the children. We have used 
complete or sampled census data or similar for Ireland, Canada, the USA, 
Scotland, England and Wales (Minnesota Population Center 2008; National 
Archives of Ireland 2014). We have further used micro level data for towns or 
regions in Serbia, Germany, Italy, Austria, Albania and Switzerland. The data 
covering towns or regions in central and Eastern Europe has been collected 
from the data releases of the MOSAIC project which aims to make available 
comprehensive census micro-data sources for Europe and beyond. The other 
data we use comes from a variety of sources. Most importantly, they come 
from the North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP) website which, similarly to 
MOSAIC, aims to provide historical micro-data for Great Britain, Germany, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States from 1801-1910. The table 
below presents an overview of the data used for this paper. 
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Table 3.1 Regional and national datasets used for the current version 
Panel A: Regional datasets
sample year sample % original
number of 
households
households 
analysed
Rostock 1867 1867-1867 100 6748 1701
San Marcello (Italy) 1827 1827-1827 100 278 72
Kruja (Albania) 1918 1918-1918 100 1361 381
Rostock (Germany) 
1900 1900-1900 100 14144 3697
Jasenica (Serbia) 1884 1884-1884 100 1474 674
Zurich (Zwitserland) 
1870 1870-1870 100 1537 364
Panel B: National datasets 
sample year sample % original
number of 
households
households 
analysed
Hungary 1869 1869-1869 0.3 6572 1059
Austria 1632-1947 1632-1947 unknown 26370 4247
Austria 1910 1910-1910 unknown 4124 363
Ireland 1911 1911-1911 5 36558 7475
Ireland 1901 1901-1901 5 35094 7612
Scotland 1881 1881-1881 100 73708 13588
England and Wales 1881 1881-1881 100 53252 9756
Great Britain 1851 1851-1851 2 7802 2939
USA 1860 1860-1860 1 53830 19336
USA 1850 1850-1850 1 37010 13605
USA 1870 1870-1870 1 78703 27138
USA 1880b 1880-1880 10 116852 53919
USA 1900 1900-1900 5 82523 35738
USA 1910 1910-1910 1 217622 62100
Canada 1901 1901-1901 100 51774 14525
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            Typically, the census micro-data is organised by enumerating each 
individual or a sample of individuals in a country or region. In the censuses 
employed here, each individual’s place in their household is also provided. 
This is done by specifying the relation to the household head (e.g. son, wife, 
or mother of the household head). In addition, the occupation, age, ethnicity, 
schooling, and religion of each individual may be reported (although this is 
not consistently available). Micro-data lacking any data on the relation to the 
household head or schooling were disregarded.
      While some of the data was already integrated and processed (the NAPP 
data and some of the Mosaic data, see below for more detailed description), 
other data required substantial cleaning before it could be used (e.g. Ireland). 
All data needed to be harmonised so that we could be sure that the analysis for 
each sample was as similar as possible. After all, if we want to say something 
about differences in countries regarding household structure and educational 
outcomes, the data should be as comparable as possible. Otherwise we 
increase the risk of attributing differences to country characteristics while they 
are actually caused by differences in the coding of the data.
 
       Enrolment was gathered either from occupational information or from a 
variable directly reporting enrolment. The latter option was only possible in the 
USA and Canadian samples. Wherever it was available we also used literacy 
as a robustness check. In many cases the enrolment data had to be obtained 
from the literal transcription of the occupation, which meant that a lot of spelling 
variations had to be processed (in the case of Ireland this held for the literacy 
data as well). String distance packages were used to facilitate this using Jaro-
Winkler distance (van der Loo 2014). In some cases a similar procedure was 
used for the coding of occupations, the relation to the household head, sex, 
and religious affiliation. These and other variables were harmonised to a more 
manageable number of possibilities. 
 
       It was also important to have information on whether or not the household 
was in an urban location. Often this was already coded in the micro-data; in 
other cases the data was matched to the extended database on city sizes 
of Bosker, Buringh, and van Zanden (2013). The data was also geocoded at 
the country level to be able to combine it with country-level data. Additionally, 
geocoding was occasionally done at the village level to be able to cluster 
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villages for regional controls that covered enough observations.57  Finally, it 
was necessary to create identifiers for households and persons. In most cases 
this was already done in the micro-data, but in some cases the information on 
household identifiers had to be derived from information on the address and the 
relation to the household head.
 
       An additional step was made to exclude unreliable or unrepresentative 
observations. This was particularly pertinent for households that had multiple 
heads of households. These turned out to often be larger scale institutions 
(think poor houses, orphanages, boarding schools) and would thus skew the 
results as they would show a large number of children going to school. In order 
to ensure that these observations were excluded from the dataset we applied 
the NAPP-definition of an institution to other datasets and dropped households 
with 10 or more members unrelated to the head. 
 
      With the data harmonised, it still needed to be reshaped to get household-
level observations for each variable. For each child, observations were created 
on the number of siblings, brothers, sisters, servants, extended and lateral 
household members, whether there were twins in the household, and the 
birth order of each child. Moreover, all available relevant parental information 
(occupation, literacy, religion, ethnicity) was added. From this, the spousal age 
gap and the implied age of the mother at first child were also calculated. 
 
      A final step was the selection of relevant cases. If schooling was mandatory 
for children of a certain age, we should not expect there to be much variation 
in their enrolment. Also, in the case of mandatory schooling the mechanism is 
no longer one of parental choice for investments in quality over quantity. For 
this reason we collected data on the age to which school was mandatory in the 
various countries considered (table 3.2). We then only looked at the enrolment 
(and literacy) of children older than this, yet below age 16. 
57     Google’s geocoding API was used to geocode villages: Google Maps. 2016. 
“Google Maps Geocoding API.” Accessed May 26 2016. https://developers.google.com/maps/
documentation/geocoding/start.
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Table 3.2 Mandatory schooling ages
Sample iso3 year age
mos-austria-1910 AUT 1910 12
mos-austria-1632_1947 AUT < 1774 -a
mos-austria-1632_1947 AUT 1774–1869 12
mos-austria-1632_1947 AUT 1869–1947 13
napp-canada-1891 CAN 1891 13
canfamilies-canada-1901 CAN 1901 13
mos-hungary-1869 HUN 1869 11
arch-ie-ireland-1901 IRL 1901 13
arch-ie-ireland-1911 IRL 1911 14
mos-jasenica-1884 SRB 1884 -
mos-kruja-1918 ALB 1918 -
napp-usa-1850 USA 1850 -
napp-usa-1870 USA 1870 -
napp-usa-1880b USA 1880 -
napp-usa-1900 USA 1900 -
napp-usa-1910 USA 1910 -
mos-rostock-1867 DEU 1867 -
napp-englandwales-1881-1pc GBR 1881 12
napp-great_britain-1851 GBR 1851 -
mos-rostock-1900 DEU 1900 -
mos-san_marcello-1827 ITA 1827 -
napp-scotland-1881-10pc GBR 1881 12
mos-zurich-1870 CHE 1870 -
Notes: a The (-) indicates that there is no mandatory age of schooling. 
We also constrained the data so that the age of the mother at the time of the 
census was between 18 and 49. The implied age of the mother at birth of first 
child was calculated by subtracting the age of the oldest child from her age. If 
this age was implausible (14 or lower), implying for example that some of the 
children were from a previous marriage of the household head, the observations 
were dropped.   
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      As mentioned above, an issue with census data is that it rarely provides 
information on completed family size, let alone intended family size. While 
longitudinal data may provide the former, the latter is the exclusive realm of 
modern-day surveys. We nonetheless think that an analysis of the QQT using 
census data is valuable due to its broad historical coverage. However, it is 
necessary to control for the possibility that children have already left home 
or that a couple is at the start of their reproductive career we include the 
implied age of the mother at first birth. At low ages of mothers at first birth, 
the household may not yet be completed. At high implied ages at first birth, 
it is more likely that some of the siblings have already left the household. The 
summary statistics also provides figures on the singulate mean age at leaving 
home (Steckel 1996) to assess any differences in this regard between the 
samples. 
 
      It is important to consider issues that might arise due to any biases in 
sibship size caused by the fact that we do not observe completed or intended 
family size. Note first that, on average, we would still expect households where 
the parents intend to have many children to show up in the census with more 
children. If the QQT exists, any bias in the estimates would be upwards (closer 
to zero): children with many siblings might have more siblings than we observe 
they do. The lower the average age at leaving home in society is, the larger this 
bias would be. A further issue, due to the fact that we measure sibship size 
inaccurately, is the introduction of noise. This means we need a large number 
of observations to measure the effect of sibship size on educational outcomes. 
Finally, looking at the number of children present in the household also has 
some advantages over looking at completed sibship size. In a situation where 
saving or borrowing is difficult, competition for resources is mostly between 
children present in the household, not those that have left the household. 
 
      A different issue is that we possibly underestimate the amount of enrolled 
children in some cross-sections because of how they were recorded. Some 
datasets provide information directly about the enrolment of children. Others 
provide information on school enrolment as reported in the occupational 
status. In the latter, we frequently find no occupation reported, and this under-
registration seems to vary by country and by individual census taker. Similar 
issues of occupational under-reporting arise in defining women’s occupational 
status, which in our datasets is seldom reported. The under-reporting of married 
women’s work in censuses is a recurring issue that all scholars face in working 
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with census data and has been addressed as such in the literature (Humphries 
and Sarasúa 2012; Schmidt and van Nederveen Meerkerk 2012).58  
 
      Lastly, the classification of occupations differs per data source. Some 
of the NAPP and Mosaic data classifies occupations using OCCHISCO, 
which we aggregate to control for occupation. The U.S. censuses also report 
imputed incomes for occupations, which were preferred as a control over 
occupational dummies when they were available. Likewise, the UK censuses 
provide occupational status scores for the occupations that were also preferred 
over the dummies. Others lack such structuring of the data, in which case we 
assigned dummies to the most frequently occurring occupations. Tables 3.3 
and 3.4 present summary statistics. Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics for 
the entire dataset whereas table 3.4 presents a number of variables specifically 
for the sample we used in each case. The continued summary statistics for 
the unharmonised dataset can be found in table A3.1 and table A3.2 of the 
Appendix. 
58     The under-registration of women’s work in the nineteenth century can be interpreted as the official 
outlet of the ideal of the male bread-winner family, prohibiting married women participating in the labour 
force (Humphries and Sarasúa 2012; Schmidt and Van Nederveen Meerkerk 2012).
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics for total datasets
Country
Sex 
ratio 
total
Population 
under 20
Mean 
age
Female 
SMAM
Male 
SMAM
Mean age 
at leaving 
home
Spousal 
age gap
Hungary 1869 0.98 0.48 24.4 20.95 25.82 18.04 4.87
Rostock 1867 1.04 0.37 28.28 28.23 30.37 16.84 2.14
San Marcello 1827 0.97 0.33 30.73 26.68 27.9 18.61 1.22
Kruja 1918 0.96 0.44 26.97 18.75 27.41 16.66 8.66
Rostock 1900 1.17 0.38 29.18 25.24 27.25 17.45 2.01
Jasenica 1884 0.97 0.53 21.06 19.55 22.87 17.76 3.33
Zurich 1870 1.34 0.31 30.08 29.09 30.07 16.88 0.97
Austria 1632-1947 1.06 0.38 30.91 28.73 30.96 16.98 2.23
Austria 1910 0.97 0.41 29.11 27.59 31.3 17.41 3.72
Ireland 1911 0.99 0.39 30.3 29.03 32.93 18.31 3.9
Ireland 1901 1.01 0.42 28.46 28.65 32.42 18.34 3.77
Scotland 1881 1.04 0.53 23.19 26.6 28.46 18.23 1.85
England and Wales 
1881 1.05 0.52 23.12 26.03 27.2 18.29 1.16
Great Britain 1851 1.03 0.5 23.75 26.65 28.12 17.72 1.47
Great Britain 1851 1.03 0.5 23.75 26.65 28.12 17.72 1.47
USA 1860 0.96 0.51 22.68 NA NA 18.88 NA
USA 1850 0.96 0.52 22.29 NA NA 18.76 NA
USA 1870 0.99 0.5 23.47 NA NA 18.79 NA
USA 1880 0.96 0.54 22.23 23.96 27.72 18.96 3.76
USA 1900 0.95 0.5 23.7 24.5 28.5 19.35 4.01
USA 1910 0.95 0.42 26.63 23.08 26.8 19.04 3.71
Canada 1901 0.95 0.45 26.26 25.45 28.68 19.51 3.23
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Table 3.4 Summary statistics for analysed data
Country N children
N 
house-
holds
Mother 
age first 
child
Lateral 
Exten-
sions
Upward 
exten-
sions
All 
exten-
sions
Servants
House-
holds with 
twins
Hungary 
1869
1304 1059 23.08 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.03
Rostock 
1867
3236 1701 26.53 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.32 0.03
San 
Marcello
1827
139 72 23.15 NA NA 0.22 0.36 0.04
Kruja 1918 689 381 25.81 0.35 0.35 0.49 0.07 0.02
Rostock 
1900 6862 3697 25.13 0.03 0.07 0.1 0.03 0.02
Jasenica 
1884 1380 674 21.91 0.26 0.14 0.32 0.04 0.07
Zurich 1870 677 364 25.77 NA NA 0.15 0.62 0.02
Austria 
1632-1947 6590 4247 25.09 NA NA 0.1 0.42 0.05
Austria 1910 461 363 25.02 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.06
Ireland 1911 19680 7475 25.67 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.03
Ireland 1901 20931 7612 24.53 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.03
Scotland 
1881 16703 13588 23.96 0.06 0.04 0.1 0.11 0.04
England and 
Wales 1881 11908 9756 23.91 0.06 0.05 0.1 0.10 0.03
Great 
Britain 1851 7143 2939 24.59 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.03
Great 
Britain 1851 7143 2939 24.59 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.03
USA 1860 44344 19336 22.52 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.04
USA 1850 33883 13605 22.37 0.07 0.06 0.12 NA 0.05
USA 1870 62485 27138 22.68 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.04
USA 1880 134181 53919 22.33 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.04
USA 1900 88658 35738 22.69 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.05
USA 1910 132532 62100 22.98 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.03
Canada 
1901 32791 14525 23.62 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.03
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Country N children
N 
house-
holds
Mother 
age first 
child
Lateral 
Exten-
sions
Upward 
exten-
sions
All 
exten-
sions
Servants
House-
holds with 
twins
Hungary 
1869
1304 1059 23.08 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.03
Rostock 
1867
3236 1701 26.53 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.32 0.03
San 
Marcello
1827
139 72 23.15 NA NA 0.22 0.36 0.04
Kruja 1918 689 381 25.81 0.35 0.35 0.49 0.07 0.02
Rostock 
1900 6862 3697 25.13 0.03 0.07 0.1 0.03 0.02
Jasenica 
1884 1380 674 21.91 0.26 0.14 0.32 0.04 0.07
Zurich 1870 677 364 25.77 NA NA 0.15 0.62 0.02
Austria 
1632-1947 6590 4247 25.09 NA NA 0.1 0.42 0.05
Austria 1910 461 363 25.02 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.06
Ireland 1911 19680 7475 25.67 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.03
Ireland 1901 20931 7612 24.53 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.03
Scotland 
1881 16703 13588 23.96 0.06 0.04 0.1 0.11 0.04
England and 
Wales 1881 11908 9756 23.91 0.06 0.05 0.1 0.10 0.03
Great 
Britain 1851 7143 2939 24.59 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.03
Great 
Britain 1851 7143 2939 24.59 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.03
USA 1860 44344 19336 22.52 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.04
USA 1850 33883 13605 22.37 0.07 0.06 0.12 NA 0.05
USA 1870 62485 27138 22.68 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.04
USA 1880 134181 53919 22.33 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.04
USA 1900 88658 35738 22.69 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.05
USA 1910 132532 62100 22.98 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.03
Canada 
1901 32791 14525 23.62 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.03
The basic estimation strategy is captured in the equation below. The outcome 
variable is a binary enrolment variable (1 if a child is enrolled, 0 otherwise) 
of a child i in household j. The analysis is restricted to children at ages when 
education is no longer compulsory, but below age 16. When available, literacy 
is used as an alternative outcome variable (see online appendix in working 
paper version).59 To test for the existence of a quantity-quality trade-off, the main 
predictor variable of interest is the number of siblings. A negative coefficient on 
the number of siblings-variable would indicate the presence of a quantity-quality 
trade-off. 
This model is estimated using logistic regressions with standard errors 
clustered at the household level. A number of robustness checks and alternative 
models were estimated using OLS regressions, again clustering standard errors 
at the household level. In the results section we mainly discuss logit estimates 
for data and regressions that are fully harmonised. This means the data is 
coded identically and the model specification is the same across all samples. 
However, this does imply that we cannot include all relevant information in the 
regressions. For example, the US censuses do not report religion, so we could 
not control for this in the harmonised regressions for other samples either. 
We have included such information in the most complete models in the online 
appendix.60
 
           A number of further variables, X, are included as controls and to investigate 
other hypotheses. First, we control for birth order as it has been found that 
this might influence the QQT (Hanushek 1992; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
2005). Including birth order effects can also pick up investments in specific 
children, such as the oldest child. Variables that measure the number of 
relatives present in the household that are not part of the nuclear family are 
also included. This includes both upward and lateral (uncles, aunts) extensions 
of the household. Some censuses only provided data on whether members of 
the household were nuclear or other relatives; in this case we have only used a 
variable measuring the number of extended household members.
59    Carmichael, S. G., A. Rijpma, and L. van der Vleuten. 2015. “Quantity versus Quality: Household 
Structure, Number of Siblings, and Educational Attainment in the Long Nineteenth Century.” CGEH 
Working paper 73. Utrecht. Accessed May 26 2016. 
http://www.cgeh.nl/sites/default/files/WorkingPapers/cgehwp73_qqt.pdf.  
60     Idem. We have included those most complete models in the online appendix available with the 
working paper version. 
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      Two variables are included to investigate the importance of maternal 
authority on children’s education. First, the age difference between husband 
and wife (the spousal age gap) was used to check if the relative position of a 
wife vis-à-vis her husband captures relative maternal authority effects in regards 
to education. Second, where available, the literacy of the mother and the father 
are included as well.  
 
      It is important to control for household income as increased resources 
would allow parents to increase both the number of children and their quality 
(Becker and Lewis 1973; Galor 2011). Another way household resources matter 
is because they could alter the need for children’s income or labour. In the 
complete (unharmonized) models in the online appendix, parental occupational 
dummies are included as a control for household income. However, since 
occupations are only a crude approximation of income and sometimes even 
this information is not available, we followed Fernihough’s (2011) approach 
by creating a variable on the number of servants present in the household. 
Servants were still very common in the nineteenth century and allow us to make 
a crude distinction between the richest deciles that could afford servants and 
the rest.61 Finally, in the unharmonised regressions in the web appendix we 
include parental occupations and as many further controls as the data provides: 
parental religion, parental race, parental ethnicity, and regional dummies (the 
exact definition of a region varies by sample).
 
       A separate model is also estimated where the number of siblings is 
replaced by the number of brothers or sisters to check for gendered effects. 
This tests whether the number of brothers or sisters has a different effect than 
the overall number of siblings. Thus, this can show whether having a largely 
female or male sibling set influenced educational attainment. Dummies for sex 
of the child itself are also included and can test whether a preference to invest 
in sons existed.
 
       The model above might have endogeneity issues (omitted variable bias 
related to household income and simultaneity bias are especially important 
here). For the estimation of the QQT using microdata, instrumental variable 
techniques using the occurrence of twins has become standard practice 
 
61     In our samples, between 3% (Rostock, 1910) and 62% (Zurich 1870) of the households have 
servants. See also the summary statistics in table 4.4.
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(Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980). The occurrence of twin birth increases sibship 
size (it is thus a relevant instrument) and its occurrence is random (it meets the 
exclusion restriction), making it a seemingly perfect instrument. The IV model 
looks as follows:
Two caveats must however be mentioned. First, twins often have low birth 
weight, which may lead parents to lower their investment in them because 
they expect their survival chances to be lower (Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009). 
In turn, such early-childhood disadvantages may have consequences for 
educational outcomes later on (Currie 2009). This direct effect on the outcome 
variable would mean that the instrument would fail the exclusion restriction. 
Secondly, most of the censuses do not allow us to identify twins perfectly, but 
only at a resolution of one year. There is a possibility that some of them are 
two non-twin children born within the same year to the same mother. Another 
possibility is that the census misreports ages due to age-heaping, making it 
more difficult to identify twins. As a check we provide the number of twins in our 
sample to see whether the figure is not too far from the natural share of twins in 
a society, which should be around 3–4 %. Lower figures can be explained by 
higher mortality among twins, but higher figures indicate that too many children 
in the data are identified as twins. The sample for Jasenica in Serbia shows a 
very high number of twin children (seven per cent). This is probably due to the 
prevalence of age heaping in this census (Whipple index > 200). 
This section mainly discusses the results of the harmonised logit regressions, 
regressing enrolment on the number of siblings, the sex of the child, the 
child’s age, the child’s birth order, the number of servants in the household, 
the spousal age gap of the parents, the implied mother’s age at first child, 
and whether the household is in an urban location. More elaborate regression 
models can be found in the online appendix. 
 
      We start by presenting graphs of average enrolment against the number of 
siblings for each of our 21 samples with the 95% confidence interval included 
(figure 3.1). These results highlight visually what we find below, i.e. that a QQT 
3.5  Results
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cannot be established for all samples. Visually it is also clear that the U.S. 
samples show a tighter relationship between the two, with smaller confidence 
intervals, than the other samples.
Figure 3.1 Graphs of average enrolment by number of siblings (nsib) for 21 samples
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The coefficients on the number of siblings in the harmonised regressions 
with 95 per cent confidence intervals are presented in figure 3.2 below. The 
coefficients reported here are the marginal effects for the logit regressions. 
Looking at the results we find evidence for a quantity-quality trade-off in roughly 
half the samples, many of which are for U.S. data. The coefficients found 
are typically around –0.01. This means, that even if we generously take the 
difference between a large and a small number of siblings to be five children, 
this only increases the chance of being enrolled by 5 per cent. It could be 
argued that over generations this effects adds up, but at the same time it does 
suggest that in understanding human capital accumulation, sibship size is not 
the only things that matters.
Figure 3.2 Coefficients on number of siblings for all samples
The varying and weak effect of sibship size is to an extent an unexpected 
finding. While we do expect variation in the society-level results of the 
quantity-quality trade-off, we would generally expect to find the trade-off at the 
household level. At the household level, in turn, the trade-off is a fairly simple 
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mechanism. Even if one does not believe fertility is consciously controlled to the 
end of investing in children, it would still be the case that having fewer children 
would free up resources to invest in the remaining children (Lucas 2002; see 
the conclusion for a brief discussion). Income is of course only imperfectly 
proxied by the number of servants in the household (or occupational controls 
in the full models reported in the appendix). It is interesting to note that for 
the countries where we have multiple datasets for a number of different years 
there is one almost universal result – the coefficient on the number of siblings 
becomes increasing negative over time. This can be observed for the Great 
Britain in 1851 compared to England and Wales, and the Scottish sample in 
1881. Similarly Rostock, Ireland and Canada show the same sort of results. The 
U.S. coefficients increase from 1850-1900 after which they dip slightly. 
Figure 3.3 GDP/capita (1990 $GK) against the coefficient on the number of siblings
Source: Bolt et al., 2014
The increasing effect over time suggests that the strength of the QQT may be 
tied to economic development. Figure 3.3 plots GDP per capita of each country 
included here for the year the observation is for against its corresponding 
coefficient on number of siblings. On the basis of the graph there does indeed 
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seem to be a relation between GDP per capita and the strength of the QQT. 
Countries with a higher income are more likely to have a QQT and typically also 
have a stronger QQT. 
Figure 3.4 Coefficient on dummy variable for servants
On the micro level we capture wealth with a dummy variable for servants and 
the following figure shows that here we find a majority of significant, positive 
effects, suggesting that the number of servants indeed captures the resources 
households had to send children to school. Zurich, San Marcello, Kruja, 
Jasenica, and Austria are the clearest examples of samples that do not adhere 
to this general pattern, having either a 0 coefficient or negative relationship with 
school enrolment (although no sample has a significant negative coefficient 
on this variable). Our samples for Kruja and Jasenica have two of the lowest 
percentages of households with servants (7 and 4 percent respectively – see 
table 3.4, summary statistics). As samples from Eastern European countries 
this is likely driven by the reduced importance of life-cycle servitude in these 
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economies, which might means that we are not capturing the same sorts of 
households with this variable as we do in the other samples. Meanwhile Zurich 
stands out for having 62% of households in our sample with servants, the 
highest percentage by far. Again this may indicate that in Zurich households 
with servants are different from those in the other samples. The aspect of 
change over time in the countries for which we have multiple years of data 
paints an inconsistent picture. In the U.S. the coefficient on servants gets 
smaller over the period for which we have data, while for the UK between the 
1851 and the 1881 samples there is a substantial increase on the coefficient on 
servant. 
 
      Next we move on to explore gendered effects. Little difference between 
the number of siblings and the number of brothers and on enrolment could 
be found.62 The following dotplot (figure 3.5) presents the coefficients on the 
variable male, capturing whether samples display preferences for educating 
boys over girls.
Figure 3.5 Coefficients on male for all samples
62     See appendix A1.
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Figure 3.5 shows that boys were often more likely to be enrolled than girls. It is 
interesting to observe that this is not the case for the USA, England and Wales 
in 1881, and Ireland in 1901. These countries exhibit a negative coefficient 
on male meaning that girls are more likely to be enrolled than boys. One 
interpretation for this could be that boys have greater labour force opportunities 
at younger ages, leaving girls behind in formal educational institutions. 
 
       Next we explore how our coefficients on the number of siblings and on 
the male dummy correlate with an aggregated indicator of patriarchal practices 
that can be derived from microdata. To test this we make use of the patriarchy 
index as developed by Szo tysek and Gruber (2015). The patriarchy index is a 
composite measure that represents the varying degrees of patriarchal bias (sex 
and age related social inequalities) in different societal and familial settings. It 
incorporates a range of variables related to familial behaviour, such as nuptiality 
and age at marriage, living arrangements, post-marital residence, power 
relations within domestic groups, the position of the elderly, and the sex of the 
offspring. The index combines these variables into a final score, which represent 
to what extent a patriarchal bias can be found. A higher score indicates a higher 
level of the patriarchal bias in society and the family. In figure 3.6 the patriarchy 
index was graphed against the coefficients on male siblings (figure 3.6A) and 
on the number of siblings (nsib; figure 3.6B) to see if we can find that more 
patriarchal societies are less likely to enrol girls.63
63     Note that we calculated our own index using their method, rather than directly using Gruber and 
Szo tysek’s patriarchy-index results, because our samples are not identical. The index is made up of a male 
dominations cluster (lack of female headed households, lack of wives older than husbands, high numbers 
of child brides and low numbers of female non-kin resident), a generational domination cluster (old laterals 
and old joint families, low nuclear family percentages and high old men resident percentages), a patrilocality 
cluster (low numbers of married daughters living at home with parents) and a son preference cluster (ratio 
of last child son high and sex ratio 0-5 skewed towards boys).
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Figure 3.6 Coefficients on male siblings and number of siblings against the patriarchy index 
Panel A: Coefficients on male siblings against the patriarchy index
Panel B: Coefficients on number of siblings against the patriarchy index
109
A slight positive relationship appears to exist between the patriarchy index 
and the coefficient on male siblings (figure 3.6.A) as well as between the 
patriarchy index and the coefficient on the number of siblings (figure 3.6.B). 
This is what we would expect to find, that in patriarchal societies investment 
in the education of males is greater relative to females. This, in turn could 
interfere with the functioning of the QQT. However the result for the coefficients 
on male seems to be being largely driven by the Austria 1910 sample, which 
had a very high and significant coefficient on male. The relationship between 
the patriarchy index and the number of siblings coefficients suggest that less 
patriarchal societies are more likely to have a quantity-quality trade off, however 
this relationship is far from perfect. Two of the countries scoring below 10 
are Hungary and England and Wales (1851), however they both also have 
a coefficient on number of siblings that is indistinguishable from zero. The 
correlation again seems to be largely driven by two outliers in the bottom left 
of the plot. These two observations are Canada (with a coefficient lower than 
–0.02) and Austria (with a coefficient below –0.03). 
 
      The spousal age gap usually has no robust significant effect (see online 
appendix).64 In some cross-sections, like in Jasenica and Rostock and an earlier 
sample of Great Britain (1851), the effect is negative: a larger spousal age 
gap, indicative of a weaker bargaining position for women, is associated with 
a lower chance of children being enrolled. In the U.S. (1850), Britain (1881), 
Canada (1891), and Kruja (1918), the opposite effect is found. Overall, the 
prediction that female empowerment, as measured by the spousal age gap, 
would affect children’s education attainment is not borne out. The results for our 
other measure of the status of mothers, mother’s literacy is presented below, 
alongside father’s literacy. 
64    Full models are available in the online appendix accompanying the working paper version.  
http://www.cgeh.nl/sites/default/files/WorkingPapers/cgehwp73_qqt.pdf. 
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Figure 3.7 Maternal and paternal literacy coefficients
There are interesting differences to note between paternal and maternal 
literacy (as well as paternal and maternal occupation and occupational status/
income). Generally, these variables have large effects. The impact of maternal 
literacy tends to be higher than paternal literacy. This provides indirect support 
for Diebolt and Perrin’s (2013) model. Not only do they suggest that maternal 
human capital can be an input in children’s education,65 their model also shows 
that human capital increases the opportunity cost of rearing children by raising 
women’s income and labour force participation. 
 
       These various tests suggest some evidence for the validity of that higher 
female empowerment in the household is associated with a higher chance 
of children being enrolled or literate, but the results for the spousal age gaps 
and the weakness of the patriarchy index correlation undermines this to some 
extent. It seems that parental education specifically, plays an important role 
in intergenerational transfers of education. Data on the occupational status 
of mother’s would provide an interesting additional check, unfortunately 
occupational statuses for women are notoriously under-recorded in historical 
data meaning this is unrealistic with our current data. 
65      This is only support for their thesis in the broadest sense, as their work suggests that parents 
educate their children themselves or improve the efficiency of education and we cannot test this here.
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Figure 3.8 Coefficients on upward extensions of households
Next we move to look at how different extensions of the household influence 
the chances of enrolment. Figure 3.8 present the coefficients for upward (that 
is, multi-generational households). The number of upward extensions to the 
household tends to have a positive effect on enrolment, significantly so in Britain 
and the United States. This provides support for the grandmother hypothesis, 
that having a grandmother in the household increases the chance of schooling 
of the children, although here no distinction is made between grandmothers and 
grandfathers. Negative effects were, however found in Jasenica and Hungary. 
If any significant effect can be found at all for lateral kin, it is that their presence 
in the household was associated with a lower probability of children being 
enrolled.66 
66     Figure available upon request; see also the results in the appendix.
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The overall conclusion of this paper is that, when it comes to investments 
in children’s education there is more to households than just the number of 
siblings. A quantity-quality trade-off was found in a number of cases, with 8 
significant negative results and a further 6 where the coefficient is negative 
although not significantly different from 0. However, in the other 7 samples the 
coefficient was either positive and insignificant or zero. Therefore, though the 
number of siblings has a significant negative effect in some cases, the finding 
is not as robust as theory suggests. The assumptions necessary for a QQT are 
very basic, requiring only that income is limited and parents value both a large 
number of children (which can make sense from a biological perspective) and 
want to invest in children’s quality (which parental altruism would suggest). 
Our findings reflect the ambivalent status of the QQT in the empirical literature 
discussed earlier. While our results may partially be driven by data issues, they 
could be of importance for theories, such as Unified Growth Theory, which 
incorporate the QQT explicitly into their underpinnings. The observation that 
the QQT appears to be stronger at later stages of development is especially 
important. The increasing opportunity costs of childrearing may be part of the 
explanation. 
 
      One explanation for this lack of robust results is that while having fewer 
children should free up resources to invest in the remaining children, there may 
be contexts where children can relax the budget constraint. The contributions 
to the household budget of farm labour and child labour in general seem 
especially pertinent here. In rural settings where boys can work on the farm, this 
may imply gendered differences in the investment in children.67 While a male 
bias is present in lesser-developed, more rural regions, the evidence for a QQT 
is similar if the effect of brothers or sisters is considered rather than all siblings. 
In a similar vein, we possibly fail to uncover a QQT in certain societies because 
of the household structure, e.g. the presence of extended family members, 
which may affect the budget constraints and fertility decisions.68  
       Another interesting avenue to explore is the potential contribution of 
67    Or, depending on the cultural setting, daughters may be responsible for largest burden of household 
tasks, and therefore we may expect male bias in educational attainment (see e.g. Gertler and Glewwe 
1992; Davison 1993).
68     In other work, Carmichael, Störmer, and Rijpma (2015) summarise the concept of the QQT from an 
evolutionary biology perspective which highlights that parents of all species and across the world face 
choices as to whether to invest their limited resources in a large number of offspring with little investment 
in quality or vice versa. In evolutionary biology the measure of quality is differently construed, mainly 
used to denote investments, which improve life expectancy, height, weight (i.e. which improve chances of 
reproductive success).
3.6  Conclusions
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children to the household budget. As introduced in chapter 2, when the returns 
to education increase, the opportunity costs of child labour increase as well. 
High opportunity costs could account for a lack of QQT at first, as additional 
children also provide additional resources. Contexts of high child mortality 
(where investments in children are insecure) or where high fertility is linked to 
higher social or religious status (see e.g. Caldwell and Caldwell 1990), could 
mean that the trade-off between quantity and quality is inhibited. Similarly the 
effects of schooling on fertility may be mitigated by other family strategies, such 
as requiring older children who are no longer compelled to attend school to 
work, while sending younger children to school for a longer period (Emerson 
and Souza 2002; Lingwall 2014b; Lingwall 2014c).69 As shown in chapter 2, 
child labour legislation and male real wages both positively affected educational 
participation at an aggregate level. This points as well to the changing nature 
of an economic contribution by children to the household’s budget. Future 
research at micro-level with information of children’s earnings is needed to shed 
further light on this matter. 
 
       Although a consistently strong QQT is not found, other household-
level determinants of children’s educational outcomes are shown to matter. 
Household extensions can have a positive effect on average educational 
attainment per child. Upward extensions especially, were found to have 
beneficial effects on educational attainment. At present, we have not divided 
this effect by grandmothers and grandfathers, but the results suggests 
that further historical research should delve deeper into the ‘grandmother 
hypothesis’. It is noticeable that in a nuclear family setting, such as the U.S., 
the addition of grandparents is not a drain, but seems to stimulate children’s 
schooling. In Jasenica and Kruja, which have the highest level of upward 
extensions in our dataset, the effect was negligible or negative. This suggests 
that in the context of frequent upward extensions the way in which the presence 
of grandparent’s works is different from those contexts where they are far less 
frequent. Lateral extensions did not have a consistent, significant effect.
 
      When it comes to gendered outcomes we found that boys were, on 
average, more likely to be enrolled than girls. However, the reverse was true 
in the USA in 1910 and 1900 and Ireland in 1901. The first explorations of 
the female household position yielded positive yet limited results. We found 
69     Such negative spillovers could explain why we fail to find an effect, because our data captures 
children who are in schooling, but no longer compelled to attend.
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that the mother’s educational status, as measured by literacy, mattered. This 
corroborates contemporary research that claims that mothers’ education 
is important for the education of the next generation (Handa 1994; Glick 
and Sahn 2000). It also supplements a massive literature in showing that 
parental education is a fundamental determinant of parents schooling choices 
for their children discussed in this dissertation’s introduction. We found a 
limited relationship between the Patriarchy Index and the coefficients on the 
QQT, which links to our finding of no effect of the sibling composition of the 
household. 
 
      The finding that maternal literacy did in fact contribute to the QQT, 
may mean that women’s knowledge is especially important in determining 
investments in children, for instance because it is important for children’s 
health and personal reproduction (Jejeebhoy 1995; Janssens 2007, 9). Ideally 
we would also explore maternal labour force participation, however data on 
women’s occupation is often missing. Surprisingly, the spousal age gap proved 
a weak predictor of a child’s education, an unexpected outcome in light of the 
findings on the basis of aggregate data (see chapter 2). This could be because 
at an individual level spousal age gaps not only reflect bargaining power 
between the spouses, but may also reflect developments on the marriage 
market. It could also be driven by the fact that certain age gaps between 
spouses may be culturally preferred and thus deviation from such an age gap 
has different meanings in different contexts. 
 
      Building and using datasets to test these sorts of hypotheses has a number 
of requirements. The first has to do with size. As the QQT seems to be a 
relatively small effect, large datasets are required in order to be able to discern 
a result significantly different from zero (1000 children or more). Secondly the 
coding of occupational statuses is key. Standard classification system like 
HISCO or OCCHISCO do not code for students as an occupational status, 
which is understandable given the scope of the system. However, it meant we 
had to manually code students from occupational strings, which may make 
reproducibility of our results in other settings difficult. A related point is that in 
an ideal world the occupational status of parents would be coded in a way that 
allows for a conversion to social status or income indicators in a comparable 
way (eg. Lambert et al. 2013). A further useful step would be to try and derive 
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a way to estimate completed family size from census data when it is not directly 
mentioned. In longitudinal studies this is possible, obviously, but in census 
snapshots the information is often missing. Possibly using average fertility, 
singulate mean age at leaving home and singulate mean age at marriage one 
could work out the number of missing children. Finally, data linkage, between 
various sources of microdata as well as with macro data would facilitate 
comparisons and allow more thorough exploration of the link between the 
household behaviour and the environment. 
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MIND THE GAP!  
THE INFLUENCE OF FAMILY SYSTEMS ON THE 
GENDER EDUCATION GAP IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, 1950–2005
Paper published in Economic History of Developing Regions 31 (1): 47–81.  
       Many countries aim for gender equality in education but, despite similar 
levels of economic development, some do better than others. An case in point, 
often cited, is Sri Lanka, which, despite not having strong economic growth, 
nevertheless has a fairly high level of gender equality, especially compared to 
countries with similar or higher national incomes (Sen 1999: 45; Hausmann 
et al. 2010). In 2010 the Sri Lankan educational system had already been 
gender equal for 20 years. In contrast, Pakistan recorded a gender ratio in 
educational attainment of 6 women to 10 men in 2010, a ratio Sri Lanka had 
achieved as early as 1950 (Barro & Lee 2010). The Sri Lankan accomplishment 
in educational gender equality is as impressive as Pakistan’s lack thereof is 
puzzling.  
 
      What causes these gendered differences in educational outcomes? This 
study assesses the effect of family systems on gender equality in education 
in countries with medium to low levels of development. Previous studies have 
emphasised the importance of economic growth for promoting gender equality 
and its strong association with gender equality in education (Marshall 1985; 
Inglehart and Norris 2003). But economic growth is not sufficient to explain 
essential gender equality differences between countries, especially the sharp 
differences found outside the highly developed countries (Dilli et al. 2015). 
Since (North 1981; North 1990) emphasised the importance of ideology in 
the enforcement of property rights and the role of institutions, institutions 
4.1  Introduction 
4
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have become a prevalent explanation of the mechanism of historical heritage. 
Cultural norms, values and preferences can be seen as informal institutions, 
encompassing the typically unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and 
supplement formal rules (Folbre 1994; North 1990). Recent scholarly attention 
has turned to the role of historical and cultural legacies in determining 
development outcomes. For instance, a seminal paper by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) demonstrates that colonial origin strongly correlates with current 
economic performance. Alesina et al. (2011) find evidence to support Boserup’s 
hypothesis that traditional agricultural practices influenced the historical gender 
division of labour and the evolution and persistence of gender norms.  
       
      Culture is an important informal institution, but its long-term effect is hard 
to measure. The family, however, is a measurable cultural institution, with two 
marked qualities important for education. First, family characteristics provide 
information about the underlying rules, norms and preferences regarding 
women’s appropriate role and behaviour. Within the family, these norms, values 
and preferences are transmitted from generation to generation, which can 
make them resilient to change. Second, decisions about how to invest in the 
children’s education are made by the family, particularly the parents. The family’s 
willingness to invest in female education will be in part determined by gender 
preferences inherited from former generations. Further, the size of the family 
and the extent of its influence may determine how far it will deviate from existing 
gender norms and how much it will invest in girls.
 
       In a country with a functional education system that is both compulsory and 
affordable, as in the highly developed countries, we might not expect a large 
difference in gender patterns. But where parents face real costs to children’s 
education, both financially and culturally (deviating from a social norm), gender 
preferences play a much stronger role. What role do family systems play in 
gender equality in education outside the highly developed nations? I look at 
the relation between family systems, marriage patterns and the gender ratio in 
education to see how different family systems have different effects and to find 
out whether historical preferences persist and to what extent. I argue that family 
systems influence the social and economic status of women and shape female 
bargaining power within the family and thus contribute to households’ everyday 
attitudes and decisions about investing in female education. Marriage patterns 
and family systems have been explored extensively for Western Europe and Asia 
(Lynch 1991; Engelen and Wolf 2005) and to some extent globally (Therborn 
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2004; Todd 1987; Todd and Garrioch 1985), and their effect on various gender 
roles has been partly explored as well (Laslett and Brenner 1989; Basu and 
Das Gupta 2001; De Moor and Van Zanden 2010; Dyson and Moore 1983). 
 
       This paper looks at the gender ratio in average years of education and its 
relation to family characteristics, with specific attention to female agency.70 
Other studies explain gender equality in education in terms of income, female 
labour force participation and the gender wage gap (Jafarey and Maiti 2015) or 
religious preferences, regional factors and civil freedom (Dollar and Gatti 1999). 
To the best of our knowledge, only the paper by (Bertocchi and Bozzano 2015) 
explores the links between family systems and gender equality in education. 
These authors found that family structure in nineteenth century Italy significantly 
affected the female to male enrolment ratio in upper primary education. To the 
best of my knowledge, there are no studies that investigate the links between 
historical family systems and human capital investment in girls at a global 
level. This paper provides the first cross-country exploration of the relation 
between family systems and gender equality in education. By exploring the 
relation between family indicators such as marriage, inheritance rights and co-
residence, it provides insight into the success or failure of countries in achieving 
gender equality in education over 55 years. 
4.2.1 Why the educational gender gap matters
During the past three decades, a large and growing volume of studies has 
emphasised the instrumental benefits of women’s education. Evidence 
suggests that gender inequality, by lowering the average level of human capital 
in education, has a direct negative effect on long-term economic growth 
(Klasen 2002). Indirectly, gender inequality in education has a negative effect 
on fertility decline, and on structural investments since women are marginally 
represented in policies (Dollar and Gatti 1999; King and Hill 1997; Klasen and 
Lamanna 2009). General rates of return to education are stronger when women 
are included, and women benefit individually by receiving larger private returns 
from labour market participation (Psacharopoulos 1994).
 
      Other gains from female education accrue from the benefits of educating 
mothers. Maternal education has been found to improve knowledge of health 
70     Defined as the ability to make meaningful life decisions (Sen 1999; Kabeer 2005; World Bank 2011).
4.2  Theoretical background
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care (Barrera 1990) and household efficiency (Rosenzweig & Schultz 1982). 
Higher levels of maternal education are related to declines in infant mortality 
(Strauss and Thomas 1995) and are associated with intergenerational 
improvements in the health, education and the general wellbeing of their 
children (Currie and Moretti 2003; King et al. 1986; Schultz 1988; Strauss 
and Thomas 1995). Mothers are vital links in the transfer of resources to 
children. Empirical evidence suggests that women are more likely than men to 
favour children in their resource allocation behaviour (Doss 2012; Hoddinott 
and Haddad 1995; Thomas 1994; Glick and Sahn 2000; Currie and Moretti 
2003). For example, Handa finds, in a study in Jamaica that mother’s with 
higher education tend to have higher bargaining power, which results in higher 
investments in the health and education of the children (Handa 1994, 119–37). 
Some authors suggest that mothers tend to channel resources specifically 
to their daughters (Thomas 1994; Glick and Sahn 2000; Currie and Moretti 
2003). In short, the benefits of educating girls are manifold and gender equality 
in education seems to make social and economic sense (Fiske and UNESCO 
2012; The World Bank 2011). Why then does gender inequality persist in 
education?  
 
4.2.2 Factors affecting female education
Poverty makes it hard to invest in human capital. To some extent, poverty 
also explains gender inequality; economic prosperity is strongly associated 
with gender equality in general (Inglehart and Norris 2003) and with gender 
equality in education, especially in secondary education (Marshall 1985). A 
poor family struggling to come out on a small budget may prefer to invest in a 
son, in anticipation of his future remittances. However, investing in boys rather 
than girls is not necessarily a rational economic cost-benefit decision; rather, 
it is likely to be based on normative views of women’s roles, value and earning 
capacity. As Boserup succinctly notes:
If a poor country belongs to a culture with a positive attitude to 
higher education for girls, we find a high proportion of girls among 
the relatively few adult students. By contrast, if the dominant 
culture is hostile or indifferent to the higher education of girls, 
we find few girls among the adult students even if the country is 
relatively advanced.  
        (Boserup 1970: 119–121)
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Religion is a prominent example of cultural norms restricting female educational 
attainment, as it imposes gender norms and expectations about suitable social 
roles for women (Fish 2002). Protestantism is thought to promote investment in 
the literacy skills of both genders, as reading the Bible is an essential part of the 
religious experience (Becker and Woessmann 2009; Weber 2001). Norton and 
Tomal (2009) find strong negative links between female educational attainment 
and the proportion of Hindus and Muslims in a country. Cooray and Potrafke 
(2011) find that female educational attainment is heavily influenced by whether 
a country is predominantly Islamic, especially after removing high-income 
countries from the equation. Donno and Russett (2004) find that Catholicism 
shows no significant negative impact on the female-to-male education ratio, 
whereas Islam does. 
 
      Several other hypotheses suggest reasons why female educational 
participation lags behind male participation, focusing on either supply and 
demand, or on access to education. In the first place, education needs to 
be supplied: schools must be built and teachers hired. The state is largely 
responsible for providing the legal and physical infrastructure needed for 
schooling and state investments tend to be guided either by ideological motives 
or by a desire to modernise and industrialise (Benavot and Riddle 1988; Meyer 
et al. 1992; Friedman 2002; Lindert 2004). The provision of mass education 
by the state overcomes credit constraints faced by local actors in financing 
education (Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff 1998; Galor, Moav, and Vollrath 
2009). With the state making education accessible, free and compulsory, 
parents find it easier to send their children to school. It seems indisputable that 
parents want their children to receive education because of seemingly obvious 
income and social benefits. But opponents of this view stress that the benefits 
of education are not clear-cut and they argue that without a clear demand for 
female education, increasing the supply of schooling yields little result (Easterly 
2006; Banerjee and Duflo 2011).  
 
      A further factor driving the demand for education is labour force 
participation. Low female labour force participation, leaving the labour force 
after marriage and the unskilled nature of female labour are various reasons 
offered to explain why women’s education trails behind men’s. The neoclassical 
argument asserts that the household, with unified household preferences, 
applies a division of labour directed at maximising efficiency and family income 
(Becker 1964, 1965; Schultz 1961, 1974). A ‘natural’ division of labour exists 
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within the household: men have a natural strength advantage, while women 
specialise in reproduction, child care and related domestic activities (Murdock 
and Provost 1973). Female domestic specialisation, by reducing women’s time 
in the labour force, makes women’s earnings and job opportunities lower than 
men’s. This in turn discourages investment in female human capital (Becker 
1985:198). A considerable literature questions this neoclassical view, and other 
explanations for restricted female labour force participation abound, citing, for 
example, gender-specific agricultural practices, per capita incomes, industries 
and cultural beliefs (Alberto F. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013; Fernández 
and Fogli 2009; Goldin 1994; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010; Folbre 1994). 
Whatever the root causes, the consequence is that women play a smaller part 
in the labour market and educational investment in women thus yields lower 
returns than investment in men.
 
       As the family is the primary locus of decisions about girls’ education, the 
study of family systems and relationships can shed light on beliefs about the 
value of women. An abundant literature on household bargaining underlines 
the importance of the way resources are distributed among family members 
(Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker 1991; Hanushek 1992; Agarwal 1997). The 
members’ relative positions in the distribution are governed by norms and 
culturally determined gender roles, and these norms and roles in turn create 
social expectations about women’s entitlements, duties and responsibilities. 
Human capital investment in women may be hampered by gender roles, 
when expectations of proper female behaviour rule out women for investment. 
Powerful legal and institutional factors determining the disposition of household 
assets, such as family laws regarding property rights and social entitlements, 
help to perpetuate such norms (Folbre 1986; Folbre 1994; Folbre 2002). 
 
       The resilience of gender norms across generations is a product of cultural 
transmission and socialisation within the family. Vital cultural preferences and 
social norms, such as family attitudes towards fertility or women’s labour force 
participation, are passed on through generations as a result of ‘imperfect 
empathy’ (Bisin and Verdier 2001; Bisin and Verdier 2008), which means that 
the family wishes to socialise their offspring optimally, yet this ‘optimal’ state 
is subjectively coloured towards the family’s own cultural experiences and 
preferences. Family choices about, for example children’s education, marriage 
partners and place of residence, all contribute to passing on cultural values 
(Bisin and Verdier 2008; Cohen-Zada 2006; Bisin and Verdier 2000). Families 
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are willing to assume high costs to socialise their children according to their 
own preferences, and one way they do it is by deciding what kind of education 
they will receive. 
 
      A family system can be defined as ‘a set of beliefs and norms, common 
practices, and associated sanctions through which kinship and the rights and 
obligations of particular kin relationships are defined’. It typically defines 
 
Family systems are very stable and may persist over centuries. A growing body 
of literature looks at how family systems affect current development (Todd and 
Garrioch 1985; Todd 1987; Duranton, Rodríguez-Pose, and Sandall 2009; Basu 
and Das Gupta 2001; Mason 2001; Therborn 2004; Lynch 2011).  
 
      A family system classification can be useful to researchers because family 
systems carry elements of gender systems, such as the appropriate roles for 
wives and husbands and the preferred sex of children (Basu and Das Gupta 
2001). Todd (1987) finds that stronger female authority within the family system 
is positively correlated with the educational advancement of the next generation. 
Measuring the impact of various historical institutions on a historical gender 
equality index, Dilli et al. (2015) find that family systems as an institution have 
insignificant effects on various elements of gender equality. Our study differs 
from theirs in using a different classification and concentrating solely on a 
single outcome, gender equality in education – this may explain why our results 
differ from theirs. For more information, see the notes to table A4.1 (descriptive 
statistics. 
 
      Family systems can also reveal how far girls exercise choice or agency, in 
other words, their ability to make meaningful life decisions (Sen 1999; Kabeer 
What it means to be related by blood, or descent, and by 
marriage; who should live with whom at which stages of the life 
course; the social, sexual, and economic rights and obligations 
of individuals occupying different kin positions in relation to 
each other; and the division of labour among 
kin-related individuals’
     (Mason 2001, 160–161). 
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2005; World Bank 2011). In societies where inheritance and marriage rules 
favour men, for example obliging the woman to live with the husband’s family 
after marriage, women have little economic independence or agency (Basu 
and Das Gupta 2001). As I explain further below, if a girl is to participate in 
education she must also have certain abilities within the family context, such as 
the ability not to be married at a young age, to own property or to generate her 
own income. The level of agency women can exercise within the family system 
is important for investment in their educational careers. For instance, King et 
al. (1986) observe that in Asia, in areas with lower female agency mothers have 
the least effect on their daughters completed education (Pakistan), whereas in 
areas with higher female agency (the Philippines) their effect is much stronger.
 
4.3.1 Women’s value and agency in the family 
Family systems allow us to understand the gender relations and preferences of 
many generations ago. Questions to ask are whether these preferences persist, 
to what extent they persist, and whether family systems have different types of 
influence. To answer these questions, I look at three features of family systems 
that could lead to gender inequality: marriage patterns, inheritance structures 
and domestic organisation or co-residence patterns.71 
 
       Marriage patterns inform us about the agency women have in whether, 
when and whom to marry. They thus reflect women’s position in their natal 
household and in the new household they will set up. Key elements are the 
age at first marriage and the age difference between husband and wife: 
the spousal age gap. Young married girls may be prevented from taking 
advantage of education or work opportunities by household responsibilities, 
pregnancy and child rearing, and social restrictions such as limitation of their 
mobility (Mathur et al. 2003; Jain and Kurz 2007). On the other hand, being 
able to delay marriage and the first birth is often strongly correlated with an 
increase in education and earnings (Field and Ambrus 2008; Goldin and Katz 
2000; Pezzini 2005) and can positively influence women’s time and resource 
investment in developing their human capital (Jensen and Thornton 2003). A 
71     Additional features that can be used are preferences for patrilocality, matrilocality, bilocality or 
neolocality and biological mythology (the child seen as a product of father, mother or both), but lack of data 
and difficulty in measuring these features prevents us considering them here.
4.3  Family organisation and gendered educational investment 
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small spousal age gap to a certain extent reflects equality between a woman 
and her partner (Casterline, Williams, and McDonald 1986) and higher female 
bargaining power than in family systems where women marry men much older 
than themselves (Carmichael, De Moor, and van Zanden 2011; Lloyd 2005). 
These factors are related: research shows that women who marry before 18 
are more likely to be married to much older men (Mensch 1986; Jain and Kurz 
2007). In family systems where women marry when they are past adolescence, 
and to men of similar age, we may assume that they are more able to make 
decisions about their human capital development, and that of their children, 
than women who are married younger and to older men.  
 
      The question here is one of direction of causality: do women marry later 
because their family system allows them to receive more education, or do 
they receive more education because their family system allows them to marry 
later? The expansion of girls’ formal schooling is often seen as one of the main 
influences on family structure and behaviour (Jain and Kurz 2007). However, 
we could argue that when marriage age is relatively high from the outset, 
girls are more likely to participate in education. Modernisation in the form of 
industrialisation, schooling and increasing employment opportunities for women 
can provide some departures from traditional gender roles, but this only partly 
accounts for the way the gender education gap varies from society to society. 
The decision to delay marriage is not only shaped by current incentives such 
as human capital accumulation or labour force participation, but also reflects 
cultural values, even though these values may have emanated from historical 
economic realities (Lynch 1991). Although age at marriage is likely to be 
sensitive to the economic environment, marriage patterns also appear to be 
shaped by other features of family systems.  
  
      The second feature I look at is inheritance structure. The ability of women 
to inherit indicates the strength of female property rights, which in turn are 
positively related to increases in female educational attainment (Roy 2011; 
Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003), and the well-being of children. In Nepal, for 
example, women’s land rights empower women by increasing their control over 
household decision making, which in turn benefits children’s health (Allendorf 
2007). Anthropologists distinguish three basic inheritance types: patrilineal, 
matrilineal or bilateral. Patrilineal systems, in which men control the productive 
resources, generally imply weak female bargaining power and a lower economic 
status for women. This gender imbalance can inhibit a mother’s ability to provide 
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for daughters, resulting in an intergenerational transfer of a lower economic 
position of women (Cox and Fafchamps 2007, 3767). Matrilineal inheritance 
seems to suggest some form of female property rights. In reality, however, 
property is transmitted through males related to the mother and women are 
prohibited from holding property. However, in this system women are arguably 
valued more highly than in the patrilineal system, where women do not form 
such links. Bilateral systems do make it possible for women to inherit and give 
them a somewhat stronger economic bargaining position, which implies better 
ability to provide for themselves and their daughters. 
 
       Our third feature of interest is domestic organisation or co-residence 
patterns. A family is either nuclear (the conjugal couple and their children) or 
complex. Complex families include adults other than the conjugal couple. There 
are three types: extended families, stem families and polygamous families. 
‘Domestic organisation’ often refers to what people consider their ideal living 
arrangement, which does not necessarily reflect the actual arrangement at every 
stage of life (see eg: Karve 1965). This measure is therefore highly normative, 
and can be used to describe ideal gender roles. The four types of family have 
different gendered expectations of appropriate female roles within the family, 
and these expectations in turn influence female human capital investment.
 
       A nuclear family excludes family members other than the conjugal couple 
from everyday decision-making. A new household is established after marriage 
and is generally based on the mutual consent of both spouses, thus providing 
a more solid base for gender equality in household investment decisions, than 
those families where marriage is not on the basis of such mutual consent. 
Nuclear families are often associated with high age at marriage and thus with 
a longer period of capital accumulation for women. They are also thought to 
have a positive influence on female labour force participation, which is positively 
related to human capital accumulation. And with the emphasis on the conjugal 
couple, and moving out of the parental home after marriage, the nuclear family 
supports a stronger agency with respect to parental authority (De Moor and 
Van Zanden 2006; Richard, Robin, and Laslett 1983; Todd 1987).72 
Extended families consist of more than one married couple, generally 
three generations including relatives such as grandparents, aunts, uncles and 
72     (Goode 1970) now textbook modernization theory), saw the ideal type of nuclear family as positively 
related to industrialisation and believed that family patterns around the world would eventually resemble the 
Western-type nuclear family. 
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(married) siblings. Cultures with extended families are considered to be typically 
less egalitarian than those that favour the nuclear family, with hierarchical 
male-dominated structures and inheritance, weakening the position of the 
women in the family (Boserup 1970; Alesina et al. 2013). Arranged marriages 
are especially frequent in extended families, often resulting in young female 
marriage with a high spousal age gap and a young bride’s outmigration to 
the husband’s family, weakening her bargaining power (Gupta 1976, 82). In 
these families, boys are favoured for human capital investment because their 
remittances flow back directly into the natal home.  
 
      In the stem family, one of the children remains at home after marriage, under 
the authority of the parents. The position of women in these families seems 
similar to that of the extended family. Decision-making involves more relatives 
than is the case in the nuclear family, and resources must be distributed among 
more kin. However, age at marriage is generally late in stem families and not all 
children are subject to parental control, which could have positive effects for 
the position of women and their human capital investment. Todd (1987) argues 
that there is a positive association between literacy attainment and those stem 
families where women’s position is favourable (measured by their propensity 
to inherit, relatively high age at marriage and low spousal age gap). This links 
up with research that suggests there is a positive relation between maternal 
education and investment in the grandchildren’s human capital – the so-called 
‘grandmother effect’ (Baizan and Camps 2007; Parker and Short 2009).  
 
      The polygamous family, found mostly in Africa, is one with multiple wives 
(polygyny) or multiple husbands (polyandry), though the latter is rare. Polygyny 
is generally considered non-beneficial for female educational investment, as it 
drives up the demand for wives and increases the price men must pay to marry 
them. This system is only sustainable when population growth is high and men 
marry women younger than themselves. Investment flows into ‘buying’ wives and 
‘selling’ daughters, decreasing capital investment, including that for education 
(Tertilt 2005; Tertilt 2006). In addition, women share their husband’s earnings 
with his other spouses. When fertility per woman remains high, fewer resources 
are available per child than is the case in other family types, which implies less 
education investment potential. When son preference is strong, boys will be 
favoured over girls for human capital investment. However, son preference is 
not clear-cut in societies with this kind of family. In Africa especially, a woman 
can have considerable autonomy, even if she lacks economic status, and may 
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run her own household in a separate dwelling (Murdock 1981). Polygamous 
societies that prize high fertility will focus strongly on daughters (Cox and 
Fafchamps 2007, 2765–3766). However, age at marriage is generally low and 
inheritance is either patrilineal or matrilineal, never bilateral.
 
       Many of these features of family systems are likely to reinforce one another. 
For instance, son preference may be exacerbated in the extended family, 
because large families can divide labour more strictly and concentrate human 
capital investment on certain children only (Das Gupta 1999; Duranton et al. 
2009). This son preference has an impact on educational investment, but also 
on the provision of food and the division of inheritance (Greenhalgh 1985; 
Elizabeth M. King and Hill 1997; Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982). In a patrilineal 
system where girls marry young and cannot claim inheritance rights, sons are 
considered the more rational investment choice as the old-age caregivers of the 
natal household, but in bilateral systems this is not necessarily the case.  
 
4.3.2 Capturing family systems 
There is data that enable us to measure marriage patterns between 1950 and 
2005. Domestic organisation and inheritance are available as historical time-
fixed indicators measured around the 1920s. This allows us to measure whether 
such historical systems still have an impact on the period between 1950 and 
2005. By combining the types of domestic organisation with inheritance, as a 
basic indicator of the economic status of women in the family, we can expand 
the four basic types described above into nine sub-types. Table 4.1 shows 
these systems, example countries for each type, and the expected effects of the 
female to male ratio in each system. 
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Table 4.1 Overview of family systems
Family systems Countries Example
Expected effect 
on female to male 
ratio in education
Patrilineal nuclear 12 Belize -
Patrilineal extended 45 Pakistan --
Patrilineal stem 4 Mongolia --
Patrilineal polygamous 12 Uganda --
Matrilineal nuclear 2 Cambodia +
Matrilineal extended 3 Ghana -
Matrilineal polygamous 3 Malawi --
Bilateral nuclear 18 Sri Lanka ++
Bilateral extended 5 Bahrain +/-
Note: the expected effects range from – (very negative) to ++ (very positive). +/- is an      
         ambiguous effect
The patrilineal extended family systems of Pakistan and India exemplify the 
effects of family systems on gender outcomes in education. Here, inheritance 
rights (patrilineal) and residence patterns (patrilocal)73 are weighted in favour of 
men. Property is transmitted though the male line, implying poor property rights 
for girls; the fathers and husbands control the family budget. Girls marry young 
and spousal age gaps are large, leaving little room for female agency in human 
capital investment decisions. Families have little incentive to invest in daughters’ 
human capital: girls move to the husband’s home after marriage, cutting off 
remittances to the natal family. This is not to say that all parents make a harsh 
cost-benefit analysis. A girl’s marriage offers a viable and culturally accepted 
‘exit strategy’, where the young bride will be taken care of by a new family. 
Nonetheless, this family system is expected to have one of the lowest potentials 
for gender equality in education. 
73    ‘Patrilocality’ refers to the married couple setting up residence in or near the husband’s family’s home. 
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       Figure 4.1 compares gender gaps in educational attainment for 
five countries from 1950 to 2005. The large gaps and slow educational 
development of Pakistan and India are clear. There is some progression 
towards gender equality, but the curve is not as steep as that of Bangladesh. 
The other two countries, Brazil and Sri Lanka, examples of the bilateral nuclear 
family system, do not have steeper convergence curves but they do have higher 
starting positions for the incorporation of women into education. It is true that 
mass education thrived much earlier in Latin America than in, for example, 
India, but Latin American countries also have a high level of female inclusion in 
education (Frankema 2009; van der Vleuten 2009). 
Figure 4.1 Gender gaps in educational attainment in five countries, 1950–2005
Note: The gender gap is defined as the ratio of female to male attainment (pop. 15+).
Source: Barro & Lee (2010)
130
The bilateral nuclear system as it exists in Sri Lanka has a strong development 
potential for female educational participation because of the strong position 
it assigns to women in the family (Caldwell 1996). Inheritance is bilateral, the 
domestic residence is nuclear and women have access to property, making 
them less dependent on relatives outside the conjugal couple. In addition, 
Sri Lankan families historically have a higher age at marriage than families 
in other countries in South Asia. To show the marriage ages in historical 
comparison, table 4.2 compares Sri Lanka with India and China in the early 
twentieth century, showing that Sri Lankan female age at marriage was high, 
well past adolescence. Age at marriage is measured using the singulate mean 
age at marriage (SMAM – the average years of single life, of those who marry 
before age 50). Hajnal (1953) created this measure to calculate the mean 
age at marriage, and more recently it has been used as an indicator of female 
empowerment (Carmichael 2011; World Bank 2011). The spousal age gap, 
measured by subtracting female SMAM from male SMAM, has been used as a 
similar indicator of women’s marginalisation within marriage and society (Edlund 
1999).
Table 4.2 Early marriage patterns in three East and South-East Asian countries, 
               early twentieth century
INDICATOR India(1901–1911)
Sri Lanka
(1900)
China
(1927)
Female SMAM 13.07 21.0 17.5
Male SMAM 20.4 27.3 21.3
Spousal age gap 7.33 6.3 3.8
Source: India and Sri Lanka (Banerjee 1998); China (Carmichael 2013)
In addition to domestic organisation and inheritance, female SMAM and the 
spousal age gap are further useful as measures of female bargaining power 
and equality within marriage. Unlike inheritance and domestic residence, 
data availability allows for the continuous measurement of these indicators 
throughout the period 1950 to 2005. De Moor and Van Zanden (2006, 2010) 
developed the ‘girl power index’ (GPI) to combine both indicators by subtracting 
the spousal age gap from the female age at first marriage. Carmichael et 
al. (2011) tested this measure against contemporary female empowerment 
measures such as the Global Gender Gap (World Economic Forum) and 
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the Gender Inequality Index (UN) and found them to correlate very strongly. 
Figure 4.2 below shows that the GPI also relates strongly to the gender ratio in 
average years of education. 
Figure 4.2 Correlation female to male gender ratio (pop. 15 +) and the girl power index  
                (GPI), 1950–2005
The above observations suggest hypotheses about the relation between 
family systems and gendered educational attainment. Late marriage and a 
low spousal age gap should increase female educational attainment and a 
higher score on the GPI should narrow the gender gap in education. Patrilineal 
inheritance probably widens the gender gap in education and conversely, 
bilateral inheritance should narrow it. Expectations for matrilineal inheritance 
fall between the negative and positive ones of the patrilineal and bilateral 
inheritance types. Complex families are expected to have higher gender 
inequality in education than nuclear families.
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To test these hypotheses, I used an unbalanced panel of 86 countries for which 
data are available on gender inequality in education, family factors and several 
socioeconomic controls between 1950 and 2005. I followed the subdivision 
of Barro and Lee (Barro and Lee 2012), which considers two broad groups 
of countries in their dataset: 24 advanced countries and 122 developing 
countries. The use of other data led to a diminishing of that total number: 21 
advanced countries and 86 developing countries. The focus is on developing 
countries since they display the most variability in the dependent variable and 
in age at first marriage.74 The main dependent variable is the ratio of female 
to male average years of education and the data are by 5-year intervals. 
Table A.1 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for all variables. The 
analytical framework is a random effects panel regression, allowing for the 
inclusion of time-invariant individual parameters such as the family system 
operators. In a random effects model, the unobserved variables are assumed 
to be uncorrelated with all the observed variables. I preferred the random 
effects model to a pooled OLS model because it can account for individual 
heterogeneity and to a fixed effects model because it can account for time-
invariant variables vital to my analysis, such as the family systems.75 I used 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors clustered on countries to correct for serial 
correlation in the panel (Newey and West 1987). 
The full regression model is specified as follows:
 
74     The 86 countries of interest are Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, 
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zambia. Although Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela 
were high-income countries in 1950, I do include them in this group for a better comparison with the Barro 
& Lee dataset.
75    A Hausman test showed that a fixed-effects model might have been better, but this model was not an 
option because the family systems are time-invariant. I used a fixed effects model as a robustness check for 
the girl power index (GPI). 
4.4  Data and analysis
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      Here yit refers to the ratio of female to male average years of education 
in country i at time t. The parameter      refers to the set of family system 
dummies,          to the GPI,          to the lagged set of socioeconomic controls 
and  to the religion dummies. All estimated models include year       and 
regional       fixed effects to control for individual change over time and by 
region unexplained by the model.76 The      is an error term, capturing all other 
omitted factors. Dummies are used for the time-invariant family systems, each 
with a different combination of domestic organisation (nuclear, extended, stem 
and polygamous) and inheritance practices (patrilineal, matrilineal and bilateral). 
Both domestic organisation and inheritance are classified as dominant when 
the proportion of the historically practicing population exceeds a benchmark 
level of 20% of the population, otherwise the variable is excluded. The family 
systems are generalised to the total population. The patrilineal extended 
system is the reference category, for which I expect the lowest gender ratio 
in education. Data for these family systems are from a dataset in (Rijpma 
and Carmichael 2016), which brings together data from Todd (1985) and 
the Murdock-Narodov atlas.77 These data sources have been used frequently 
by other authors (Alberto F. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 2013; Duranton, 
Rodríguez-Pose, and Sandall 2009; Tur-Prats 2014).78 The is a continuous 
measure, consisting of data from Sarah Carmichael’s work on marriage patterns 
(Carmichael 2011; Carmichael et al. 2011). It is lagged with one period (t-1), 
as are the other time-variant factors, to account for delays in the effect of the 
variables. For instance, mother’s bargaining power and subsequent investment 
possibilities are expected to influence the education of the next generation of 
girls, and a five-year lag adjusts for this delay.79 This does, however, imply a 
diminished number of observations. 
 
       The economic control variables include (the log) of GDP per capita, the 
female labour force participation rate (FLFPR) and public expenditure on 
education, all with a 1-period lag (t-1). The parameter of religion describes 
religious adherence: Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Hindu, or other. Following 
76    Regions are classified according to the CLIO-Infra OECD classification (Zanden et al. 2014).  The 
regions are: East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, 
South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Advanced Economies, Europe and Central Asia.
77    See notes for table A4.1 in the Appendix. 
78     Further elaboration on this dataset can be found in the notes to table A4.1 in the Appendix.
79     I tested for the robustness of this lag period against using multiple lags and found that the latter 
yielded similar results. However, because the lag period decreases the number of observations, I selected 
the shortest lag period. 
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(Inglehart and Baker 2000), the religion dummy takes the value of one when 
a particular religion is dominant and zero otherwise. The benchmark for 
dominance of adherents was set at 50%. For the highly developed countries, a 
dummy for Protestant was included as well.80
 
 
Model 1 in table 4.3 shows the relation between the gender ratio, the various 
family systems and the full spectrum of control variables. Models 2 to 4 add 
the marriage patterns, either the GPI (2), solely the age at marriage (3) or 
the spousal age gap (4). The last model adds a comparison, in which the 21 
highly developed countries are also included.81  Table 4.3 shows that most 
expectations about the link between women’s value in the family and the gender 
ratio in education are met. Model 1 shows a statistically significant correlation 
between the gender ratio in education and those family systems where the 
women’s value is high and families are relatively small. Nuclear systems have 
a more significant positive association with the gender ratio in education than 
the patrilineal extended family system, but only when women have a say in the 
transmission of property, in other words, when the nuclear system is combined 
with bilateral or matrilineal inheritance. The estimates for the matrilineal nuclear 
and bilateral nuclear family systems are 0.154 and 0.142 respectively, both 
significant at 1%. The second of these estimates implies that the bilateral 
nuclear system increases the value of the gender ratio in education by 14.6 
percentage points. This is a fairly large increase compared with the mean of the 
gender ratio in education, which is 0.72 in the sample. 
 
      Patrilineal inheritance has no significant effect on female educational 
participation, but this could be because the baseline category is a patrilineal 
system as well. Nevertheless, I would have expected the patrilineal nuclear 
system to perform better than the extended ones, because son preference 
might be increased by the nature of extended families, as explained above. 
Matrilineal inheritance has no positive effect on the female to male ratio 
when the domestic organisation type is extended. Surprisingly, matrilineal 
inheritance does have a positive effect in combination with a polygamous 
80     In the set of low to middle developed countries, no country reached the benchmark of 50% for the 
variable ‘Protestant’.
81     The highly income countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, UK and US.
4.5  Results
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family system. In addition the patrilineal polygamous family system is positive 
and significant vis-à-vis the patrilineal extended system, though I expected 
polygamous systems in general to perform similarly or worse. With the inclusion 
of the GPI in the second model, the effect of the patrilineal extended system 
becomes more significant than that of the polygamous systems, which could 
indicate that the influence of these polygamous systems on the gender ratio is 
driven by differences in age at marriage and spousal age gap. This supports the 
findings by (Tertilt 2005; Tertilt 2006) that spousal age differences are higher in 
polygamous than in monogamous systems. In sum, inheritance types that favour 
women have positive effects in all the models. Nuclear family systems perform 
better than extended systems, as expected. Polygamous systems seem to have 
a more positive effect than the extended system, but this is more robustly so in 
combination with a historically matrilineal inheritance structure. This may also 
be because girls are valued more highly on the basis of their future fertility (Cox 
and Fafchamps 2007, 2765–3766), or because of (domestic) labour conditions 
that allow girls to go to school while boys need to work. The reasons for a 
smaller gender gap in families with a tradition of matrilineal inheritance and a 
polygamous structure should be analysed in future research.
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Table 4.3 Family systems, 1950-2005
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SAMPLE Developing and middle-income countriesa Incl. high-income  countriesb
VARIABLES Female to male ratio in average years of schooling
Patrilineal nuclear 0.0402(0.0444)
0.0101
(0.0404)
0.0147
(0.0403)
0.0201
(0.0426)
0.0857***
(0.0332)
Patrilineal extended (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Patrilineal stem 0.107(0.0693)
0.0830
(0.0702)
0.0877
(0.0751)
0.0897
(0.0652)
0.0748*
(0.0394)
Patrilineal polygamous 0.145**(0.0698)
0.0776
(0.0604)
0.114**
(0.0560)
0.0724
(0.0694)
-0.0789
(0.0692)
Matrilineal nuclear 0.154***(0.0579)
0.126***
(0.0426)
0.147***
(0.0467)
0.117**
(0.0467)
0.0231
(0.0553)
Matrilineal extended -0.0203(0.0735)
-0.0441
(0.0714)
-0.0172
(0.0632)
-0.0609
(0.0829)
-0.225***
(0.0788)
Matrilineal polygamous 0.141**(0.0600)
0.108**
(0.0529)
0.147***
(0.0470)
0.0821
(0.0641)
-0.0629
(0.0621)
Bilateral nuclear 0.142**(0.0671)
0.117**
(0.0572)
0.124**
(0.0578)
0.122**
(0.0616)
0.127***
(0.0330)
Bilateral extended 0.0548(0.0923)
0.0549
(0.0921)
0.0700
(0.0908)
0.0388
(0.0936)
0.0658
(0.0898)
Bilateral stemc - - - - -0.0156(0.0341)
Girl power index (t-1) - 0.0146***(0.00307)
- - 0.00456*
(0.00264)
SMAM (t-1) - - 0.0215***(0.00469)
- -
Age gap (t-1) - - - -0.0229***(0.00604)
-
Log GDP per capita (t-1) 0.0238*(0.0144)
0.0260*
(0.0149)
0.0207
(0.0154)
0.0303**
(0.0138)
0.0308**
(0.0131)
FLFP rate (t-1)d 5.04e-05(0.000567)
-7.32e-05
(0.000542)
1.44e-05
(0.000555)
-0.000106
(0.000542)
0.000270
(0.000393)
Public expenditure on 
education (t-1)
-0.00808*
(0.00489)
-0.0103**
(0.00431)
-0.0104**
(0.00434)
-0.00912**
(0.00450)
-0.00600
(0.00457)
Catholic (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Protestant - - - - 0.0648*(0.0369)
Muslim 0.00289(0.0311)
0.0383
(0.0299)
0.0335 
(0.0309)
0.0264
(0.0302)
-0.103***
(0.0389)
Hindu -0.105 -0.0674 -0.0470 -0.107 -0.374***
(0.132) (0.128) (0.127) (0.130) (0.0924)
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MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SAMPLE Developing and middle-income countriesa Incl. high-income  countriesb
VARIABLES Female to male ratio in average years of schooling
Patrilineal nuclear 0.0402(0.0444)
0.0101
(0.0404)
0.0147
(0.0403)
0.0201
(0.0426)
0.0857***
(0.0332)
Patrilineal extended (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Patrilineal stem 0.107(0.0693)
0.0830
(0.0702)
0.0877
(0.0751)
0.0897
(0.0652)
0.0748*
(0.0394)
Patrilineal polygamous 0.145**(0.0698)
0.0776
(0.0604)
0.114**
(0.0560)
0.0724
(0.0694)
-0.0789
(0.0692)
Matrilineal nuclear 0.154***(0.0579)
0.126***
(0.0426)
0.147***
(0.0467)
0.117**
(0.0467)
0.0231
(0.0553)
Matrilineal extended -0.0203(0.0735)
-0.0441
(0.0714)
-0.0172
(0.0632)
-0.0609
(0.0829)
-0.225***
(0.0788)
Matrilineal polygamous 0.141**(0.0600)
0.108**
(0.0529)
0.147***
(0.0470)
0.0821
(0.0641)
-0.0629
(0.0621)
Bilateral nuclear 0.142**(0.0671)
0.117**
(0.0572)
0.124**
(0.0578)
0.122**
(0.0616)
0.127***
(0.0330)
Bilateral extended 0.0548(0.0923)
0.0549
(0.0921)
0.0700
(0.0908)
0.0388
(0.0936)
0.0658
(0.0898)
Bilateral stemc - - - - -0.0156(0.0341)
Girl power index (t-1) - 0.0146***(0.00307)
- - 0.00456*
(0.00264)
SMAM (t-1) - - 0.0215***(0.00469)
- -
Age gap (t-1) - - - -0.0229***(0.00604)
-
Log GDP per capita (t-1) 0.0238*(0.0144)
0.0260*
(0.0149)
0.0207
(0.0154)
0.0303**
(0.0138)
0.0308**
(0.0131)
FLFP rate (t-1)d 5.04e-05(0.000567)
-7.32e-05
(0.000542)
1.44e-05
(0.000555)
-0.000106
(0.000542)
0.000270
(0.000393)
Public expenditure on 
education (t-1)
-0.00808*
(0.00489)
-0.0103**
(0.00431)
-0.0104**
(0.00434)
-0.00912**
(0.00450)
-0.00600
(0.00457)
Catholic (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Protestant - - - - 0.0648*(0.0369)
Muslim 0.00289(0.0311)
0.0383
(0.0299)
0.0335 
(0.0309)
0.0264
(0.0302)
-0.103***
(0.0389)
Hindu -0.105 -0.0674 -0.0470 -0.107 -0.374***
(0.132) (0.128) (0.127) (0.130) (0.0924)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are clustered per country
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: 
a  86 countries.
b 21 countries. 
c Within this dataset, the bilateral stem family only exists within the advanced economies.
d FLFP rate is short for the female labour force participation rate.
e The regions are East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East 
and North Africa, South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Central Asia.
Turning to the link between the GPI and the educational gender gap, we see 
that the positive and significant sign of the coefficient supports the hypothesis 
that later marriage and a smaller spousal age gap are positively associated with 
the gender ratio in education. In model 2, keeping all control variables equal, 
a one-point increase in the GPI results in a 1.5 percentage point increase in 
the gender ratio. When marriage partners are on a more equal footing, i.e. 
when ‘girl power’ increases, gender equality in education rises as well. Further 
investigation into the two variables constituting the GPI show that both SMAM 
and the age gap have the right positively and negatively significant signs 
respectively, with somewhat larger coefficients (models 3 and 4). As mentioned 
earlier, the inclusion of the age gap decreases the effect of the polygamous 
family system on the gender ratio in education, while the age at marriage 
does not have this effect. I added model 5 because I wondered whether the 
inclusion of highly advanced countries would weaken the significance of either 
of the variables. With the addition of the 21 advanced countries, the GPI is still 
significant at a 10% level. 
 
Other 0.0340(0.0259)
0.0566**
(0.0251)
0.0521**
(0.0257)
0.0507**
(0.0258)
-0.0292
(0.0208)
Constant
0.658***
(0.132)
0.326***
(0.126)
0.158
(0.150)
0.671***
(0.128)
0.550***
(0.126)
Observations 435 435 435 435 605
Number of countries 86 86 86 86 107
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Region dummiese Y Y Y Y Y
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       Table A4.2 in the Appendix tests the robustness of these marriage pattern 
findings by applying alternative estimation methods. The same controls, year 
and region dummies apply, but for the sake of brevity these are unreported. 
Models 1 and 2 show the benchmark random effects estimation and a pooled 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors. The GPI is significant and positive 
and the two models yield very similar results, providing some confidence in my 
model specification (Wooldridge 2009, ch. 14). As mentioned earlier (footnote 
65), a Hausman test indicated that fixed-effects model might have been better, 
but this would yield no estimations for my time-invariant family systems. With 
the GPI now as the main independent variable of interest, I performed a fixed-
effects estimation, reported in model 3 in table A4.2. Though the coefficient of 
the GPI is somewhat smaller, it remains robustly significant. Lastly, I recognise 
that the GPI suffers from an endogeneity problem because high education of 
women might result in later marriage. I therefore applied a traditional technique 
of using lags of the GPI as an instrument in the model, using a two-stage 
least-squares approach. I lagged these variables once, and my model still 
yielded significant results. I interpret these last models with caution and use 
them only as a test to check the robustness of my results. Since Angrist and 
Krueger (2001) have pointed out the mechanical and a-theoretical nature of this 
traditional choice of instrument, the use of lagged variables as instruments is 
under heavy debate. All in all though, I find that the GPI is robustly associated 
with the gender ratio in average years in education.  
 
      Some interesting findings appeared in the controls. Surprisingly, 
expenditures on education were negatively related to the gender ratio in 
education. The results are similar even when I do not control for income per 
capita. It must be noted that the data quality of this particular variable is weak, 
which discourages drawing strong conclusions. Nonetheless, the relative 
worsening of female education by public spending seems like an unlikely 
outcome. A possible explanation might be that added public expenditure on 
education benefits men over women. Regressing the same model on female 
and male education separately, I found that expenditure had no significant 
relation to female education, but a small significant and positive (10% level) 
effect on male education (not reported). When the highly developed countries 
are included in the analysis, the detrimental effect of public educational 
spending on the gender ratio disappears. This could indicate two things. 
First, the effects of educational spending on male instead of female education 
could be stronger in developing countries because of a gender bias of state 
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institutions. Second, in the period from 1950 onwards, developing countries 
began their mass education systems, which at first generally included more men 
than women. This feature diminished as mass educational systems matured, 
as is the case in the developed regions and reflected by the drop in the 
significance of the coefficient in model 4. Further investigation into this variable 
might yield some interesting results. 
 
      The control variable GDP per capita provides some indication of the 
resources available for education. The positive sign of the GDP coefficient 
indicates that as income per capita increases and the constraints of poverty 
become less severe, gender differences in educational enrolment diminish. The 
female labour force participation rate showed no significant association with the 
gender ratio in education. It is difficult to assess the causality direction of the 
relationship between female labour force participation and female education. 
Development economists have shown that the effect of education on labour 
force participation rates is not uniform across years of education and that the 
relationship may be U-shaped. This means that female gains in education are 
not always reflected by female gains in income and employment or vice versa 
(Cameron, Dowling, and Worswick 2001).  
 
       Religious adherence produces some interesting results. Recent studies 
show that female education is more constrained in a society with a large share 
of Muslim adherents, and to some extent in one with a large share of Hindu 
adherents, than it is in a society with a large share of any Christian faith (Cooray 
and Potrafke 2011; Norton and Tomal 2009). However, when I include regional 
dummies, I find that the Muslim and Hindu dummy variables are insignificant, 
while without including regions dummies (not reported), I did obtain a significant 
coefficient. This implies that the cultural effects are captured by regional 
differences, not by religious ones. 
 
       To compare the effect of the different variables influencing the gender 
ratio in education, table A4.3 in the Appendix shows the standardised 
coefficients of the full family systems model. The effect of the family system 
variables is very strong, even stronger than that of income per capita. The 
matrilineal nuclear family and the bilateral nuclear family both stand out as 
having a particularly strong association with the gender gap, though the effect 
of the matrilineal polygamous system is strong as well. The coefficient for the 
GPI and its comparative effect on the educational gender gap is also stronger 
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than that of income per capita. Though not as large as the effect of the family 
characteristics, GDP per capita still has a positive effect on the gender ratio in 
education. In comparison, the coefficient for public expenditure on education is 
smaller, and still negative. Once again, there are no strong negative effects for 
the Muslim and Hindu variables.
  
       As a robustness check, I tested the full model again only for the year 2000, 
for the set of developing countries (table A4.4 in the Appendix). The association 
with the gender gap in education and the GPI remains robustly significant. 
However, many family systems now lose their significant effect compared to the 
base category of the patrilineal extended system. The bilateral nuclear system 
retains its significant effect on the gender ratio in education and the effects 
of the matrilineal extended system come out as negative. An F-test (F( 8, 46) 
= 4.12; P = 0.0009) performed for all family systems shows that these family 
systems do have some jointly significant effect on the gender ratio. 
 
      Figure 4.3 illustrates the predictive power of our model, by showing 
the actual time-series of the gender gap in educational attainment, and the 
outcome as predicted by our model for five countries. Pakistan, with a patrilineal 
extended family type, and Brazil and Sri Lanka, both with bilateral nuclear 
types, seem to fit the model quite well. The actual gender gaps demonstrate 
somewhat more volatility than the model can pick up, but there seems to be 
a fair match between the actual and the modelled outcomes. The modelled 
outcome for India shows the model’s imperfections as well. India is already a 
weak performer, but the modelled outcome predicts the gender gap to be even 
larger. Possibly, the prediction missed some important elements adding to 
Indian-specific gender equality in education, such as caste divisions. Another 
possible explanation is that there is a marked contrast between the historical 
demographic patterns of North and South India, and that using the Indian 
country-average family system as data does not accurately portray reality. 
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Figure 4.3 Actual and modeled gender gaps and in educational attainment for five  countries,      
   1950–2005
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This study adds to the debate on the determinants and persistence of gender 
gaps in education and the effects of cultural institutions more broadly. I argue 
that family systems and female agency are a productive area for inquiry into 
the roots of gender inequalities and their ongoing persistence. I found robust 
evidence of the association between the value placed on women in the family 
and the gender ratio in education, whether this is via institutional effects of 
family systems or via marriage patterns associated with high female agency. 
The family as an institution may thus either limit or increase women’s freedom 
of choice and life opportunities more than it does men’s, through unequal 
educational participation. Matrilineal and bilateral family types are strong 
predictors of equal gender participation in education, especially when they are 
also the nuclear family type. I found that extended or polygamous families did 
not necessarily have a negative effect on the gender ratio in education; rather, 
the ratio depended more on the type of inheritance system prevalent in a region. 
Historical legacies do not weaken a society’s ability to overcome gender 
inequalities. Countries across the world are trying to overcome gender barriers 
in education, improve female labour force participation and, more generally, 
make women valued as assets to society. Moreover, women are themselves 
active agents in their struggle towards gender equality in all aspects of life. My 
study demonstrates that the struggle may be more arduous in some parts of 
the world than in others, because of differences in the slow-changing cultural 
institution of the family, and the different ways in which has been organised 
historically. Strong female agency within the family enables women to make 
important life decisions, such to invest in their own education and their 
daughters’. Where both spouses are educated, intergenerational transfer of 
knowledge benefits. This study provides a well-quantified study with a wide 
range of international data and indicates that in countries where women lack 
the capacity to choose, either because they marry into a new family at a young 
age, or because they lack property rights, it is likely that less will be invested in 
women’s education than in men’s.  
 
4.6  Conclusions
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Written Selin Dilli and Sarah Carmichael as chapter 5 in J.L. van Zanden, A. Rijpma 
and J. Kok (Eds.), Agency, gender, and economic development in the World Economy, 
1850-2000: Testing the Sen Hypothesis.82
“The best thermometer to the progress of anation 
  is its treatment of its women.”
                                                       Swami Vivekananda, 1893
India, despite its success in building and consolidating a vibrant democracy 
(Hasan 2010), is still characterized by deep-rooted discrimination against 
women. This discrimination can be found in many features of daily life: in 
education, work, politics, and within the home (Esteve-Volart 2004; Das Gupta 
1987; Fuwa et al. 2006; Chhibber 2002; Vlassoff 1992). In general, women are 
more likely than Indian men to suffer from the hardships of poverty and lack of 
access to resources. Maternal mortality remains high across the country, with 
India, taken together with Nigeria, accounting for over a third of global maternal 
deaths (Hogan et al. 2010). Child marriage is still prevalent, which has negative 
effects on schooling and health of girls, and is associated with physical violence 
within the home (Jain and Kurz 2007). Discrimination against women also 
manifests itself in a more extreme form in violence against women and sex 
selective abortion resulting in many ‘missing women’ (Sen 1990). Klasen and 
Wink (2003) estimated that due to bias in the allocation of resources, a total of 
39.1 million girls were missing in India in 2001.    
82      Accepted for the Gender and Well-Being book series at Ashgate (ed. Christina Borderias).
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      However, the position of women varies significantly across the states of 
India. Various studies have observed that the position of women is substantially 
better in the South compared to the North (e.g., Basu and Das Gupta 2001; 
Kishor 1993; Dyson and Moore 1983). Kerala, the Southern state held up by 
Amartya Sen as being exemplary for development, is one of the top performers 
in a number of gender outcomes (e.g. literacy, maternal health, low violence 
against women) (Sen 1999). States in the North, such as Uttar Pradesh and 
Rajasthan, score very low on these indicators. Ghani et al. (2012) showed that 
the female business ownership rate is especially high in Karnataka, Kerala, and 
Tamil Nadu, in contrast to low female ownership shares in Delhi, Bihar, Haryana, 
and Gujarat.  The 2007 National Family Health Survey III documented that even 
among recent cohorts of women aged 18–29, 52% of women were married by 
age 18 in Uttar Pradesh; corresponding proportions were 25% in Tamil Nadu 
and 17% in Kerala (Desai and Andrist 2010).83 Bhaskar and Gupta (2007, 222) 
found that the states of the North (Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, 
Uttar Pradesh) and West (Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra) show ‘abnormally’ 
high sex ratios biased against women compared to the states of the South 
(Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Goa) and the East (Assam, 
Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal). Basu (1992) finds, based on qualitative and 
quantitative data on migrants from Southern and Northern states to Delhi, that 
Southern women enjoy greater freedom of mobility and expression. 
 
       A number of studies focusing on the long-term trends in gender equality 
outcomes highlight that the state level differences in gender equality are not 
a new phenomenon but have deep historical roots. Das Gupta (2014) shows 
that the regional differences in sex ratios have persisted over the course of the 
twentieth century. She attributes the persistence of son preference in India 
to the existence of deeply rooted cultural values.84 States in the South were 
historically characterized by lower marital fertility, later age at marriage, and 
more equal sex ratios compared to the North (Basu and Das Gupta 2001; 
Kishor 1993; Dyson and Moore 1983). In some states in the East and the 
South, bilateral or matrilineal inheritance practices were historically common 
for some communities, for example for the Nayars and Tiyyars in the state of 
83     Data is based on International Institute for Population Sciences and Macro International (2007).
84     In this, she follows in the footsteps of a body of literature devoted to this topic, ranging from the 
first observations in the 1901 General Report of the Census, to the seminal work by Karve (1953), and to 
more contemporary work like Miller (1981), Dyson and Moore (1983), Rahman and Rao (2004) and Gooch 
(2014).
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Kerala (Schneider and Gough 1961; Sen 1999). Taken together these examples 
point to differences across India in the position of women, which seem to have 
persisted over time. 
       This chapter seeks to map and analyse the regional patterns in different 
dimensions of women’s position and gender inequality in the late nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Like in chapter 2, 3 and 4, we study what drives 
educational attainment, especially economic development and (constraints 
to) female agency within the family, but in this chapter, we investigate gender 
equality more broadly. We study what explains the regional variation and the 
historical changes in in gender equality observed in India and chapter employs 
data on various dimensions of the gender gap, such as sex ratios, marriage 
ages and education calculated from Indian censuses, from 1881 to the present 
day as indicators of gender equality. In addition, data on parliamentary and 
voting activity, available from 1961 onwards are used to study gender inequality 
in politics.85 This data is available for 16 Indian states, covering more than 95% 
of the total Indian population (Clots-Figueras 2011). This makes it possible 
to track the dimensions of gender inequality over time and space, and study 
how they relate to the various family systems of India and trends in economic 
development. Moreover, we have developed an index of the constraints on 
female agency (CFA) as ‘produced’ by the different family systems of the sub-
continent to test for a link between gender inequality and family systems. To test 
whether economic development helps to explain the differences between Indian 
states in terms of gender equality, we look at the level of urbanisation as a proxy 
of economic development, as this measure is the only available proxy available 
for the entire time period under investigation. 
 
      The main purpose of this investigation is twofold. First, at the sub-national 
level, the relationship between gender, development and family systems could 
be different from the national or cross-country level due to inter-regional 
disparities. This, however, remains largely unexplored in the existing literature 
(Arora 2012). In chapter 4, figure 4.3 showed that the actual gender gaps in 
education and the outcomes on the basis of the model were different for India 
in the period between 1950 and 2005, which is most likely due to large regional 
differences.  Second, studies focusing on India are either based on current-day 
85    It is not possible to study the gender differences in voter turnout at the global level due to secret ballot 
system adopted by many countries in the world. India is one of the few countries in the world that provide 
voter turnout statistics by gender (see the website of IDEA for a list of countries for which this data is 
available by gender at:  http://www.idea.int/gender/vt_by_country.cfm)
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data and lack historical perspective, or those with a long-term perspective are 
limited in geographical scope and in the dimensions of gender equality they 
study. For example, Rahman and Rao (2004), using a randomized household 
and individual level survey conducted in 1995 in the districts of Karnataka and 
Uttar Pradesh, show that village exogamy and public investment (i.e., number 
of roads, presence of schools) are positively associated with higher levels of 
gender equality. Arora (2012) tests the impact of globalization and economic 
development on gender inequality in Indian states using data available after 
2000. He finds that at the sub-national level in India higher per capita income is 
accompanied by lower gender inequality. However, he also observes that some 
high-income states also have high levels of gender inequality. Kubichek (2011) 
is one of the few studies to take long-term perspective, analysing district-level 
data from six Indian states for the period 1961-2001 to understand the roots 
of gender gaps in literacy and sex ratios. She finds that economic growth to 
be associated with a decrease in female to male child sex ratios and female to 
male literacy ratios, which aligns with Arora’s findings, but concludes that as the 
main variations in sex ratios and literacy ratios are accounted for by the passage 
of time, other unaccounted for factors must be of importance. Vlassoff (2013) 
shows that in rural Maharashtra, between 1975 and 2005, economic progress 
(i.e., the transformation of agriculture from subsistence to cash crops) together 
with social expenditure in the region (i.e., improved sanitation, construction of 
schools and health centres) had a positive impact on female education and 
marriage ages. Despite this progress, she also found that traditional gender 
roles persist. For example, only 7% of married women worked in ‘white-collar 
jobs’ such as teachers and office workers.
 
       None of these studies provide insight into women’s position from the 
colonial period to the present day. Difficulties in obtaining long-term data 
on both gender indicators and economic development underlie this lacuna. 
With new data, we would like to add to this literature by testing the relative 
importance of economic development and historical institutions in explaining 
regional differences in both colonial and postcolonial period, measured in 
terms of different dimensions of gender equality. At this point we should make 
explicit one feature of our dataset i.e. that the data is captured at state level. 
This means that we have had to, in very broad terms, project back current 
day state boundaries on to the historical data we had available. This is hardly 
ideal but is the only feasible way to paint, in broad strokes, a picture of the 
regional differences in the position of women and to explore in rough lines the 
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changes over time. It is, though, important to note in what follows that the state 
boundaries shift over time that may have implications for the analysis. This is 
particularly pertinent in the period 1950 to 1960 when many state boundaries 
changed. To reduce some of the concerns, we repeat the empirical analysis 
by using the data from 1880, 1960 and 2000. We also repeat the panel data 
regressions in the post 1960 period.
       In addition, we evaluate whether Indian society is becoming more, or less 
gender equal over time, in other words, whether there is a convergence towards 
gender equality or not. The basic idea of convergence is that states with lower 
initial levels of gender equality in our indicators should grow at a faster rate 
than those states starting with a higher level of gender equality. As a result of 
national policies in the post-colonial period, states starting with lower levels 
of gender equality might be expected to be catching up with states that have 
high levels of gender equality. After independence, the Indian government took 
a number of actions to eliminate gender inequalities in various dimensions of 
wellbeing. For instance, within a year of Independence, the government under 
the leadership of Nehru enacted a number of progressive laws in relation 
to marriage and divorce  (1955), and to succession and inheritance (1956) 
(Hasan 2010, 942). In 1992 India became a signatory to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).86 In 
September 1996, the Indian government passed a Bill that proposed reserving 
one-third of the seats in the Panchayats (local governments) for women (Clots-
Figueras 2011, 664).87 The Government of India adopted a new national 
policy for the empowerment of women in 2001 to bring about gender justice, 
leading to important changes in the legal framework to increase women’s rights 
concerning marriage, property and protection against domestic violence. As a 
result of these attempts by the national government, gender inequality in India 
is expected to decline and the long-term regional disparities in gender equality 
should become less prevalent, i.e. we expect to find convergence. 
 
      However, the efficiency of the national attempts to eliminate gender 
disparities is unclear. Introduction of quota systems in local governments has 
helped increase women’s political representation substantially. When the quota 
86    http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/Review/responses/INDIA-English.pdf
87    In September 1996, the Indian government introduced a Bill in Parliament that proposed reserving 
for women one-third of the seats in the Lok Sabha (Central Government) and in the State Assemblies. This 
proposal has since been widely debated in several parliamentary sessions, but no agreement has yet been 
reached (Clots-Figueras 2011, 664).
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mandated that only women were permitted to run for seats in reserved districts, 
thereby removing competition by men, the random assignment of reservation 
indicated that there was an estimated 10-fold increase in women running for 
office (Pande and Ford 2011). In addition, Clots-Figuras (2011) finds that female 
legislators favour “women-friendly” laws, such as amendments to the Hindu 
Succession Act, which was designed to give women the same inheritance 
rights as men and increase the education of individuals from their home 
districts. While female literacy in India has increased almost 12 percentage 
points from 2001 to 2011, the current female literacy rate of about 65% is still 
lower than that of males, which is about 82% (Kubichek 2011). The overall male 
labour force participation rate in India is 85%, in stark contrast to the female 
labour force participation of 36%. The female to male sex ratio in India, defined 
as the number of females per 1,000 males, has dropped from 972 in 1901 to 
933 in 2001 (Kubichek 2011; Bhan 2001). We provide a systematic look at 
these trends in gender equality and test whether the gap between men and 
women has grown or declined from the late nineteenth century onwards.  
 
       To study these issues, we analyse our dataset using an Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression technique. First, we test the relevance of the 
indicators in explaining the long-term regional differences in women’s position 
and gender equality. Our findings highlight the relevance of urbanisation and 
the family systems constraining female agency as important factors in explaining 
the long-term regional differences in gender equality. As a second step in our 
analysis we look at the change (growth) towards gender equality in Indian 
states and whether the gap between the states is closing over time. The results 
show that except in literacy, there is convergence towards gender equality in 
India. However, the findings also highlight that is not a uniform process across 
Indian states. The convergence process is slowed down by regional differences 
in historical institutions and the urbanisation rate. Thus, our findings provide 
support for those of Shah (1998), who attributes the varying impacts of national 
policy to the different traditional family structures and religious composition 
across India.  
 
       The chapter proceeds as follows: section 5.2 provides a discussion on 
the factors that may be relevant in explaining the position of women in Indian 
states. The aim is not to reiterate what has been said in the previous chapter, 
but discuss the relevant literature in the context of India. Section 5.3 then 
150
introduces the data sources and section 5.4 provides a description of how the 
position of women in Indian states changed over the course of the twentieth 
century. Section 5.5 presents the results of the empirical analysis on the 
determinants of gender equality in India whereas section 5.6 focuses on the 
results of the convergence model. Section 5.7 concludes.
      The literature to date presents a number of factors as important in 
determining the North-South divide in terms of the position of women in India. 
Some scholars attribute the differences to economic factors. This strand of 
literature argues that the South has more labour-intensive crops than the North 
and correspondingly larger market for female labour (Bardhan 1974; Foster and 
Rosenzweig 1996; Gooch 2014; Miller 1981). Labour-intensive rice-cultivation 
in the South expands labour demand for women. As demand rises and her 
economic value increases, women’s status goes up, especially when these 
women belong to the classes above the lowest economic strata of society 
(Boserup 1970, 69–75).  Since the seminal work by Dyson and Moore (1983), 
cultural factors as shaped by family systems received substantial scholarly 
attention. The authors argue that differences in how women are treated are 
the result of long-term cultural preferences determined by the family structure. 
However, according to Irwati Karve (1953), these family systems are partly 
explained by the pastoral nature of Northern India, versus the crop agriculture of 
Southern India. In both of the explanations, geography seems to play an indirect 
role in explaining differences in the position of women, as the type of soil, and 
climate, plays a crucial role in determining the type of crop to be planted. A 
third approach attributes the differences to state policies designed to promote 
gender equality, which have been more proactively pursued in Southern states 
compared to the North (Jeffrey 1992; Rahman and Rao 2004). While our data 
does not allow us to study all the relevant explanations mentioned here, we 
review the literature on the determinants of gender equality below, which we are 
able to test in the empirical specification.
      We test the relevance of two hypotheses. Firstly, we focus on the link 
between gender inequality and family systems. The dominant explanation of 
the large north-south differences in gender inequality is that family systems 
differed radically between the regions of India. The family and kinship systems, 
which often determine the rights of women in traditional societies, have for 
5.2  Determinants of the position of women 
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example been highlighted as one of the most important factors in explaining 
the historically persistent pattern of missing women in India (see for example 
Agarwal 1995; Das Gupta et al. 2003; and Kishor 1993). As mentioned, 
Dyson and Moore (1983) argue the differences in gender equality are mainly 
the result of cultural factors, determined by family systems. They argue that 
the lower status of women in the North can be attributed to the widespread 
practice of exogamous marriage. However, their view on exogamy as being 
detrimental to the status of women has been challenged by Rahman and Rao 
(2004). They claim that marrying within the family may require wives to split 
their time and loyalty between two competing circles of kin. Moreover, rules 
that prescribe marriage to an uncle or a cousin (exogamy) may limit women’s 
freedom in choosing marriage partner, which may result in unequal bargaining 
power between spouses. Their empirical findings show no impact of exogamy 
on the position of women.88 Beside exogamy, there are other dimensions of 
family systems relevant in determining the position of women, such as co-
residence, how descent is defined and inheritance practices (see chapter 4). 
We operationalize this hypothesis by creating a measure of the constraints to 
female agency resulting from the family system and testing for the link between 
this CFA index and gender inequality. The supplementary hypothesis to help 
explain trends in gender inequality over time is that economic development has 
been instrumental in improving the position of women.  
 
       Secondly, we test the economic development thesis that as countries, 
or regions, become more economically developed, the bargaining position 
of women and overall gender equality will improve (Inglehart and Norris 
2003)”number-of-pages”:”244”,”source”:”Google Books”,”event-place”:”Ca
mbridge”,”abstract”:”The twentieth century gave rise to profound changes in 
traditional sex roles. However, the force of this rising tide has varied among 
rich and poor societies around the globe, as well as among younger and 
older generations. Rising Tide sets out to understand how modernization has 
changed cultural attitudes towards gender equality and to analyze the political 
consequences of this process. The core argument suggests that women and 
men s lives have been altered in a two-stage modernization process consisting 
of (i. Urbanisation is intrinsically bound up with the process of economic 
88     While exogamy and endogamy distinction is worthwhile testing in the empirical specification, we 
exclude this dimension of family systems from our measure due to the mismatch between the definition of 
exogamy in the context of India (i.e., has a broader definition which refers to marriage arrangements not with 
non-relatives but also members of other castes and villages) and the dataset we are using, which does not 
allow for such a distinction. 
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development. As societies shift from agricultural or nomadic to non-agricultural 
activities, agglomeration in cities becomes economically efficient. The World 
Bank (2009) highlights the process of urbanisation as a source of growth, 
integration and specialization through its creation of scale economies. The 
generation and presence of scale economies in the mode of production is also 
a reason for the increasing importance of urban settlements. This process 
is most advanced in developed countries while it is still in an intermediate 
phase in many other parts of the world. The link between urbanisation and 
economic productivity can also be empirically demonstrated (Malanima 2005). 
As such, the inclusion of the variable urbanisation in the model specification 
is justified as a proxy for the larger process of “economic development”. 
Urbanisation is expected to promote gender equality as it provides greater 
employment opportunities for women, and greater exposure to more gender 
egalitarian values (Kubichek 2011). Thus, we expect states with a higher level 
of urbanisation to perform better on the indicators of gender quality. However, 
while a number of studies using cross-national data, have observed that 
urbanisation significantly increases the level of gender equality in a society (e.g., 
Carmichael 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003), the evidence in the literature on 
the role of urbanisation in promoting gender equality in Indian states is less 
conclusive. For instance, Kubichek (2011) finds that urbanisation leads to a 
small increase in female to male literacy ratios, but has no impact on female to 
male child sex ratios. 
 
      We also control for a number of other historical institutional factors. These 
are religion, colonial rule and caste. Colonial rule is used as an indicator of the 
influence of contact with foreign rule. Colonial India consisted of states under 
direct British colonial rule, and states with indirect rule, under the administration 
of Indian kings rather than the British Crown; these were known as the 
“native states” or the “princely states” (Iyer 2010).89 Colonial rule may have an 
ambiguous effect on gender equality. While colonial administrators attempted 
to curtail such practices as female infanticide and child marriage, at the same 
time they imposed their own ideals on the countries they came into contact 
with, sometimes resulting in a shift from matrilineal forms of social organization 
towards patrilineal ones (Henderson and Whatley 2014). For instance, 
the British colonial regime suppressed certain customs such as female 
infanticide and sati, but it did not make any serious effort to intervene in the 
89    Prior to national independence, some Indian states experienced elections under a highly 
restricted franchise, while others did not (Tudor and Zoegfeld 2010).
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institutions of family and marriage (Shah 1998, 149). Therefore, in areas ruled 
directly by the British, we may expect to find less son preference. Moreover, 
the disadvantageous position of women in Muslim majority countries has 
been largely attributed to Islam (e.g., Fish 2002; Donno and Russett 2004). 
Therefore, we test whether states with a larger share of Muslim population 
historically have higher levels of gender inequality and a lower status of women 
in the long run. 
       While studying the relevance of institutional indicators in gender equality, 
we will also take into account elements of the caste system, specific to India. 
Although formally abolished after independence, today the Indian government 
still recognizes some social groups historically disadvantaged on the basis 
of this normative system. The caste system was a closed system of social 
stratification, whose origins are entwined with those of Hinduism. The system 
is subdivided into four major categories, which are again divided into a number 
of castes.90 Upward mobility was virtually impossible and certain occupations 
were historically tied to particular castes, such as priest, governor and farmer. 
Outside the four major categories was another fifth category, the untouchables, 
also called Dalit. This lowest caste was associated with “unclean” occupations, 
such as any involving leatherwork, butchering, or waste (O’Malley 2013, 
141–43). Bidner and Eswaran (2015) demonstrate that endogamy (marriage 
only within castes) is one of the core features of the caste system and 
punishments for violations of endogamy are more severe for women than for 
men. This is because hypergamy (women marrying up) is more acceptable 
than hypogamy (women marrying down). The levels of gender equality and the 
position of women are expected to be lower in states with a larger share of Dalit 
population, as social inequality interacts with gender inequality.  
       The drivers of gender equality discussed here may also be relevant while 
characterizing the trends in gender equality in India over time. As a result of 
the national intervention, we expect the gender gap in India to decline and the 
regional differences between the states to get smaller over time, yet, the decline 
in gender inequality may be slowed by state differences in urbanisation rates. 
Moreover, a decline in overall gender inequality in India could be held back by 
slower change in states with historical institutions that are detrimental to the 
position of women.
90     The major categories are (in descending order of social status): 1) Brahmans; 2) Kshatriya/Rajput; 3) 
Vaishya; 4) Shudra. 
154
       To study the historical roots of women’s position across India, regional level 
data was collected from primary and secondary sources for the time period 
between 1881 and 2011 for 16 states of India. To provide an indication of the 
location and size of the states, map 5.1 shows an overview of the state names 
referred to later on in the text.
Map 5.1 Map of India - States and Union Territories
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:India_states_and_union_territories_map.svg 
      The changing boundaries of the states in the colonial and post-colonial 
period cause difficulty in combining the historical dataset from the censuses 
with the current day data.91  The modern state boundaries in India are different 
from older native state or British province boundaries, mainly due to the 
1956 reorganization of states on a linguistic basis (Iyer 2010). As a result, 
some states have been divided, and others have been newly created or have 
disappeared over the period under consideration. The state division from the 
91    For a list of states’ names in different time periods, see the appendix 5A.1.
5.3  Data 
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1990 census is used to combine historical data with supplementary data from 
secondary sources described below. We focus on state level analysis as the 
number of districts has increased substantially, especially since the 1970s 
(Banerjee and Somanathan 2007). Therefore, we are better able to capture 
women’s empowerment over a long period when the measures used are at 
the state level rather than at district level. However, this choice of sampling 
comes at the cost of sample size, which limits the possibilities to apply complex 
empirical analysis.92  
 
       The historical measures of women’s empowerment, namely sex ratio, 
marriage ages and literacy, were collected from the decadal Indian censuses 
available from 1881 onwards.93 The sex ratio is calculated by taking the ratio 
of females males for the age cohorts of 0-10, 10-15 and total population. In the 
modern literature it has been shown that at birth the ratio between females and 
males should be about 0.94 (see Carmichael, Dilli, and Rijpma 2014). In 2010 
the global sex ratio at birth in 2010 was estimated by the United Nations to be 
0.94, i.e., approximately 94 female births for every 100 male births. Thus every 
value below 0.94 would indicate an inclination to son preference (Dyson 2012). 
Though we would prefer to use the age category 0-1 or 0-5, the age category 
0-10 is used, as the measure for ages 0-5 are not available for the entire period. 
Also, unlike in 2010, son preference would historically not manifest itself as pre-
birth sex selective abortion but rather in preferential treatment of male infants 
and/or female infanticide, which might be better captured by taking the age 
group 0-10. Age at first marriage of women and men are calculated using the 
Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) method (Hajnal 1953; Carmichael 
2011; Carmichael, Dilli, and Rijpma 2014).94 
92     This way of reconstructing the census data to match it to current day states means that the 
observations should not be construed as 100% accurate but rather as somewhat rough measures of the 
historical situation.
93     The census data is at the level of states with the possibility of disaggregating the data at the district 
level. However, to have a long-term insight on various indicators of women’s empowerment, our focus is 
limited to the state level.
94     The method works as follows: using the never married category, percentages single can be calculated 
for every age band, and by weighting these by the number of years in each age band the mean age of the 
transition between single and married can be calculated. One subtracts the number of years spent single 
by those who never marry and arrives at the average number of years those who eventually marry spend 
in an unwedded state. Two issues with this calculation arise. Firstly the SMAM takes a single point in time 
and calculates the age at marriage by looking at the whole range of marital experiences of the population 
aged between 15 and 50. This can be different from the true mean age of marriage, which can be a cohort 
specific measure. The second issue arises due to the retrospective nature of the calculation that SMAM 
represents. This means the SMAM results are influenced by age and marriage specific mortality and by any 
in or out migration (Carmichael 2011, 6).
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Lastly, the female and male literacy rates are the percentage of the population 
reported in the census data as being able to read and write.95 
 
      From the 1960s onwards, measures of the political empowerment of women 
become available. Our focus is on two indicators, namely the percentage of 
female seats in the state legislatures (Vidhan Sabhas) and the voter turnout 
rate by gender for the elections for state legislatures. The State Legislative 
Assemblies are directly elected bodies that carry out the administration of the 
government in the Indian states that have the freedom to decide the expenditure 
and budget allocated to development policies (Clots-Figueras 2011). The data 
is available from the reports published by the Election Commission of India 
(ECI).96 To calculate the voter turnout, the ratios of the number of women and 
men who voted in the last election to the number of female and male eligible 
voters are taken.  
 
      While we study the trends in women’s position, we also take the ratio of the 
indicators of women’s position to that of men to evaluate not only the absolute 
position of women, but their relative position to that of men as well. The ratio 
indicator provides a better overview of the size of the gender gap, and thus 
a better indicator of gender inequality. We take the ratio of the measures on 
women’s position only after missing values have been dealt with. 
 
      To capture family systems, we create an index called constraints on female 
agency (CFA), made largely on the basis of Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas.97 
We made use of information from Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas, supplemented 
with additional information from Karve (1953), who classifies Indian states 
according to family structures into a Northern, Central and Southern zone.98 
95     For 1881, 1931 and 1961 literacy is for ages 5 and up. For 1901, 1911 and 1921, literacy is for ages 
zero and up. Since 1981, literacy is for ages 7 and up.  This may mean that for the period 1901-1921 the 
literacy data is downward biased by the presence of those under the age of 5 in the statistics. The shifting 
boundaries may cause jumps between time periods.
96    Although after independence, elections took place in the 1950s in Indian states, in the electoral 
reports women turnout rates started to be recorded only starting with the elections from the 1960s 
onwards.
97    For more on the Ethnographic Atlas see: Rijpma and Carmichael (2016).
98    While Karve (1953) also provides a classification on family practices in India, we do not use her 
classification in the empirical specification, as Karve’s zones do not map to state boundaries. She often 
describes geographical features as the separation between zones, which do not coincide with state 
borders. Our aggregation of states to have a long-term overview of the state’s development in terms 
of gender equality causes difficulties in employing her classification. Therefore, we use her work as a 
complementary material to our measure on constraints on female agency.
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These two data sources supply information on co-residence and how kinship 
is defined (patrilineal descent versus bilateral or matrilineal). Besides co-
residence and kinship, we include the norms of premarital sexual behaviour of 
girls in the index.99 Based on these three dimensions, we construct an index 
called constraints on the female agency (CFA), which has a continuous scale. 
A higher score on the index indicates less constraint on female agency, thus 
being more female friendly. The distributions of the states according to the index 
on constraints on female agency are mapped below. Map 5.2 shows that while 
on average, the states located in the South seem to be more female friendly, 
a number of states located in the North and the East, such as Jammu and 
Kashmir, Assam, and Orissa show also less constraint on the female agency.
Map 5.2 Constraints on female agency defined by family systems
 
Data on religion is captured by the percentage of the population that is Muslim 
and Hindu measured in 1901. We employ a categorical measure of colonial rule 
with three categories, namely direct British rule (reference category), native rule 
and a mixed rule for states that had a combination of British and native rule. The 
mixed rule category was created due to changing boundaries of the states. This 
99     The way family systems are studied in this chapter differs from the chapter 4 due to no information 
on Indian states within Todd (1987) and limited information on Indian states in Murdock dataset. We can 
measure co-habitation, but not property rights. These are proxied by how kinship is defined: patrilineal 
descent versus bilateral or matrilineal, which can correspond to inheritance practices. We choose to add 
another dimension, namely whether it is socially accepted to have sex before marriage or not, which is not 
covered in the other chapters of this dissertation to have more information on long term historical practices 
limiting female agency in the household. Another shortcoming caused by the limited data availability is that 
we are not able to test the different dimensions of family systems separately.
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data comes from Iyer (2010). For caste we use the percentage of untouchables 
/ Scheduled Castes in the state population, as it is the only caste traceable 
over the entire period.100 To study the role of economic development on gender 
equality, we use urbanization as a proxy. Data on urbanisation comes from 
the census data as well and is available from 1881 onwards. The descriptive 
statistics of the indicators are provided below.
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics based on Non-Imputed Data     
   
      As Table 5.1 illustrates, the number of observations differs per variable. 
We made use of a multiple imputation technique, which estimates the missing 
values using a bootstrapping-based algorithm.101 The data coverage and the 
descriptive statistics after the imputation are provided in Table 5.2 below.
100      The caste groups are defined based on the following sources: The Constitution Scheduled Castes 
Order, 1950, http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/subord/rule3a.htm. Annexure Ib, List of notified Scheduled Castes, 
Census of India Website, http://censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/ST%20Lists.pdf.
Annexure Ia, List of notified Scheduled Castes, Census of India Website, http://censusindia.gov.in/Tables_
Published/SCST/SC%20Lists.pdf.
101   Detailed description available on request.
min max mean sd count
Sex ratio 0-10 .81 1.10 .98 .05 105
Female SMAM 10.25 23.10 15.95 3.35 116
Female/Male SMAM ratio (Mar) .57 .86 .73 .07 116
Female literacy .00 .89 .17 .22 159
Female/Male Literacy ratio (Lit) .00 .94 .32 .27 159
% Female Parliament 0 .11 .04 .02 80
Female/Male Parliament ratio (Parl) 0 .12 .05 .03 80
Women turnout .33 .79 .57 .11 79
Female/Male turnout ratio (Turn) .57 .99 .86 .10 79
Constraints on Female Agency (CFA) 0 1 .44 .47 131
% Muslim 1901 .40 52.60 21.29 16.49 185
% Hindu 1901 13 91.90 65.75 22.59 185
Mixed rule (Mixedr) 0 1 .26 .44 211
Native rule (Nativer) 0 1 .25 .43 211
% Dalit 3 30 17.87 6.84 70
Urbanisation 1.36 44.04 15.52 8.98 153
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics based on Imputed Data
Before moving to the discussion of the explanations of gender equality in 
India, we first provide an overview of the position of Indian women over time. 
We start by providing an overview of the indicators of women’s position in the 
colonial period for which we have data. Then we look at the development of 
women’s position in Indian states over time. To investigate the historical origins 
of current day gender inequalities in India, we compare a selection of current 
day indicators of gender equality, namely maternal mortality rate, crimes against 
women, the share of female representatives in state legislatures and female 
marriage age in the 2000s.
min max mean sd count
Sex ratio 0-10 .81 1.10 .98 .05 105
Female SMAM 10.25 23.10 15.95 3.35 116
Female/Male SMAM ratio (Mar) .57 .86 .73 .07 116
Female literacy .00 .89 .17 .22 159
Female/Male Literacy ratio (Lit) .00 .94 .32 .27 159
% Female Parliament 0 .11 .04 .02 80
Female/Male Parliament ratio (Parl) 0 .12 .05 .03 80
Women turnout .33 .79 .57 .11 79
Female/Male turnout ratio (Turn) .57 .99 .86 .10 79
Constraints on Female Agency (CFA) 0 1 .44 .47 131
% Muslim 1901 .40 52.60 21.29 16.49 185
% Hindu 1901 13 91.90 65.75 22.59 185
Mixed rule (Mixedr) 0 1 .26 .44 211
Native rule (Nativer) 0 1 .25 .43 211
% Dalit 3 30 17.87 6.84 70
Urbanisation 1.36 44.04 15.52 8.98 153
min max mean sd count
Sex ratio 0-10 .81 1.10 .98 .05 224
Female SMAM 10.25 23.10 16.07 3.41 224
Female/Male SMAM ratio (Mar) .54 .89 .73 .08 224
Female literacy .00 .89 .19 .22 218
Female/Male Literacy ratio (Lit) .00 .95 .37 .28 218
% Female Parliament 0 .11 .03 .02 224
Female/Male parliament ratio (Parl) 0 .12 .03 .03 224
Women voter turnout .33 .79 .54 .10 220
Female/Male turnout ratio (Turn) .57 .99 .81 .10 220
Constraints on Female Agency (CFA) 0 1 .44 .43 224
% Muslim 1901 .4 52.6 21.03 15.51 224
% Hindu 1901 13 91.9 67.17 21.35 224
Mixed rule (Mixedr) 0 1 .26 .44 211
Native rule (Nativer) 0 1 .25 .43 211
% Dalit 3 30 17.55 6.25 224
Urbanisation 1.36 44.04 16.72 9.72 224
5.4  Trends in various indicators of the position of women 
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Map 5.3 The historical position of women in India in three indicators                
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As map 5.3 illustrates, the historical pattern is relatively clear. For female 
literacy, sex ratios and female SMAM the southern states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu 
and Karnataka are outperforming the vast majority of their northern cousins. 
This fits to some extent with Karve’s (1953) female friendly southern family 
zone. However, Andhra Pradesh does not perform as expected, having an 
average SMAM of under 13 years between 1881 and 1951, and low literacy. 
Some argue that the female friendliness of the South is not so much about the 
Southern states, but rather about coastal zones in Southern India (Dyson 2014). 
Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka are, in such a model, likely to demonstrate less 
female friendly behaviour as they have more inland area relative to coastline than 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
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       This map also highlights that in the Central and Northern regions the 
picture is more varied, except when it comes to literacy between 1881 and 
1951, when only Southern states achieve a level of literacy of over 2% for 
women. The picture when it comes to female SMAM is one in which the central 
states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa102 perform worst, along with the 
northern states of Bihar and West Bengal. Punjab, Haryana, Assam and Jammu 
and Kashmir display midrange SMAMs of between 14 and 15.103 Despite having 
slightly higher SMAMs than their central state neighbours, Punjab and Haryana 
have some of the most male biased sex ratios for the whole of India in 1911. The 
sex ratio, of between .89 and .93, points towards the existence of a strong son 
preference. Similarly Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, with sex ratios of between 
.93 and .97, are likely to have seen a substantial level of female infanticide or 
neglect of female infants leading to their premature demise. Madhya Pradesh is 
a borderline case in the sense that at birth a sex ratio of .94 to .95 is considered 
normal. However, over the course of infancy, due to male infants heightened 
susceptibility to disease, this generally equalizes. Thus, for Madhya Pradesh 
an argument could be made that the recorded sex ratio reflects (limited) son 
preference and female infanticide.
       The next question that we turn to is how the position of women and gender 
equality has evolved over the past 120 years in Indian states, which is illustrated 
in the figures below.104
102    Until 1950 Orissa and Bihar were listed as one item in the summary statistics of the census. This 
likely biases this statistic somewhat as the change over time graph for female SMAM in the next section will 
show. 
103    In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, this may be because the data from this state only enters into the      
censuses from 1911 onwards, meaning that the average is not lowered by the earlier observations.
104    The figures are based on non-imputed dataset.
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Figure 5.1 Female SMAM 1880 to 2001 (absolute values)
In the above graph a clear upward trend in marriage ages can be observed 
starting from the 1930s onwards in the majority of Indian states. This seems 
to coincide with the passing of the Sarda Act, the Child Marriage Restraint 
Act passed in 1930 throughout British India, making the legal female age at 
marriage 15. However, many contemporaries recognized this act as ‘ornamental 
legislation’, as not many violators of the act were prosecuted (Johnson and 
Forbes 1996, 108). In 1978 the legislation was amended to increase the female 
age at marriage to 18 (and men’s to 21) (Lakshmanan 2008). No similar break 
can be distinguished in this time period. In addition, some of the states such as 
Kerala and Jammu and Kashmir, witnessed an increase in female marriage ages 
already from the early twentieth century onwards. Therefore, women’s position 
captured by later marriage ages already started to improve in the colonial period. 
Some states, such as Andhra Pradesh, come from the lowest marriages ages in 
1930 to mid-range SMAMs by 2001. Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh 
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however are three states that have amongst the lowest marriage ages in 1930 
and still retain this position in 2001.105
       The Southern states of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu all start and 
end in the top half of the range, with Kerala in particularly pulling ahead of the 
other states between 1940 and 1990. However, it is interesting to note that 
the top four in 2001 are made up out of Kerala alongside Jammu and Kashmir, 
Orissa and Assam (two northern and one central state). In addition, the graph 
illustrates that the gap between those states with the highest and the lowest 
female age at marriage is around five years at both the beginning and at the end 
of the period.106 A final point is that Indian women in 2001 are still marrying at 
relatively young ages (i.e. between 18.2 and 23.1).107
Figure 5.2 Ratio of female to male literacy 1881-2011
105    It is important to note that, due to the inconsistent form of the data in 1941 and 1951 there is a 
gap in the data between 1931 and 1961 so interpreting the break point as occurring in the 1930s is 
problematic. However it cannot be denied that substantial changes have taken place between 1931 and 
1961, particularly seeing as the SMAM statistic is calculated in a way that takes the marital experience of 
the whole population into account, thus meaning it is not prone to rapid change.
106    Although in the intermediate period, the top and bottom ranking states have changed.
107   These ages could, to some degree, be seen as upper bounds as it is likely that child marriages are 
censored from the statistics.
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Figure 5.2 shows the ratio of female to male literacy rates. We see that in 
1881 only Maharashtra had a ratio of above one literate woman to every ten 
literate men. Both Kerala and Tamil Nadu make early progress in this measure 
of the performance of women with both surpassing the 0.4 ratio level by 1931, 
Kerala doing so by a substantial margin. Kerala’s performance may be related 
to the early adoption of an institutional schooling framework by feudal lords. 
Travancore and Cochin (both in what is now Kerala) were the first areas of 
present-day India to issue legislation that would make the local government 
responsible for primary schooling costs, in 1817 and the 1890s respectively 
(Jeffrey 1992, 56). However, they were also the first to include girls even before 
the centralized education systems of the 1860s, which may partly be attributed 
relatively favorable position of women in the regional family system (e.g., Jeffrey 
1992). From the 1930s onwards all Indian states experienced a push towards 
greater equality in this measure. Moreover, while progress towards gender 
equality in literacy is already visible in the colonial period, in the post-colonial 
period around the 1960s, this progress towards gender equality accelerates. 
By 2011 only Rajasthan has failed to reach a ratio of 0.7 women literate to 
every 1 man, and Kerala has nearly achieved equality between the sexes. The 
difference in the ratio between men’s and women’s literacy is somewhat more 
differentiated between the states, but the underlying trends in absolute female 
literacy alike, as figure 5.3 shows. 
Figure 5.3 Female literacy 1881-2011
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Here the real take off from 1960 onwards. This is before the 1968 introduction 
of the first post-independence national policy on education, which suggests 
the increase is not purely a result of policy at the national level. In the post-
colonial period, female literacy improved substantially in all the states. During 
the colonial period until the 1930s, hardly any women were literate in India 
except in Kerala and Tamil Nadu. This picture shifts in the postcolonial period. 
Rajasthan and Bihar come in lowest in 2011 reaching 50% literacy. Kerala is 
evidently ahead of the pack with Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra performing best 
of the remaining states. In the early 1990s the cumulative effect of gender and 
caste meant many women were still illiterate in educationally disadvantaged. In 
the last few decades, literacy was boosted by low-cost non-formal ‘educational 
centres’ in rural areas where formal educational centres were lacking. The 
central government was first involved in the 1980s, but their involvement was a 
failure. More effective were, for example, Madhya Pradesh’s community based 
attempts to bring schooling facilities within reach of the underprivileged (Drèze 
and Sen 2002a, 169–70). 
      Finally, two measures of women’s political empowerment are graphed 
below, from 1960 until 2001. Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of women in 
State Legislative Assemblies. And figure 5.5 shows male versus female voter 
turnout.
Figure 5.4 Women MPs in State Legislative Assemblies 1960-2001
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Figure 5.4 shows that starting from the 1970s onwards, there has been some 
improvement in women’s political representation in the Indian state assemblies. 
Only, Jammu and Kashmir shows a reverse trend in which the share of female 
seats has decreased from the 1970s onwards. This state also has the lowest 
number of female representatives in 2011, followed by Karnataka, which 
hardly makes any progress in increasing the share of female seats in the state 
assemblies. Gujarat and West Bengal, followed by Orissa have made the most 
progress in improving women’s political representation.
 
      However, while some progress in women’s political representation is 
visible, politics remains an arena in which women are under-represented.108 
This low level of female representation is something that occurs even in states 
like Kerala, which is characterized by favourable treatment of women in other 
dimensions. Only in Tamil Nadu does women’s representation reach a level 
above 10 per cent. 
Figure 5.5 Ratio of Female to Male Turnout 1960-2001 
 
108      To increase the representation of women in political life, since 1993 one third of the seats at the 
local government level have been reserved for women. In local governments, where there are reserved seats 
to women, they found female politicians with lower education levels (Singh 2003). However this is not the 
case at the State and National government level (Clots-Figueras 2011).
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Figure 5.5 highlights large regional variations in the trends of gender gap in 
voter turnout. For some states such as Kerala and Tamil Nadu, the gender gap 
in voter turnout was small in 1960 and remains stable over the entire period. 
While Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar have the largest gap at the start of the 
period, these states also made the most progress in closing the gender gap.  
       The regional differences described above are also visible in contemporary 
data. To highlight the persistence of these patterns, map 5.4 shows data on 
maternal mortality and violence against women, captured by recorded crimes 
against women (two gender indicators for which we do not have historical data) 
as well as SMAM and female political participation. Gender inequalities extend 
beyond the fields measureable historically presented above, but the maps 
illustrate clearly that regional patterns in these indicators follow similar regional 
patterns as the historical ones sketched above. 
Map 5.4 Current day indicators on the position of women
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The maternal mortality map shows one of the clearest divides between regions 
with Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Madhya Pradesh and to 
a lesser extent Orissa demonstrating substantially higher levels of maternal 
mortality than the rest of India. Crimes against women109 also occur more 
frequently in the North with Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh exhibiting the 
highest levels.110 
 
             Female representation in state assemblies in 2010 presents a patchy 
picture. Tamil Nadu and West Bengal are the two best performers, and on 
this measure many of the Northern and Central states outperform Kerala and 
Karnataka. Madhya Pradesh, for instance, is one of two states with the second 
highest level of political representation, which fits awkwardly with its high 
maternal mortality and crime statistics. 
        Although it is difficult to sum up all the various indicators presented above, 
a few general points can still be distilled. The first is that on many measures 
of the position of women the Southern states seem to be outperforming 
their fellow states (with Andhra Pradesh representing an intermediary case). 
However, the picture is not clear-cut, particularly for measures of political 
participation. The states of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir often do not fit into 
the regional patterns of the “North”. A block of four states, Bihar, Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh appear to demonstrate similarities in the 
way they fare on various measures. The following two sections will focus on the 
analysis of certain factors that may underlie these long-term patterns in Indian 
states.
109    Which here is the sum of rape, kidnap and abduction and dowry deaths (defined by the Oxford 
Dictionary as the murder or suicide of married women caused by a dispute over her dowry).
110    Important to note here is that the statistics are based on persons arrested for various crimes rather 
than total crimes reported. Therefore, this statistics might be influenced by the state level differences in the 
efficiency of legal institutions (e.g. judiciary).
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In this section, we test empirically the relevance of the determinants of gender 
equality and women’s positions discussed in Section 5.2 in explaining the long-
term state level patterns in India. To do so, we first focus our analysis on the 
levels of gender equality and women’s position found in the 16 states between 
1881 and 2001 and estimate the following panel data specification:
Genderit refers to our set of indicators on women’s position and gender 
equality in state i at time t, namely sex ratio, female marriage age and the 
ratio of female to male marriage age, female literacy and the ratio of female 
to male literacy, female seats in the state legislatures and the ratio of the 
percentage of parliamentary seats by both genders, women’s voter turnout 
and ratio of women’s turnout to men’s turnout in the elections.       refers to the 
time varying explanatory variables, namely the level of urbanisation and share 
of Dalits in the population in state i at time t; and     refers to the long term 
time invariant institutional characteristics, namely the constraints on female 
agency index, whether states had native or a combination of British and native 
rule in the colonial period, and the share of Muslim and Hindu population in 
1901. Decadal fixed affects are included to control for any unobserved time 
effect. This equation has been estimated by using an ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression.111 However, our results should be approached with caution 
and interpreted as robust relations rather than causal ones. In the empirical 
specification, we are not able to account for the fixed state effects due to the 
time invariant variables of interest, such as family systems. Thus our results are 
likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. These issues should be kept in mind, 
while reviewing the results presented in table 5.3 below.
       The results of table 5.3 highlight a number of interesting findings. First 
of all, we find that family systems as measured by the constraints on female 
agency variable have a strong effect on the various dimensions of the gender 
gap. The results show that in states with a high CFA index, son preference is 
less prevalent (Model 1), women get married later, have higher literacy rates 
111    The time invariant nature of the institutional variables does not allow for fixed effects panel data 
estimation. However, we checked the robustness of this specification using a random effects model. As 
the interpretation of the results does not change substantially, we use the OLS regressions for the ease of 
comparability with section 5.6. The results based on random effects model are available upon request.
5.5  Empirical Analysis of Determinants of Women’s Position 
170
and participate more in the elections (Models 3, 5 and 9). The gender gap is 
smaller in literacy (Model 4) and voter turnout of women is higher (Model 7) in 
states with family systems that have higher female agency as measured through 
the family system. However, the constraints on female agency index does not 
seem to be a significant predictor of gender inequalities in marriage ages as 
measured by the spousal age gap, and on parliamentary activity. 
       We also find evidence confirming the second hypothesis about the 
impact of economic modernisation. In states with higher levels of urbanisation, 
women marry later (Model 3), have higher levels of literacy (Model 5), and 
participate more in the elections  (Model 9), controlling for the other variables 
in the regression. For example, one percentage point increase in urbanisation 
increases the female marriage ages on average by .09 points. Considering the 
variation in the level of urbanisation between Indian states, the magnitude of the 
effect is moderate. For instance, if we compare Assam, which has an average 
of 6.81 per cent urbanisation rate for the entire period under investigation to 
Gujarat with an average urbanisation rate of 25.70, the difference in female age 
is equivalent to 1.69 (calculated as: (.09*25.70)-(.09*6.8)). Moreover, the size 
of the gender inequalities in literacy and voter turnout is also smaller in states 
with higher levels of urbanisation. Contrarily, urbanisation seems to lead to 
more skewed sex ratios biased against women. This can be explained by the 
availability of technologies in urban areas that enable sex selective abortions 
(Gupta 2014). Furthermore, urbanisation does not seem to be a relevant 
explanation of the ratios of female to male marriage ages or parliamentary 
activity. Therefore, urbanisation has mixed effects in promoting gender equality 
and does not seem to always translate into higher levels of gender equality.
        The results concerning the effect of religion reveals that having a larger 
share of Muslim population historically leads to more skewed sex ratios biased 
against women in the long run (Model 1). Contrarily, in states with a larger share 
of Muslim population, the gender gap in voter turnout is smaller. However, as 
this finding is only present for the ratio variable, which evaluates the relative 
position of women compared to men rather than the position of women, it 
highlights the fact that in these states with higher levels of Muslim population 
such as Punjab and Bihar, the voter turnout rates for both men and women are 
low. While Mitra (2014) highlights that the Muslim population in India overall 
had the lowest female literacy rates compared to the other religious groups in 
the country, our results do not show support for a detrimental effect of Muslim 
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religion in explaining state level differences in female literacy rates in India. We 
find no significant effect of Hinduism on any of our gender indicators. 
 
        Turning to colonial rule, our analysis shows that states that had historically 
native rule have more skewed sex ratios biased against women and a lower 
position of women, in terms of education and politics, compared to the states 
with direct British rule. The realisation of the underlying scale of female 
infanticide prompted the British to pass the Infanticide Act in 1870, making 
infanticide illegal (Patel 1996). States which had a combination of British and 
native rule, classified as mixed rule112, are characterized by higher female literacy 
compared to states with direct British rule. In terms of the effects of caste, we 
find that in states with a larger share of Dalit population, women marry younger. 
However, we do not observe any significant effect of the caste system on any of 
other gender indicators. 
       Except for native rule in colonial period, none of the other indicators 
included in the analysis help to explain the state differences in parliamentary 
activity. This comes as no surprise as in developing countries, including India; 
quota systems have been shown to be the most effective way to increase 
female seats in the parliaments (Dahlerup 2005; Clots-Figueras 2011).
112     These states are Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab and Kerala.
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Women’s lower levels of education and labour force participation, together with 
their domestic obligations have been shown to be relevant factors in explaining 
the regional variation of women’s political engagement in India (Chhibber 2002). 
However, as our focus here is not on how each dimension of gender equality 
is related with each other, this remains as an avenue for future research. Our 
model also fails to explain the long-term state level differences in spousal age 
gap. A possible reason for this is that legislation regarding the age at marriage 
is different for men and women. Men are allowed to marry after 21 years, but 
women already at 18 years (Lakshmanan 2008). Thus some level of spousal 
age gap is institutionally maintained. In cross-country regressions Carmichael 
(2015) found that spousal age gaps are not determined by urbanisation but 
by variables which capture family systems or historical institutions. Similarly 
Casterline et. al. (1986) find that spousal age gaps seem to be determined by 
cultural preferences. The fact that we fail to find any relationships between our 
explanatory variables and spousal age gaps could mean that we have not been 
able to capture the relevant cultural variables in our model, or that the variation 
across India is not as large as between countries.  
       To check the robustness of our findings, we also regress the same 
empirical specification above on cross sectional data from 1880, 1960 and 
2000. This can provide better insight into the differences between the colonial 
and post-colonial period and whether the effects of our indicators change 
between these two time periods. These results are reported in appendix 
5A.2. The impact of urbanisation on sex ratios becomes strongly significant 
only in 2000.113 Two factors may be driving these results. Abortion was 
legalized only in 1972 in India. The infrastructure that provides possibilities 
for sex selective abortions such as ultrasound technology became affordable 
after 1990 (Akbulut-Yuksel and Rosenblum 2012). States, which score high 
on the constraint on female agency index, are also significantly related with 
higher female marriage ages both in the colonial and postcolonial period. This 
highlights the persistent effect of family systems on gender equality in the long 
run which is in line with our findings elsewhere (see chapter 4, Carmichael 
2011; Dilli et al. 2015; Rijpma and Carmichael 2016). Moreover, the differences 
between states in terms of gender gaps in literacy and electoral turnout are 
particularly associated with differences in family systems in the postcolonial 
period. 
113    p<.10 (one-sided t-test)
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In this section we evaluate the progress that has been made towards gender 
equality in India. In other words, the empirical analysis in this section will 
focus on whether we can find any type of catch-up effect (convergence) in 
the gender indicators. The analysis in this section also provides insight into 
whether indicators which are shown to explain different levels of gender equality 
between Indian states are also relevant in explaining the progress states has 
made towards gender equality. 
 
       We test whether the trends in gender equality are characterised by a 
convergence or divergence, regressing the growth in gender equality indicators 
per decade on the lag of the level of gender equality indicators using an 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique.114 If this correlation is significantly 
negative without including any other predictors in the regression model, there is 
unconditional beta (ß)-convergence. We then include the variables tested above 
to see whether there is conditional convergence, and to evaluate their relevance 
in the process towards gender equality. The results are presented in table 5.4. 
       The results of table 5.4 below indicate that some of the coefficients of 
the lagged gender equality indicators on the growth rate of gender equality 
are significantly negative. This indicates unconditional beta convergence. 
In particular, states that have a higher level of gender inequality in terms of 
marriage ages, literacy ratios and politics in the past are moving significantly 
faster toward gender equality than states with a lower level of gender 
inequality.115 However, convergence for female literacy is not observed. This 
can be interpreted as meaning that although women are catching up to men, 
in terms of education of women overall the weak performers of the early period 
are not catching up to the leaders in terms of absolute literacy. This is probably 
partly due to the very low levels from which the literacy statistics start, meaning 
that Kerala’s early progress opened up the spread of scores substantially, while 
no other state has yet managed to catch up with it.116 Lastly, as a higher growth 
rate in sex ratios indicates more bias against women, the results show that there 
has been unconditional convergence towards more skewed sex ratios biased 
114    We also estimate the convergence model with fixed effects, which takes into account the time-
invariant characteristics of the states. In the fixed effects model, the estimated convergence coefficients 
always increase in size compared to those presented in table 5.3. These results are available upon request.
115     The large coefficient of the lag of female political representation is probably caused by the big 
jumps in the level of female political representation between decades moving from no women in the state 
legislatives to a substantial number of women entering parliament.
116     The implication could also be that male literacy has stagnated, meaning that even a small increase 
in female literacy in some states causes convergence in the equality measure without convergence in the 
absolute level
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against women. Thus, over time son preference became more prevalent in every 
state, even in those that did not exhibit initially skewed sex ratios biased against 
women.117  
 
        We estimate the convergence model again including the level of 
urbanisation, family systems, colonial rule and religion as controls, shown 
in the previous section to contribute towards gender equality. Here we test 
whether urbanisation and long-term institutional factors help explain the growth 
in gender equality, which might be relevant in understanding the convergence 
process observed in table 5.4.  The results for this model are reported in table 
5.5 below. With the inclusion of these predictors the estimated convergence 
coefficients (in other words, the coefficients of the lag of gender indicators) 
increase substantially compared to the coefficient presented in table 5.4. For 
instance, with the inclusion of historical institutional characteristics and the 
urbanization rate, the coefficient of the lag of sex ratio changes from -.21 to -.47. 
In addition, there is evidence for convergence towards higher levels of female 
literacy conditional upon urbanization and long-term institutional characteristics. 
 
       Turning to the impact of the explanatory variables in explaining the growth in 
gender equality, urbanisation seems to contribute to the progress made towards 
higher female marriage ages and higher female turnout rates. States with family 
systems that constrain female agency also seem to make more rapid progress 
towards higher levels of female marriage ages and literacy rates. Moreover 
states with a higher score on the constraints on female agency index are closing 
the gender gap in voter turnout more rapidly.  States with native rule compared 
to the states with direct British rule in colonial period make significantly slower 
progress towards gender equality. In states where the Muslim population is 
higher, the sex ratios are becoming more rapidly skewed biased against women 
over time.118 We do not find any significant differences in growth rate of states 
towards gender equality based on lowest caste.119
117     Excluding the outlying state Kerala from the regression analysis does not change the interpretation of 
the results. These results are available upon request.
118    Once Muslim variable is excluded from the model, there seems to be a significant difference between 
North and South family zones, which suggests a close link between religion and the family zones.
119    Another way of studying convergence is by looking at sigma convergence. Even if beta-convergence 
holds, states may fail to converge in real data as long as random shocks to the growth process are large 
(Rodrik 2011; Cherodian and Thirlwall 2015). Moreover, beta convergence only focuses on average 
values in the reference time period (Dvoroková 2014).  The literature on convergence highlights that 
beta convergence is an insufficient condition for sigma convergence (Young, Higgins, and Levy 2008). 
Therefore, we estimate directly the evolution the coefficient of variation (CV) for 16 Indian states from 1881 
onwards, which is d in Table C. We also tested evidence for sigma convergence by including a time trend 
and including the variables from Table 5.4. As the overall conclusions remain the same, the results are not 
reported separately but available upon request.
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Our study has provided a long-term look at gender inequality in India by 
focusing on various indicators related to gender inequality. In line with the 
literature, we see a North-South divide in almost all our indicators of gender 
equality and women’s position, and find that a band of states in the centre 
-which includes Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh- exhibit 
similar patterns in gender inequalities. These state differences can be attributed 
to states’ level of urbanisation and the dominant family system (measured using 
marriage, residence and inheritance patterns), whereas religion and colonial rule 
play a more secondary role. We generally find that family systems that allow for 
higher levels of female agency also result in less gender inequality in education, 
and less gender equality in general. This result that confirms the evidence 
about similar patterns found at the country level in chapter 4 and in work by 
Carmichael and Rijpma with similar national data (Carmichael and Rijpma 
2016). We also find that economic development is positively correlated with 
gender equality in almost all its dimensions – the exceptions being the spousal 
age gap and the female members in parliament. 
 
       We also evaluate whether there is a convergence towards gender equality. 
From our convergence analysis we discover a catch-up of poorly performing 
states the early frontrunners in all gender indicators. Although progress has 
been made in the course of the twentieth century especially in women’s 
marriage ages, gender inequalities are still present in all the indicators we 
assess. For female literacy specifically, we found no convergence. Even 
though there is a catch-up, the weak performing states of the early period are 
not catching up with the forerunners in terms of absolute literacy. Progress 
towards gender equality seems to take off especially in the late colonial and 
post-colonial period. Progress has, however, been limited especially in women’s 
political representation in the state legislatives. States have also converged to 
the sex ratios more biased towards sons. This is a worrisome trend and shows 
the persistence of a clear son preference likely being consolidated by the 
availability of sex selective abortion. 
 
       Urbanisation and family systems related to female agency also explain 
the growth in gender equality. However, the impact of urbanisation on gender 
equality is mixed as urbanisation leads to more skewed sex ratios biased 
against women by making modern technologies more accessible. Our findings 
support those of Rahman and Rao (2004), that economic factors are powerful 
5.7  Discussion and Conclusion
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in explaining increases in differences of female equality and states in society. 
However, we cannot agree with their finding that economic factors are more 
important that kinship structures, as we find that especially our CFA have a 
lasting impact on the gender equality measures.  
  
       Our empirical investigation, however, is limited by the availability and scope 
of historical data to study the exact mechanisms through which the long-term 
drivers of gender equality operate, and how the persistent gaps in gender 
equality can be eliminated. The data availability also limits possibilities to study 
the relative importance of historical institutions and economic development in 
promoting gender equality. Urbanisation provides only limited insight into how 
economic development can translate into gender equality, as Indian society is 
still largely rural. Gathering better data to explain this persistence remains an 
ambition for future studies.
This chapter focuses on the different historical factors that may influence 
various indicators of gender equality. What is needed for further research is an 
investigation into the interrelations between the different dimensions of gender 
equality. For example, some literature shows that there is a relationship between 
age at marriage and educational attainment (Jain and Kurz 2007; Carmichael 
2011). From our work, we find an effect of certain historical institutions on 
marriage ages, sex ratios and literacy. Increases in these indicators could in turn 
affect gender gaps in political participation and the labour market, or possibly 
in fertility adjustment. This leaves plenty of scope for future research to tease 
apart the interrelations between the various indicators. 
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Increasing the educational participation of children, especially of girls, has been 
on the development agenda for a number of years. Limited female inclusion to 
education can be economically damaging and is undesirable for reasons of 
social justice. Despite the recent progress in girls’ educational participation, 
gaps between boys and girls remain. To gain a better understanding of why 
these gaps persist, this research has tried to explain what factors were involved 
in educational participation globally, especially of girls, over the course of the 
last 160 years. This study attempts to contribute both to explanations of gender 
differences in schooling and to educational attainment of both genders. The first 
part, chapter 2 and chapter 3, investigated the factors of influence for both boys 
and girls. The main factors of interest were the effects of legislation, real wages 
and family size, but in addition I looked at controls for economic development, 
religion and polity. In the chapters thereafter, the focus shifted to gender 
inequalities. The role of the family as an institution took center stage, both as 
an influence on gender differences in educational participation (chapter 4), as 
well as on gender more broadly (chapter 5). Factors like economic development, 
political influences, female labor force participation and religious backgrounds 
were taken into account.  
 
       Section 6.1 deals with education attainment in general. It first discusses 
the role of legislation and wages, and of coping strategies of households 
when faced with a choice of education. Section 6.2 discusses the findings 
concerning gender and girls´ participation in education. Section 6.3 considers 
the dissertation’s strengths and weaknesses and section 6.4 concludes with 
implications and recommendations for further research. 
 
 
Two main institutional settings were scrutinized as being important to female 
education and educational participation in general. One was the area of the 
6  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
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political and legal domain and the other was the family. In the former, the 
impact of child labor and compulsory education legislation was a significant 
contribution to the level of average years of education of a nation. This 
corroborates findings from longitudinal studies in the U.S. (Angrist and Krueger 
1990; Lingwall 2014a), but extends such findings to a global level, for both 
developed and developing countries alike. It also refutes older studies on 
the U.S. that oppose this view (eg. Landes and Solmon 1972, 86; Eisenberg 
1988). The question immediately arises that if such legislation was effective in 
getting children to school, how did families deal with the corresponding costs? 
Child labor and compulsory education laws affect the direct and indirect costs 
(forgone child labor and income) to schooling. Parents still largely carried 
the direct costs of education, even after compulsory education legislation, as 
shown for instance in the work by Humphries for the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Britain (Humphries 2010).  
 
       How were families able to deal with such rising costs? Two main 
hypotheses have been tested. The first was that increasing real wages at the 
lower end of the wage pyramid made educational participation more accessible. 
The second was that families may alter their family size preferences and keep 
households small (Basu and Tzannatos 2003; Murtin 2013). In the first place, 
male unskilled real wages affected average years of education, as shown in 
chapter 2. This effect was somewhat distorted by the inclusion of GDP per 
capita, which correlated closely to real wages. In essence, these factors tell a 
similar story: higher income lead positively affects average years of education. 
However, though GDP per capita informs about national averages, the unskilled 
male builders wages provides a glimpse into the subsistence of those at the 
lower end of the wage spectrum. Increase in real unskilled male wages was 
thus instrumental to the rise in average years of education. 
 
       Though chapter 2 has shown the instrumental qualities of both legislation 
and male unskilled real wages on average years of education, the underlying 
workings remain speculative. To a certain extent the literature shows that this 
increase in wages and education was substantiated by a shift in cultural values 
in the West, exported to other areas of the world over time. Children became 
an emotional instead of economic asset in the nineteenth century (Cunningham 
1996; Heywood 2013) and the economic family model shifted from the family 
firm to the male breadwinner model (see eg.: Horrell and Humphries 1997). 
Rising real wages facilitated this cultural ideal. That international legislation on 
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child labor was effective, perhaps even more so than national legislation, seems 
to suggest that there was an international trend towards shielding children from 
labor and fostering education. This trend expanded greatly after the 1950s due 
to the efforts of the International Labour Organization (ILO) for child labor, and 
UNESCO for education. Other explanations, such as the increasing opportunity 
costs to women s´ labor, are difficult to substantiate due to a lack of data on 
female wages. 
       The second hypothesis tested was that households might deal with the 
increasing costs of children’s education by limiting fertility. This view is related 
to the premise of the Quality Quantity Trade-off (QQT) as used in Unified 
Growth Theory (UGT), though the incentive according to the latter were the 
technological innovations of the eighteenth and nineteenth century that raised 
the returns to education (Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav 2002). In 
both theories household size has an inverse relationship with educational 
participation. Nevertheless, across the 15 different contexts in Western and 
Eastern Europe, the U.S. and Canada, at different cross-sections in time, we 
found limited evidence for the existence of a universal trade-off in pre-1920 
micro-data in chapter 3. Some households with a large number of children tend 
to have fewer children enrolled, or more children had lower levels of literacy, but 
the size of the coefficient is small.  
 
       If evidence for the impact of household size on educational attainment is 
limited, what could potentially explain educational attainment at the household 
level? Again, income played a role. Having a servant in the household had 
a positive impact on enrolment and literacy. At a higher aggregation level, 
countries with a higher GDP per capita were more likely to have a (stronger) 
QQT. In all likelihood, the schooling infrastructure was better established in 
these countries, the costs of education might have been lower, which could 
have aided the process. Furthermore, the data seems to suggest that upward 
extensions to the household (grandparents) appear beneficial for children’s 
enrolment in some contexts. In addition, the educational attainment of the 
parents, especially the mother, and their occupational status, has a positive 
effect. In other words, there is more to the household than its size alone.  
 
       The reason for not finding a QQT may be two-pronged. The first is that 
families may have had coping strategies to deal with the increasing costs of 
children’s education, such as letting the oldest siblings work to pay for the 
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education of the younger siblings (Lingwall 2014b, 63). The second is that 
schooling may have been indirectly involved in decreasing household size, by 
for example decreasing children’s mortality by improving children’s health. At 
the macro level, explanations offered other than the costs of education are a 
combination of lowered child mortality, new cultural values and shifting gender 
relations, and altered preferences of educated parents (Lesthaeghe 2010; 
Reher 2011; van der Vleuten and Kok 2014). UGT generally pays little heed to 
the role of women in this process, while women generally bear the lion share 
of the costs of fertility. Therefore, changes in family size and human capital 
accumulation are both thought to be related to the opportunity costs of women 
(Diebolt and Perrin 2013).
  
This research shows that access to educational facilities and average years 
of schooling are determined in part by traditional female restrictions within 
the family. Such established patterns affect human capital investments 
continuously. ‘Standard’ factors of educational participation – national income, 
real wages, and political educational support – were found to contribute to 
educational attainment as well. However, they explain only a limited share of 
educational attainment, and in some areas of the world, they fail to explain 
women’s participation specifically. More than is the case with boy’s schooling, 
girls’ education, and subsequent empowerment in the form of spillovers in 
other areas of gender equality, is explained by cultural norms. Girls face norms 
unhelpful to education in the form of unequal property rights, early marriage, 
large spousal age gaps (offsetting the balance of power between spouses) 
and unhelpful labor markets and legal systems. In both chapters 4 and 5 such 
norms were clustered into family systems to test the long-term persistence on 
the global gender gaps in education (chapter 4) and gender equality to a wider 
extent in India (chapter 5). For example, in chapter 4 inheritance structures 
that favored women were strong predictors of equal gender participation in 
education. This was especially the case in a nuclear family setting, but whether 
a family was nuclear or more complex was less of an influence than could be 
expected from the literature (see eg. Tertilt 2006). At a regional level in India, 
the Constraints on Female Agency index (CFA) had a positive association 
with literacy, as well as other indicators of gender equality like female age at 
marriage and female voter turnout. 
 
6.2  Gender and girl’s participation in education
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       Though the day-to-day practices of such systems may change with 
development and societal changes, the underlying norms and values will 
continue to persist to a certain extent. In India, we found that development in 
the form of urbanization aggravated son preference at the ages 0 to 10 instead 
of halting it. This corroborates work by others, who suggest that deeply rooted 
cultural values cause such regional variation in educational attainment (Dyson 
and Moore 1983; Gupta 2014). This makes female empowerment problematic, 
because, as ethical philosopher John Rawls underscored, the family as the 
basic unit of society must be equal to all members (Okin 2005). If not, political 
and economic equality cannot ensue. The persistence of historical gender 
norms is therefore problematic not only for women’s position within the family, 
but their position in the whole of society. Like Duflo argues, it is unlikely such 
gender gaps will disappear as a result of the virtuous cycle between economic 
development and gender equality. Policy commitment to equality for its own 
sake may be needed to bring about equality between men and women (Duflo 
2012). 
  
       Targeted policy may be effective for increasing educational participation, 
as shown in chapter 2. Political understanding of setting up a mass education 
system and including girls are an important first step to education for all. 
However, such political understanding was founded on cultural beliefs, 
which were increasingly shared internationally, such as the role of women as 
homemakers responsible for the education of her children. This may have been 
the reason for the effectiveness of international ILO legislation on child labor 
(chapter 2). On the other hand, certain national cultural beliefs and practices 
may have aided female inclusion in education from the bottom up, such as a 
traditional late age at marriage. However, even though women were included 
in education, this did not lead to an immediate improvement of their situation 
within society. More than ever, the newly institutionalized role of women as 
mothers and educators, via civil codes and the educational system, tied 
women even firmer to a domestic ideal. The work that women did remained 
predominantly low skilled, with few prospects to a long-term career. Similarly, 
chapter 5 on India states that where cultural norms favor women, as proxied 
by a higher CFA index, there is less son preference (in sex ratios 0-10 years), 
higher (female) literacy attainment and women participate more in elections. 
But India, from North to South, is still characterized overall by high sex ratios; 
low ages at marriage, limited educational attainment and limited female political 
participation. Compared to other areas in the world women still have much 
6.3  Strengths and weaknesses  
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empowerment to gain, even in states that perform best on the assessed 
indicators.  
 
       However, policy and legislation are helpful tools in the hands of 
governments with the right incentives to install an education system. As the 
Indian case study shows, gender inequality is both persistent and pervasive in 
all areas of life. The issue is that the cultural fibers of a society, with the family 
as a nexus of intergenerational transfer of cultural norms, provide us with a 
framework for thinking, acting and social interaction. These norms are not easily 
changed, not even when they are harmful to general well-being. Education may 
prove to be a first step. Yet again, the process of empowerment does not end 
with female education, but this can be considered a first step to gain a foothold 
on other important areas of life like political influence, labor force participation 
and personal well-being. At the core, women’s education was governed by 
largely the same factors that cause male education. However, the institutional 
framework and more importantly, the cultural embedding of women’s education, 
determine her ability to access, participate and utilize this education. Cultural 
endowments that have existed over several centuries will not change overnight, 
or even over the course of the next 20 years.  
 
       The wider results of this dissertation should be approached with care 
in two ways. The first is that the historical data used are generally crude 
indicators, providing only basic insight into matters such as marriage ages, 
fertility, educational attainment, economic development or political institutions. 
In other words, they are proxies for the historic reality. Data for real wages as 
used in chapter 2 is a measure that applies to (unskilled) builders only. This 
gives us some indication of real wages in the lower half of the wage pyramid, 
but these data cannot be generalized to the complete (working) population. 
Family systems are a proxy for family preferences and behavior, as an ideal 
arrangement of family; on top of that they are averages of human behavior 
within one geographical unit. Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) is a 
proxy for the actual marriage ages, calculated from age distributions of married 
and unmarried persons in censuses. Educational attainment as measured in 
average years of education does not disclose information on the quality of 
education or the curriculum taught. Historical quantitative data on educational 
quality may be one of the main challenges to tackle in the near future. However, 
6.3  Strengths and weaknesses  
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many educational datasets have been built in the last 20 years, and many more 
additions have been done, which allows us to take on increasingly larger issues. 
 
       The second issue is the possibility that gender differences in education are 
both a cause and a consequence of economic and political development. The 
same reversed causality issue holds for the relationships between education 
and family norms, such as preferred family size. The possibility of feedback 
effects is prone with institutions like a mass education system affecting 
culture and gender norms. Thus, I have tried to abstain from any hard claims of 
causality. In some instances I (or we) made use of the instrumental variables 
approach, as an additional method to rule out certain endogeneity issues. 
However, for most part the analyses were kept as simple as possible, in order 
to keep the results easy to interpret. In addition, the historical national-level data 
used were not always robust enough to withstand such sophisticated analysis. 
Perhaps it is best to interpret the outcomes as a restriction of the possible 
relationships. For example, in almost all specifications where I used an indicator 
of income, the coefficient showed a positive sign in its relation to average 
years of education. This partial correlation does not mean that income always 
positively impacts educational attainment, but it would make it increasingly 
difficult to argue that income would be negatively related to schooling 
attainment. The advantage is that this process is based on a structured model 
of an expected relationship and its influences, instead of on finding a functional 
instrument (Wacziarg 2002).  
By employing a mixed method approach (micro and macro), the complexity 
of the family as an institution could be addressed from multiple angles. Though 
aggregate measures differed from those at the micro-level, at both levels 
of measurement evidence pointed to the direction that the extent of female 
empowerment within the family was important for educational attainment. 
For example, at the micro-level, mother’s education positively influenced the 
enrolment and literacy of her children and large families did not always have 
less educated children on average. At the macro-level, family systems in which 
women were more empowered (in the form of property rights), educational 
attainment was more likely to be gender equal. Though there are many 
additional and intermediate factors to consider (for example that a husband’s 
education mattered as well, or the intermediating effect of fertility), both at micro 
and at macro level evidence suggested an influence of female bargaining power 
within the family on educational attainment. As this example also shows, though 
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both levels point towards the importance of female decision making power, the 
outcome variables are completely different, and one should be cautious about 
drawing direct parallels. However, these outcomes show the merit of such 
investigations and provide a basis for new research and data collection. 
 Quantitative analyses pinpoint to factors of general relevance to 
educational attainment across the globe, and women’s inclusion. This means 
that a level of detail is sacrificed to uncover general trends. It furthermore 
means that to extend our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie such 
trends, qualitative studies are needed. Further qualitative analyses can show 
how various governments came to the decision of including girls in education, 
or how education furthers female agency specifically. For example, in my master 
thesis I showed that from 1880 to 1910, Argentina and Japan were successful 
in their attempt to set up a gender equal education system at primary level, 
because of the political understanding that girls needed to be included (van 
der Vleuten 2009). Though chapter 2 has illustrated the importance of child 
labor and compulsory education laws, the reasons for its effectiveness may 
have varied over these nations. To make targeted policy recommendations, case 
studies are needed.
 By using quantitative analyses I was able to provide evidence for factors 
hypothesized to lead to education, but that had little empirical backing in the 
contemporary literature. New global datasets, such as those of CLIO-Infra, 
IPUMS, Mosaic (Szo tysek and Gruber 2015) and the global datasets on 
education of recent years (eg. Morrisson and Murtin 2009), allowed the analysis 
to go beyond regional or national cases studies, while at the same time allowing 
for more control factors than usually possible in global historical studies 
(e.g. religion). In addition, this study added a historical dimension to current 
development debates surrounding education. To the best of my knowledge, it 
is the first study that extends globally, has such a long time scope, and goes 
beyond the measurement of average years of education and income, towards 
more innovative measures of culture. This study has also uncovered new topics 
for future research and discusses these below, together with some policy 
recommendations.
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A major implication from this study is that current development agencies could 
be more perceptive to the role of historical institutions. The historical legacy of 
family system elements as age at marriage, property rights and co-habitation 
patterns has a relevant impact in explaining female access to resources like 
education. The underlying norms in these family systems are slow changing 
and retain a lasting impact of gender divisions, even if singular indicators do 
progress. This may add a historical dimension to the World Bank’s emphasis 
on lifting (patriarchal) barriers against girl’s education in households and 
empowering girls by means of education. In the World Bank’s framework, 
increased gender equality and bargaining power in the household leads women 
to have better access to markets and control over assets, better education 
and health, improved children’s well-being and higher labor force participation 
and productivity for women (The World Bank 2011). One of the routes to 
empowerment is increased education. However, in my view, access to education 
is partly determined by traditional views of women and their role within the 
family and society. Educational policy and traditions of female empowerment 
are important. But to further improve girls’ educational uptake attention must be 
paid to the context of gender norms binding them to the past. Historical context 
matters. In assessing the increase of education, gender equality and bargaining 
power, one should take into account these different historical traditions of 
female empowerment, for example in women’s possibility to manage property 
or women’s obligations of filial piety. This could allow for a more effective 
selection of the best tools to overcome gender constraints in education. This 
may be providing positive female role models in the context of one country’s, but 
increasing educational supply and female labor opportunities in another. 
 
       Second, another implication is that policy and legislation were influential 
in increasing average years of education. This has implications for the 
hypothesized poverty trap, by which educated parents have an advantage in 
raising educated children, and those not educated, often the poor, do not (Moav 
2005). Effective legislation, whether international or national, can provide the 
possibility of an institutional push out of the poverty trap. Though most countries 
nowadays have compulsory education, such findings may be important for 
understanding the effectiveness of compulsory education. Though this is only 
the first step out of many, it is a much more effective step than previously 
hypothesized (e.g. Landes and Solmon 1972). 
 
6.4  Implications and recommendations for further research 
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      There are a few areas that require further investigation. One area is that 
of institutional change, and its interaction with, for example, the legal system. 
Though I have tried to show historical institutions may have persistent effects, 
equally interesting would be the question what leads them to change, especially 
on a global level. The implementation and success of compulsory education 
legislation across the globe begs the question what motives underlie such 
adoption of legislation. And, importantly, was this a coercive process or rather 
an adoption of ‘best practices’? The second step in investigating the relation 
between gender, education and labor would be to investigate the relationship 
between secondary and higher education and empowerment specifically. The 
difference between literacy and having a high school diploma is striking as 
current development literature now claims the best practices in educational 
attainment come from secondary education. Primary education (literacy) and 
secondary education specifically have different effects on different capabilities. 
Hence, they influence other domains of female agency, such as on women’s 
age at marriage, on political participation and on labor force participation. These 
different effects need to be fleshed out when educational data can be split 
by educational stages and gender. Only then can we understand what type 
of education is empowering to which area in life. Some important questions 
relate to link between female labor force participation and education. Does 
education, divided into primary and secondary, directly relate to female labor 
force participation, or are intermediary factors at play (such as technological 
innovation or political power)? Would the relationship between real wages and 
education hold when we look at women’s real wages? Such questions require 
further data. 
 
      Thus, this dissertation ends with a plea to elaborate global historical 
datasets by gender. History provides an interesting testing ground to unravel the 
relationship between education and empowerment, especially female education 
and female empowerment. But such gendered data is not easy to come by and 
requires new creative ideas to uncover women’s often under recorded (but 
not unrecorded) role in society. For one, we need more gendered educational 
data for the period before 1950. Country-studies do report more gendered 
educational data, but it has not found its way into the large global datasets. 
Women’s employment and (real) wage data are difficult to come by, but current 
awareness of such issues has made scholars very creative in trying to uncover 
women’s role in the labor force (Humphries and Sarasúa 2012; Van Nederveen 
Meerkerk and Paping 2014). 
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DUTCH SUMMARY
Het vergroten van wereldwijde scholingsparticipatie van kinderen, vooral die 
van meisjes, staat al jaren op de ontwikkelingsagenda. Ondanks de recente 
vooruitgang op het gebied van vrouwelijke onderwijsparticipatie, blijven er 
sekseverschillen bestaan. Om die hardnekkige verschillen te doorgronden, 
worden de belangrijkste factoren voor wereldwijde onderwijsdeelname in dit 
onderzoek uiteen gezet, gekeken naar de afgelopen 160 jaar. Dit onderzoek 
levert een bijdrage aan zowel de redenen voor sekseverschillen in het onderwijs 
als voor het algemene opleidingsniveau van beide geslachten. Daarnaast levert 
het een bijdrage aan het in kaart brengen van vrouwelijke agency en de relatieve 
onderhandelingspositie ten opzichte van mannen. 
      Naast sociale rechtvaardigheid draagt gelijke scholing bij aan 
economische groei, betere gezondheid en scholing van de volgende generatie 
en vermindering van genderongelijkheden in andere levensdomeinen als 
de politiek en de arbeidsmarkt (World Bank 2011; Klugman et al. 2014). 
Daarnaast speelt onderwijs een belangrijk onderdeel in de ‘empowerment’ 
van vrouwen. Het ondersteunt cognitieve en non-cognitieve skills, verbetert de 
persoonlijke planningscapaciteit, en vergroot de mogelijkheid tot economische 
zelfstandigheid. Vrouwen met meer onderwijs hebben doorgaans meer ‘agency’, 
meer zelfbeschikking, om belangrijke levenskeuzen te maken. Deze studie richt 
zich juist ook op een andere vraag: hebben vrouwen met historisch relatief 
weinig agency ook minder toegang tot agency-verhogende hulpmiddelen zoals 
onderwijs? 
      De inleiding (hoofdstuk 1) zet de relevantie, de theorie, reeds bekende 
factoren en de aanpak uiteen. Dit onderzoek sluit het best aan bij het kader 
van de Nieuwe Institutionele Economie (NIE). NIE richt zich op instituties als 
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zijnde de formele wettelijke regels en informele sociale normen die individueel 
gedrag en sociale interacties bepalen. Zowel de formele als informele regels 
zijn bepalend voor onderwijsdeelname. Armoede is een van meest bepalende 
factoren voor een gebrek aan onderwijsdeelname, maar tegelijkertijd betekent 
een inkomenstoename niet per definitie meer onderwijsdeelname van meisjes. 
Gendernormen spelen hier een rol in maar deze zijn historisch lastig te 
kwantificeren. De literatuurverkenning laat zien dat er onduidelijkheid bestaat 
over de werking van bepaalde factoren, namelijk de effectiviteit van wetgeving, 
het effect van de huishoudgrootte op de scholingsdeelname per kind en 
de moeilijk grijpbare culturele component die bepalend is voor vrouwelijke 
scholingsdeelname. 
      Daardoor is het onderzoek in twee centrale delen gesplitst. In de eerste 
twee hoofdstukken worden eerst een aantal bredere redenen voor verschillen 
in onderwijs onderzocht (zoals leerplichtswetten en kinderarbeidswetten 
en inkomen). Hoofdstuk drie en vier gaan vervolgens dieper in op de 
sekseverschillen in scholing. Door gebruik te maken van een classificatie 
van familiesystemen en huwelijkspatronen is het mogelijk de potentie 
tot zelfbeschikking binnen de familie in kaart te brengen. De mate van 
zelfbeschikking binnen de familie (gemeten aan o.a. de huwelijksleeftijd en 
erfrecht), en familiecompositie (de grootte van de familie, wie met elkaar 
samenwonen) worden aangevoerd aan als belangrijke factoren in wereldwijde 
sekseverschillen in onderwijs. 
      Te beginnen met de redenen voor onderwijs van beide seksen wordt in 
hoofdstuk twee de vraag gesteld wat de relatieve effecten zijn van kinderarbeid- 
en leerplichtwetten tegenover reële lonen op scholing, wereldwijd in de 
periode van 1800-2006. De analyses wijzen uit dat kinderarbeidswetten en 
leerplichtwetten een positieve associatie hebben met het gemiddeld aantal 
scholingsjaren, met name in de jaren na 1900. Een opmerkelijke vondst was 
dat zowel nationaal als internationaal geratificeerde kinderarbeidswetten een 
effect bleken te hebben. Inkomen gemeten aan reële arbeiderslonen en BNP 
per hoofd van de bevolking is ook een belangrijke indicator voor scholing. Hoe 
kunnen we deze bevindingen duiden? Toegenomen inkomen betekent simpel 
gezegd meer financiële mogelijkheden tot onderwijs en minder noodzaak 
tot een bijdrage van kinderen aan het huishoudelijk budget. Echter, dat het 
inkomen van de ongeschoolde mannelijke arbeider hier ook aan bijdraagt 
is minder evident. Uit onderzoek blijkt dat ouderlijke voorkeuren veranderen 
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wanneer zijzelf scholing genieten, en dat ongeschoolde ouders onderwijs 
vaak niet erkennen als belangrijk kapitaalgoed (Clemens 2004). In de literatuur 
spreekt men van de mogelijkheid om vast te komen zitten in een ‘armoedeval’ 
waarin ouders met een beperkt opleidingsniveau blijven kiezen voor minder 
onderwijsinvesteringen en hogere fertiliteit (Moav 2005). Daarbij sluiten de 
bevindingen van effectieve kinderarbeid- en leerplichtwetgeving aan. Dergelijke 
wetgeving kan fungeren als een externe schok voor families, dat ouders dwingt 
investeringsbeslissingen omtrent scholing aan te passen doordat kinderen 
verplicht naar school moeten en nauwelijks meer in staat zijn bij te dragen 
aan het huishoudbudget. Deze schok valt bovendien samen met twee andere 
gebeurtenissen. Ten eerste werd sinds de opkomst van massaonderwijs 
midden negentiende eeuw de verbindende kracht van massaonderwijs gebruikt 
als cement in de opbouw en consolidatie van de natiestaat. Ten tweede 
kenterde in dezelfde tijd het Westerse denkbeeld over kinderen van een 
economisch tot een emotioneel ‘goed’ en verschoof het huishoudeneconomie 
model naar een mannelijk kostwinnermodel (Heywood 2013; Horrell and 
Humphries 1997). Stijgende reële lonen faciliteerden deze ideeën. Later 
werd dit gedachtegoed, samen met kinderarbeid- en scholingswetgeving 
door de ILO en UNESCO, wijdverbreid over de wereld. Uit de analyses blijkt 
dat internationale wetgeving tegen kinderarbeid een positief effect heeft op 
het gemiddeld aantal scholingsjaren. Dit lijkt te wijzen op een internationale 
trend waarin kinderen werden teruggetrokken uit de arbeidsmarkt en tegelijk 
aangemoedigd om naar school te gaan. 
      Hoofdstuk drie gaat in op de vraag wat voor effect verschillende 
huishoudstructuren hebben op onderwijsparticipatie. Met name zijn we 
geïnteresseerd in de aanwezigheid van een ‘Quantity-Quality Trade-off’ (QQT): 
een inwisseling van kwantiteit (veel kinderen met weinig scholing) voor kwaliteit 
(minder kinderen met meer scholing) (Becker 1991). Aanleidingen voor een 
dergelijke QQT kunnen de toegenomen vraag naar geschoolde arbeid door 
technologische vooruitgang zijn (Galor and Weil 1999) of de in hoofdstuk twee 
genoemde ‘schok’ redenatie waarin wetgeving leidt tot hogere kosten per 
kind. Echter, uit historische casestudies blijkt de QQT niet zo duidelijk als de 
theorieën doen vermoeden. Om een QQT te signaleren werden volkstellingen 
gebruikt (longitudinale microdata) uit de periode voor 1920 in 15 verschillende 
contexten binnen West- en Oost-Europa, de Verenigde Staten en Canada. We 
vonden weinig bewijs voor een QQT in onze analyses. Onderwijsparticipatie 
lijkt door veel meer bepaald te worden dan het aantal kinderen per huishouden 
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alleen. Relevanter waren de indicatoren voor inkomen (dienstbode in het 
huishouden en BNP per hoofd van de bevolking) en de geletterdheid van 
de ouders, met name die van de vrouw. Vrouwelijke zelfbeschikking lijkt op 
deze wijze een bijdrage te leveren aan scholingsparticipatie van de volgende 
generatie. De aanwezigheid van grootouders had ook een positieve associatie 
met de onderwijsdeelname van aanwezige kleinkinderen. Er zijn twee redenen 
waardoor we mogelijk geen QQT waarnemen. Ten eerste pasten huishoudens 
mogelijk andere overlevingsstrategieën toe om met scholingskosten om te 
gaan, zoals de verdere verdeling van huishoudelijke arbeid. Zo konden oudere 
kinderen scholingskosten op zich nemen of oppassen op de jongere generatie. 
Grootouders vervulden mogelijk eenzelfde functie, zoals blijkt uit contemporaine 
bevindingen (Duflo 2003; Gibson en Mace 2005; Parker en Short 2009). 
Ten tweede leidt scholing potentieel pas indirect tot een vermindering van de 
huishoudgrootte door een betere gezondheid van kinderen en een verminderde 
kindersterfte. 
      Om dieper in te gaan op sekse-specifieke onderwijsverschillen gaat 
het vierde hoofdstuk nader in op de vraag of historische familiesystemen en 
huwelijkspatronen een impact hebben op het gemiddeld aantal scholingsjaren 
van vrouwen in vergelijking tot mannen. Familiesystemen en huwelijkspatronen 
geven beide een indicatie van zelfbeschikkingsrecht van vrouwen binnen de 
familie. In het hoofdstuk wordt relatie verkent op een wereldwijde schaal met 
behulp van macro-level data voor 86 ontwikkelings- en middeninkomenslanden 
in de periode tussen 1950 en 2005. In die landen waar historische 
familiesystemen en huwelijkspatronen vrouwen meer zelfbeschikking laten 
zien nam ik minder grote sekseverschillen in gemiddeld scholingsjaren waar. 
Met name lijkt historisch erfrecht een belangrijke factor te zijn. Landen met 
een overwegend historisch bilateraal of matrilineair erfrecht vertonen minder 
grote sekseverschillen ten opzichte van patrilineaire landen. Opmerkelijk is dat 
wanneer vrouwen in polygame systemen erfrecht hadden, dit systeem minder 
met een sekseverschil associeert. Uit de analyse blijkt dat verschillende wijzen 
waarop families historisch zijn georganiseerd en de langzaam-veranderende 
culturele normen die de familie als institutie onderliggen, lange-termijn effecten 
uitoefenen op onderwijsverschillen tussen mannen en vrouwen. Betekent 
dit historische determinatie? Niet noodzakelijk, maar wel dat de strijd voor 
seksegelijk onderwijs in sommige delen van de wereld moeilijker is dan in 
anderen. 
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      Hoofdstuk vijf test nogmaals de impact van historische familiestructuren, 
en de rol van vrouwen binnen die structuren, op de genderkloof in onderwijs, 
nu voor de casus van India tussen 1880 en 2010. We gebruiken deze casus 
om te testen of de resultaten van de wereldwijde analyse ook op nationaal 
niveau te vinden zijn. Dit hoofdstuk is breder opgezet dan hoofdstuk vier. We 
analyseren nu de impact van familiesystemen en economische ontwikkeling 
op verschillende gender-indicatoren: huwelijksleeftijd en echtelijke verschillen 
in huwelijksleeftijden, sekseverschillen bij geboorte en politieke resultaten 
(het aantal vrouwen in statelijke parlementen en kiesopkomst van vrouwen). 
Bovendien testen we op convergentie van de genderindicatoren van de 
Indiaanse staten door de tijd. In staten waar familiestructuren vrouwelijke 
agency minder beperken trouwen vrouwen later, zijn ze algemeen meer 
geletterd en is het man-vrouw verschil in alfabetisering kleiner. Daarnaast is 
politieke participatie groter en stemmen vrouwen vaker. Daarnaast vonden 
we een sterk verband tussen urbanisatie – een veelgebruikte indicator 
voor economische ontwikkeling – en de gender indicatoren. We vonden 
convergentie tussen de staten op het gebied van politieke activiteiten en 
huwelijksleeftijden, en voor geletterdheid, maar niet specifiek voor vrouwelijke 
geletterdheid. Dit betekent dat de zwakker presterende landen uit de vroege 
periode de voorlopers niet inhalen op het gebied van vrouwelijke geletterdheid. 
Een deel hiervan wordt verklaard door heersende familiestructuren, maar ook 
door economische groei en of de staat een prinselijk geregeerde staat was. 
Sekseratio’s (0-10) zijn door de tijd heen juist schever geworden, een indicatie 
dat oude normen een nieuwe invulling krijgen door technologieën als sekse-
selectieve abortussen. 
      Hoewel de dagelijkse praktijk van familiesystemen zoals beschreven in 
hoofdstuk vier en vijf kunnen veranderen door maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen, 
blijven de onderliggende normen en waarden een afdruk achterlaten op 
hedendaagse sekseverschillen. Zoals de casus van India laat zien is het 
voortbestaan van historische gendernormen problematisch omdat schadelijke 
seksenormen binnen de familie hun weerslag vinden in de gehele maatschappij, 
niet alleen onderwijs. In hoofdstuk vier blijken zaken als vrouwelijke 
arbeidsparticipatie en overheidsuitgaven voor onderwijs geen relevante factoren 
voor de genderkloof in onderwijs. Zoals ook Duflo beargumenteerde is het 
onwaarschijnlijk dat zulke genderverschillen alleen zullen verdwijnen door een 
positieve spiraalwerking tussen economische ontwikkeling en gendergelijkheid 
(Duflo 2012). Politiek engagement voor gelijkheid zelf is nodig om de balans 
tussen de seksen te herstellen. 
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      Er zijn twee belangrijke beleidsimplicaties uit deze studie te herleiden. Ten 
eerste dat historische context ertoe doet. Beleid moet rekening houden met de 
verschillende historische tradities van vrouwelijke empowerment, om vervolgens 
effectiever tools te selecteren om seksebeperkingen in onderwijs te bestrijden. 
In het ene land zal dit betekenen dat er positieve vrouwelijk rolmodellen gezocht 
moeten worden, in het andere dat vrouwelijke eigendomsrechten verbeterd 
moeten worden. Een tweede implicatie is dat wetgeving er wel degelijk toe 
doet. Wetgeving kan een mogelijkheid zijn uit de ‘armoedeval’ te komen, 
waarin opgeleide ouders meer kans hebben op beter opgeleide kinderen dan 
onopgeleide ouders. 
      Deze kwantitatieve studie schetst een lange-termijn beeld van factoren 
die tot onderwijs leiden en de rol van vrouwelijke agency hierin. Uiteraard 
is er enige voorzichtigheid geboden bij de interpretatie van de uitkomsten 
van een dergelijk kwantitatief historisch onderzoek. Historische data zijn 
benaderingen van de werkelijkheid. Tegelijkertijd biedt een dergelijk aanpak 
wel de mogelijkheid een breder perspectief op de wereldgeschiedenis te 
geven. Nieuwe datasets met een lange historische en internationale reikwijdte 
maakten het mogelijk om internationale kwantitatieve analyses uit te voeren en 
brede patronen te schetsen. Hierdoor konden hypotheses op basis van case 
studies nu internationaal worden getoetst (bijvoorbeeld over het bestaan van 
de QQT) en konden we hedendaagse thema’s uit de ontwikkelingseconomie 
historisch onderbouwen (zoals de rol van zelfbeschikking in de context van 
familienormen). Zo is de geschiedenis niet alleen een zeer goed proeflokaal om 
dit soort theorieën te toetsen, maar laten we ook zien dat veel (hedendaagse) 
patronen in onderwijs en economische ontwikkeling deels bepaald worden door 
ontwikkelingen het verleden. 
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7 APPENDICES 
Appendix to chapter 2  
A2 Table appendix 
Table A2.1 Recreating table 2.3 with standardized coefficients
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed.
Child labor law 0.481***
(0.0205)
0.355***
(0.0248)
0.245***
(0.0338)
0.182***
(0.0384)
0.194***
(0.0460)
0.0838***
(0.0252)
Compulsory ed. law 0.276***
(0.0292)
0.213*** 
(0.0293)
0.118***
(0.0370)
0.0837*
(0.0425)
0.0529***
(0.0199)
Log male unskilled 
wages 
0.452***
(0.0531)
0.343***
(0.0587)
0.196***
(0.0483)
0.0104
(0.0280)
Spousal Age Gap -0.175***
(0.0560)
-0.143***
(0.0429)
-0.119***
(0.0301)
Full Democracy (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Democracy -0.434***
(0.0945)
-0.105
(0.0746)
0.0292
(0.0450)
Closed Anocracy -0.748***
(0.136)
-0.384***
(0.129)
-0.130**
(0.0610)
Open Anocracy -0.597***
(0.129)
-0.272***
(0.0944)
-0.113*
(0.0620)
Autocracy -0.669***
(0.109)
-0.395***
(0.0901)
-0.179***
(0.0617)
Catholic -0.647
(0.527)
-0.00721
(0.259)
Protestant -0.557* -0.259
(0.319) (0.198)
Muslim 1.984*** 1.208***
(0.616) (0.438)
Hindu -0.304* -0.136
(0.180) (0.121)
Nonreligious 0.536** 0.225***
(0.230) (0.0808)
Log GDP p. capita 0.674***
(0.0428)
Constant -0.194***
(0.00829)
-0.229***
(0.0108)
-0.116***
(0.0157)
0.556***
(0.0983)
1.237***
(0.232)
0.640***
(0.137)
Observations 15,312 15,312 7,500 4,017 3,738 3,692
R-squared 0.348 0.416 0.577 0.610 0.688 0.868
Number of countries 141 141 116 100 100 100
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
     Period first compulsory education law
VARIABLES Av. yrs. 
ed.1800-
1900
Av. yrs. 
ed. 1901-
1950
Av. yrs. 
ed. 1951-
1980
Av. yrs. 
ed. 1981-
2006
Av. yrs. 
ed. 1800-
1900
Av. yrs. 
ed. 1901-
1950
Av. yrs. 
ed. 1951-
1980
Av. yrs.
 ed. 1981-
2006
Child labor law 0.162
(0.385)
0.584**
(0.252)
0.930*** 
(0.157)
1.206*
(0.586)
0.575*** 
(0.191)
0.532*
(0.267)
0.448
(0.412)
0.977***
(0.159)
Compulsory ed 
law 
0.652**
(0.285)
0.397
(0.435)
1.147***
(0.155)
0.478**
(0.169)
0.703*
(0.356)
0.389
(0.284)
1.003**
(0.364)
0.900**
(0.295)
Log male 
unskilled wages 
0.165**
(0.0713)
-0.0533
(0.297)
0.412***
(0.102)
-0.393
(0.224)
0.0768
(0.109)
0.00184
(0.213)
0.332***
(0.114)
0.613*
(0.295)
Full Democracy 0.269
(0.254)
0.350
(0.323)
-0.159
(0.349)
0.482***
(0.0623)
0.381
(0.305)
-0.0201
(0.178)
-1.040
(0.741)
1.573***
(0.431)
Democracy (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Closed 
Anocracy
-0.465**
(0.206)
-1.048**
(0.404)
-0.724*
(0.427)
-0.333
(0.430)
-0.493**
(0.229)
-0.909***
(0.256)
-1.234**
(0.508)
0.674***
(0.202)
Open Anocracy 0.194 
(0.380)
-1.057***
(0.289)
-0.339
(0.391)
-0.487
(0.809)
0.0675
(0.365)
-0.702**
(0.276)
-1.149*
(0.649)
0.707*
(0.338)
Autocracy 0.167
(0.234)
-1.326***
(0.397)
-0.704**
(0.281)
-0.214
(0.572)
-0.0392
(0.349)
-0.981***
(0.334)
-1.351***
(0.403)
0.416*
(0.202)
Log GDP p 
capita
2.876***
(0.116)
2.928*** 
(0.218)
1.647*** 
(0.250)
3.078*** 
(0.333)
2.971*** 
(0.146)
2.490*** 
(0.166)
2.664*** 
(0.535)
1.431*** 
(0.316)
Constant 18.90***
(1.155)
-18.06*** 
(1.510)
-10.96*** 
(1.890)
-18.83*** 
(2.391)
-19.98*** 
(1.123)
-15.14*** 
(1.217)
-17.02*** 
(3.822)
-10.02*** 
(2.143)
Observations 2,104 1,807 1,417 389 2,466 2,148 653 419
R-squared 0.917 0.840 0.729 0.845 0.911 0.778 0.809 0.670
Number of 
countries
24 31 44 9 34 43 18 11
Table A2.2  Legislation and wages on average years of education
Per period of ratification incl. log GDP per capita
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Period first child labor law
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average years of education
VARIABLES Sample national legislation        Sample international legislation
Total 
period
Period 
before 1945
Period 
starting 1945
Total 
period
Period 
before 1945
Period 
starting 1945
Child labor law 0.353*
(0.184)
0.126 
(0.214)
0.286***
(0.00859)
0.448**
(0.182)
2.460***
(0.170)
0.417**
(0.186)
Compulsory ed law 0.750***
(0.231)
0.350**
(0.155)
0.310
(0.236)
0.852**
(0.352)
0.241***
(0.0302)
0.937***
(0.354)
Log male unskilled 
wages 
0.183
(0.135)
0.152
(0.184)
0.236
(0.156)
0.128
(0.111)
0.151
(0.101)
0.0998
(0.107)
Full Democracy 0.495
(0.488)
0.808
(0.500)
-0.773**
(0.291)
-0.225
(0.211)
-0.0178
(0.0740)
-0.196
(0.233)
Democracy (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Closed Anocracy -0.365**
(0.169)
-0.417*** 
(0.116)
-0.389
(0.242)
-0.719***
(0.221)
0.334
(0.198)
-0.736***
(0.245)
Open Anocracy 0.00993
(0.215)
-0.0115
(0.372)
-0.0703
(0.253)
-0.650**
(0.277)
0.317***
(0.0949)
-0.789***
(0.297)
Autocracy -0.128
(0.196)
-0.133
(0.217)
-0.0820
(0.278)
-0.800**
(0.307)
0.297***
(0.0568)
-1.082***
(0.353)
Log GDP p capita 2.695***
(0.180)
3.266***
(0.487)
2.607***
(0.228)
2.678***
(0.158)
0.567*
(0.280)
2.600***
(0.191)
Constant -17.82***
(1.330)
-22.02*** 
(3.740)
-16.35***
(1.651)
-17.05***
(1.213)
-1.898
(2.190)
-16.27***
(1.530)
Observations 1,502 703 799 3,250 423 2,827
R-squared 0.813 0.761 0.769 0.754 0.509 0.662
Number of countries 62 28 47 96 27 96
Table A2.3 Estimates on the nature of child labor laws:  
National laws vs. international treaties, before and after 1945, incl. log GDP per capita
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
204
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. 
ed.
Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed. Av. yrs. ed.
Child labor law (dum) 2.628*** 
(0.265)
2.259*** 
(0.242)
1.896*** 
(0.282)
1.536*** 
(0.345)
1.352*** 
(0.333)
0.587*** 
(0.176)
Compulsory ed law 
(dum)
1.709*** 
(0.229)
1.401*** 
(0.172)
0.770*** 
(0.230)
0.597** 
(0.286)
0.361*** 
(0.135)
Log male unskilled 
wages 
1.411*** 
(0.232)
1.132*** 
(0.201)
0.647*** 
(0.161)
0.0350 
(0.0945)
Spousal age gap -0.330*** 
(0.120)
-0.291*** 
(0.0874)
-0.243*** 
(0.0616)
Full Democracy 1.311*** 
(0.291)
0.340 
(0.249)
-0.0995 (0.153)
Democracy (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.)
Closed Anocracy -0.943*** 
(0.338)
-0.954*** 
(0.294)
-0.544*** 
(0.176)
Open Anocracy -0.610** 
(0.294)
-0.553** 
(0.237)
-0.484*** 
(0.167)
Autocracy -0.797*** 
(0.279)
-0.971*** 
(0.247)
-0.711*** 
(0.205)
Catholic -0.0631 
(0.0545)
-0.000703 
(0.0252)
Protestant -0.0816 
(0.0516)
-0.0395 
(0.0302)
Muslim 0.191*** 
(0.0608)
0.121*** 
(0.0438)
Hindu -0.100* -0.0440
(0.0578) (0.0391)
Nonreligious 0.188** 0.0738***
(0.0812) (0.0265)
Log GDP per capita 2.286*** 
(0.145)
Constant 3.527*** 
(0.228)
2.281*** 
(0.226)
-1.160* 
(0.623)
1.753 
(1.125)
4.362 
(3.347)
-13.50*** 
(2.092)
Observations 3,692 3,692 3,692 3,692 3,692 3,692
R-squared 0.099 0.130 0.410 0.526 0.690 0.868
Number of countries 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table A2.4   Estimates for legislation and wages on average years of education, holding all      
      samples equal
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A2 Sources and raw data appendix 
Data for child labor and compulsory education legislation was gathered by 
Annelies Tukker and Lotte van der Vleuten. It will become available on Clio-
Infra.120 
Child labor legislation 
It contains information on legislation abolishing child labor for 181 countries 
between the period of 1832 and 2013. Data was collected from several 
secondary sources of an academic standard, a few original laws and 
international treaties made with the ILO. Quality of the data on first child labor 
laws, 1: national laws, 2: international treaties (ILO). No data has been used 
from untrusted sources. A first national child labor law was not found for all 
countries. In these cases international treaties from the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) have been used. Data based on ratification international 
treaties is considered less precise than data bases on national laws, as it is 
possible that these treaties, although ratified, were never implemented, and 
it is possible that a predating national law that has not been found within the 
scope of this research. The ILO international treaties that have been used are 
listed below. C006 and C090 on night work have not been accepted as a 
basis for setting a date on first child labor legislation, as it did not abolish child 
labor. On the same note C007, C015, C058, C112, and C123 on work at sea 
and underground without other more comprehensive legislation have been 
considered too limited to count as a first child labor law. 
Main sources
1.   National legislation
    Several original law texts were used, which can be found in the original Excel 
    file (available online). In this case the source field refers to a website with 
     the original text or to ILO Natlex, where the original text may be found.  
2.  Secondary sources
     Hobbs, Sandy, Jim McKechnie, and Michael Lavalette, Child Labor: A 
     World History Companion (ABC-CLIO, 1999). 
     Blanpain, R., International encyclopaedia for labor law and industrial relations 
     (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1988)
    Hindman, H. D. ed, The world of Child Labor: An Historical and Regional 
    Survey (M.E. Sharpe, 2009) 
120    https://www.clio-infra.eu/ (Accessed May 26 2016). 
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3. International treaties
ILO: International Labour Association
For ratification see: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12001:0::NO::: (Ac-
cessed May 26 2016). 
Legislation included in this dataset:
C005 - Minimum Age (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 5) : 14 years old
C006 - Night Work of Young Persons (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 6)
C007 - Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1920 (No. 7): 14 years old
C010 - Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention, 1921 (No. 10): 14 years old
C015 - Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers) Convention, 
           1921 (No. 15): 18 years old (16 if no persons over 18 are available)
C033 - Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention, 
            1932 (No. 33): 14 years old 
C058 - Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1936 (No. 58) : 14 years old
C059 - Minimum Age (Industry) Convention (Revised), 1937 (No. 59): 15 years old
C060 - Minimum Age (Non-Industrial Employment) Convention (Revised), 
            1937 (No. 60): 15 years old
C090 - Night Work of Young Persons (Industry) Convention (Revised), 1948 (No. 90)
C112 - Minimum Age (Fishermen) Convention, 1959 (No. 112): 15 years old
C123 - Minimum Age (Underground Work) Convention, 1965 (No. 123) : 16 years old
C138 - Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138): 14 years old
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Compulsory education legislation 
This database contains information on legislation making education compulsory 
for 194 countries between the period of 1724 to 2013. Data is available on the 
presence of a compulsory legislation in general, but there is also some data 
available regarding to a specific area, sex or ethnicity. Quality of the data on first 
compulsory education laws, 1 = data from trusted academic sources (mainly 
the 1956 World Survey of Education) 2 = data from trusted online sources 
(International Bureau Education, Right to Education Project). The data from 
International Bureau Education, and Right to Education Project is trustworthy, 
but only notes completely compulsory education, and often only the latest 
law. Therefore, it is possible that there is an earlier date at which compulsory 
education was made almost completely compulsory that has not been included 
in these sources. In addition, colonial history and late unification makes it more 
difficult to find the earliest date of compulsory education, therefore the data on 
Africa should be used with caution. See the notes in the Excel file. 
Main sources
World Survey of Education, II Primary Education (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, Paris, 1958)
International Bureau of Education, UNESCO, http://www.ibe.unesco.org/en/
worldwide.html (last accessed 29 February 2016). Provides information on 
education legislation for 195 countries.
Country Database, The Right to Education Project: http://r2e.gn.apc.org/
node/272  (last accessed 29 February 2016). Provides data on education 
legislation.
Other sources can be found in the source file of the online Excel file. 
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 First child labor laws and first compulsory education laws
Country Year of first 
compulsory 
education law
Country Year of 
first child 
labor law
Austria 1774 Germany 1839
Greece 1834 France 1841
Spain 1838 Austria 1842
Sweden 1842 Italy 1843
Portugal 1844 Russian Federation 1845
Norway 1848 Sweden 1846
United States of America 1852 Finland 1868
Argentina 1855 Ireland 1872
Italy 1859 Denmark 1873
Romania 1864 Canada 1873
Mexico 1867 Spain 1873
Hungary 1868 Netherlands 1874
Slovakia 1869 New Zealand 1875
Slovenia 1869 Guyana 1876
Paraguay 1870 Myanmar 1881
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1870 India 1881
Ecuador 1871 Pakistan 1881
Canada 1871 Bangladesh 1881
Australia 1872 Azerbaijan 1882
Japan 1872 Armenia 1882
United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 1872 Turkmenistan 1882
Haiti 1874 Uzbekistan 1882
Guyana 1876 Belarus 1882
New Zealand 1877 Kyrgyzstan 1882
Bulgaria 1879 Latvia 1882
Honduras 1880 Kazakhstan 1882
France 1882 Tajikistan 1882
Croatia 1883 Ukraine 1882
Kazakhstan 1884 Lithuania 1882
Kyrgyzstan 1884 Georgia 1882
Latvia 1884 Republic of Moldova 1882
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Azerbaijan 1884 Belgium 1889
Belarus 1884 Brazil 1891
Uzbekistan 1884 Portugal 1891
Tajikistan 1884 Norway 1892
Ukraine 1884 Bulgaria 1905
Armenia 1884 Romania 1906
Republic of Moldova 1884 Argentina 1907
Lithuania 1884 Egypt 1909
Turkmenistan 1884 Tunisia 1910
Georgia 1884 Australia 1910
Russian Federation 1884 Japan 1911
Algeria 1886 Mexico 1912
Dominica 1890 Greece 1913
Montserrat 1890 Panama 1914
United States Virgin Islands 1890 United States of America 1916
British Virgin Islands 1890 Peru 1918
Antigua and Barbuda 1890 China 1923
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1890 Costa Rica 1923
Netherlands 1900 Poland 1924
Cuba 1900 Colombia 1924
Liberia 1900 Indonesia 1925
Peru 1901 Chile 1925
Switzerland 1902 Morocco 1927
Panama 1903 Hungary 1927
Puerto Rico 1903 Ecuador 1928
Iceland 1907 Luxembourg 1928
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 1909
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 1928
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1911 Cuba 1928
Luxembourg 1912 Albania 1932
Turkey 1913 Zambia 1933
Belgium 1914 Dominican Republic 1933
Jamaica 1914 Uruguay 1933
Uruguay 1916 Nigeria 1934
Dominican Republic 1917 Nicaragua 1934
Chile 1920 Malawi 1939
Albania 1921
Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of) 1939
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Afghanistan 1923 Iraq 1939
Egypt 1923 Iceland 1947
Zambia 1925 Sri Lanka 1950
Ireland 1926 Jamaica 1951
Colombia 1927 Guatemala 1952
The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 1929 Philippines 1953
Iraq 1929 Israel 1953
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1929 Brunei Darussalam 1954
Bermuda 1930 Burkina Faso 1954
Thailand 1932 Cameroon 1954
Togo 1935 Nepal 1955
Brazil 1937 Algeria 1956
Zimbabwe 1938 Ghana 1957
Sri Lanka 1939 Haiti 1957
Myanmar 1940 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1958
Mongolia 1942 Turkey 1959
Kenya 1942 Guinea 1959
Mauritius 1944 Benin 1960
South Africa 1945 Liberia 1960
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1945 Chad 1960
Guatemala 1945 Congo 1960
Pakistan 1948 Central African Republic 1960
Bangladesh 1948 Madagascar 1960
Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea 1948 Cote d’Ivoire 1960
Mauritania 1949 Cyprus 1960
Burkina Faso 1949 Mali 1960
Mali 1949 Senegal 1960
Guinea 1949 Togo 1960
Israel 1949 Gabon 1960
Senegal 1949 Sierra Leone 1961
Costa Rica 1949 Niger 1961
Benin 1949 Mauritania 1961
Republic of Korea 1949 Singapore 1961
Cote d’Ivoire 1949 United Republic of Tanzania 1962
Niger 1949 Lebanon 1962
Gibraltar 1950 Uganda 1963
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El Salvador 1950 Trinidad and Tobago 1963
India 1950 Malaysia 1964
Nicaragua 1950
Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 1964
Libya 1951 Kenya 1964
Guam 1951 Fiji 1965
Madagascar 1951 Malta 1965
Comoros 1952 Lesotho 1966
Malaysia 1952 Jordan 1966
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1952 Paraguay 1966
Vietnam 1952
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 1967
Micronesia (Federated States of) 1952 Barbados 1967
Philippines 1953 Thailand 1968
Syrian Arab Republic 1953 Yemen 1969
Indonesia 1954 Mongolia 1969
Jordan 1955 Cambodia 1969
Lebanon 1957 Mauritius 1969
Malawi 1957 Rwanda 1970
Ghana 1961 Burundi 1971
Morocco 1963 Libya 1971
Congo 1963 Samoa 1972
Kuwait 1965 Suriname 1976
Rwanda 1966 Angola 1976
Trinidad and Tobago 1966 Papua New Guinea 1976
Gabon 1966 Guinea-Bissau 1977
United Arab Emirates 1972 Saudi Arabia 1978
Bahrain 1973 Swaziland 1978
Grenada 1976 Comoros 1978
United Republic of Tanzania 1978 Djibouti 1978
Somalia 1979 Seychelles 1978
Barbados 1981 Grenada 1979
Seychelles 1982 United Arab Emirates 1980
Central African Republic 1984 Saint Lucia 1980
China 1986 Honduras 1980
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1986 Belize 1983
Sao Tome and Principe 1988 Dominica 1983
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Namibia 1990 Equatorial Guinea 1985
Tunisia 1991 Mozambique 1990
Lesotho 1992 Vietnam 1990
Yemen 1994 Namibia 1990
Equatorial Guinea 1995 El Salvador 1990
Gambia 1996 Holy See 1990
Cameroon 1996 Saint Kitts and Nevis 1990
Chad 1997 Zimbabwe 1990
Djibouti 2000
Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea 1990
Singapore 2000 Bhutan 1990
Qatar 2001 Gambia 1990
Nigeria 2003 Sao Tome and Principe 1991
Sierra Leone 2004 Kuwait 1991
Mozambique 2005 Croatia 1991
Occupied Palestinian Territory 2005 Ethiopia 1991
Brunei Darussalam 2007
The former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia 1991
Eritrea 2008 Republic of Korea 1991
Uganda 2008 Cape Verde 1992
Guinea-Bissau 2010 Slovenia 1992
Bahrain 1992
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993
Slovakia 1993
Vanuatu 1993
Marshall Islands 1993
Czech Republic 1993
Saint Vincent and the Gren-
adines 1993
Syrian Arab Republic 1993
Micronesia (Federated 
States of) 1993
Eritrea 1994
Afghanistan 1994
Nauru 1994
Niue 1995
Palau 1995
Qatar 1995
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Namibia 1990 Equatorial Guinea 1985
Tunisia 1991 Mozambique 1990
Lesotho 1992 Vietnam 1990
Yemen 1994 Namibia 1990
Equatorial Guinea 1995 El Salvador 1990
Gambia 1996 Holy See 1990
Cameroon 1996 Saint Kitts and Nevis 1990
Chad 1997 Zimbabwe 1990
Djibouti 2000
Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea 1990
Singapore 2000 Bhutan 1990
Qatar 2001 Gambia 1990
Nigeria 2003 Sao Tome and Principe 1991
Sierra Leone 2004 Kuwait 1991
Mozambique 2005 Croatia 1991
Occupied Palestinian Territory 2005 Ethiopia 1991
Brunei Darussalam 2007
The former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia 1991
Eritrea 2008 Republic of Korea 1991
Uganda 2008 Cape Verde 1992
Guinea-Bissau 2010 Slovenia 1992
Bahrain 1992
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993
Slovakia 1993
Vanuatu 1993
Marshall Islands 1993
Czech Republic 1993
Saint Vincent and the Gren-
adines 1993
Syrian Arab Republic 1993
Micronesia (Federated 
States of) 1993
Eritrea 1994
Afghanistan 1994
Nauru 1994
Niue 1995
Palau 1995
Qatar 1995
Botswana 1995
Tonga 1995
South Africa 1995
Kiribati 1995
Solomon Islands 1995
Oman 1996
Serbia 2000
Timor-Leste 2003
Montenegro 2006
 First legislation used in specifications
country first child 
labor law
country first 
compulsory 
education law
France 1841 Austria 1774
Austria 1842 Greece 1834
Sweden 1846 Spain 1838
Finland 1868 Sweden 1842
Ireland 1872 Portugal 1844
Denmark 1873 Norway 1848
Spain 1873 United States of America 1852
Netherlands 1874 Argentina 1855
New Zealand 1875 Italy 1859
Guyana 1876 Romania 1864
Bangladesh 1881 Mexico 1867
Myanmar 1881 Hungary 1868
India 1881 Slovakia 1869
Pakistan 1881 Slovenia 1869
Georgia 1882
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 1870
Turkmenistan 1882 Paraguay 1870
Kazakhstan 1882 Ecuador 1871
Azerbaijan 1882 Canada 1871
Lithuania 1882
United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 1872
Latvia 1882 Australia 1872
Republic of Moldova 1882 Japan 1872
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Belarus 1882 Haiti 1874
Ukraine 1882 Guyana 1876
Kyrgyzstan 1882 New Zealand 1877
Armenia 1882 Bulgaria 1879
Tajikistan 1882 Honduras 1880
Uzbekistan 1882 France 1882
Belgium 1889 Croatia 1883
Brazil 1891 Turkmenistan 1884
Portugal 1891 Georgia 1884
Norway 1892 Latvia 1884
Bulgaria 1905 Armenia 1884
Romania 1906 Republic of Moldova 1884
Argentina 1907 Tajikistan 1884
Egypt 1909 Lithuania 1884
Tunisia 1910 Azerbaijan 1884
Australia 1910 Ukraine 1884
Greece 1913 Russian Federation 1884
Panama 1914 Kazakhstan 1884
Peru 1918 Uzbekistan 1884
China 1923 Kyrgyzstan 1884
Poland 1924 Belarus 1884
Chile 1925 Algeria 1886
Indonesia 1925 Antigua and Barbuda 1890
Hungary 1927 United States Virgin Islands 1890
Luxembourg 1928 Montserrat 1890
Cuba 1928 British Virgin Islands 1890
Ecuador 1928 Dominica 1890
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1928 Saint Kitts and Nevis 1890
Albania 1932 Netherlands 1900
Zambia 1933 Cuba 1900
Dominican Republic 1933 Liberia 1900
Nicaragua 1934 Peru 1901
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1939 Switzerland 1902
Malawi 1939 Puerto Rico 1903
Iceland 1947 Panama 1903
Jamaica 1951 Iceland 1907
Israel 1953 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 1909
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Cameroon 1954 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1911
Brunei Darussalam 1954 Luxembourg 1912
Burkina Faso 1954 Turkey 1913
Nepal 1955 Jamaica 1914
Algeria 1956 Belgium 1914
Haiti 1957 Uruguay 1916
Ghana 1957 Dominican Republic 1917
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1958 Chile 1920
Guinea 1959 Albania 1921
Madagascar 1960 Afghanistan 1923
Congo 1960 Egypt 1923
Mali 1960 Zambia 1925
Central African 
Republic 1960 Ireland 1926
Chad 1960 Colombia 1927
Senegal 1960
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 1929
Cote d’Ivoire 1960 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1929
Benin 1960 Iraq 1929
Gabon 1960 Bermuda 1930
Togo 1960 Thailand 1932
Mauritania 1961 Togo 1935
Sierra Leone 1961 Brazil 1937
Niger 1961 Zimbabwe 1938
United Republic of Tanzania 1962 Sri Lanka 1939
Uganda 1963 Myanmar 1940
Kenya 1964 Kenya 1942
Malta 1965 Mongolia 1942
Fiji 1965 Mauritius 1944
Paraguay 1966 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1945
Lesotho 1966 South Africa 1945
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1967 Guatemala 1945
Barbados 1967 Pakistan 1948
Mongolia 1969
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 1948
Yemen 1969 Bangladesh 1948
Mauritius 1969 Mali 1949
Burundi 1971 Guinea 1949
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Libya 1971 Costa Rica 1949
Samoa 1972 Senegal 1949
Angola 1976 Israel 1949
Papua New Guinea 1976 Benin 1949
Swaziland 1978 Mauritania 1949
Djibouti 1978 Republic of Korea 1949
Comoros 1978 Cote d’Ivoire 1949
Seychelles 1978 Niger 1949
Grenada 1979 Burkina Faso 1949
United Arab Emirates 1980 El Salvador 1950
Honduras 1980 Gibraltar 1950
Saint Lucia 1980 India 1950
Belize 1983 Nicaragua 1950
Dominica 1983 Guam 1951
Equatorial Guinea 1985 Madagascar 1951
The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 1991 Libya 1951
Croatia 1991 Comoros 1952
Slovenia 1992
Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic 1952
Czech Republic 1993 Micronesia (Federated States of) 1952
Slovakia 1993 Malaysia 1952
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993 Vietnam 1952
Serbia 2000 Philippines 1953
Montenegro 2006 Syrian Arab Republic 1953
Indonesia 1954
Jordan 1955
Lebanon 1957
Malawi 1957
Ghana 1961
Morocco 1963
Congo 1963
Kuwait 1965
Gabon 1966
Trinidad and Tobago 1966
Rwanda 1966
United Arab Emirates 1972
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Bahrain 1973
Grenada 1976
United Republic of Tanzania 1978
Somalia 1979
Barbados 1981
Seychelles 1982
Central African Republic 1984
China 1986
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 1986
Sao Tome and Principe 1988
Namibia 1990
Tunisia 1991
Lesotho 1992
Yemen 1994
Equatorial Guinea 1995
Gambia 1996
Cameroon 1996
Chad 1997
Singapore 2000
Djibouti 2000
Qatar 2001
Nigeria 2003
Sierra Leone 2004
Occupied Palestinian 
Territory 2005
Mozambique 2005
Brunei Darussalam 2007
Eritrea 2008
Uganda 2008
Guinea-Bissau 2010
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Appendix to chapter 4
 Table A4.1 Descriptive statistics for developing and middle-income countries
VARIABLES Obs Mean Sd Min Max Source
Ratio of female to male 
average years of educationa
1440 0.722 0.261 0.0254 1.455 Barro & Lee 2010
Nuclear 1320 0.318 0.466 0 1 Rijpma and 
Carmichael 2015 b
Extended 1320 0.509 0.500 0 1
Stem 1320 0.036 0.187 0 1 “
Polygamous 1320 0.155 0.155 0 1 “
Patrilineal inheritance 1344 0.795 0.404 0 1 “
Matrilineal inheritance 1344 0.071 0.258 0 1 “
Bilateral inheritance 1344 0.241 0.427 0 1 “
Girl power indexc 901 18.07 3.942 5.05 31.81 Carmichael 2011
Log of GDP per capita 1192 7.662 0.970 5.383 10.446 (Maddison 2010)
Female labour force 
participation rate
823 21.59 14.942 0 66.3 ILO 2013
Expenditure on education 1316 2.938 1.911 0.574 14.79 World Bank 2013
Catholic 1114 0.012 0.453 0 1 (Maoz and 
Henderson 2013)
Protestant 1114 0.288 0.107 0 1 “
Muslim 1114 0.266 0.442 0 1 “
Hindu 1114 0.022 0.145 0 1 “
Other 1114 0.413 0.493 0 1 “
Notes:
a The ratio of female to male average years of education for the proportion of the population of 
15 years and older.
b The combined Todd-Murdock dataset contains family characteristics such as marriage and 
inheritance rules. It combines the strengths of Todd’s work and the Murdock-Narodov atlas 
as updated and turned into country-level variables by Bolt (Bolt 2012). Todd’s work covers a 
large set of countries, with Europe being the most detailed, whereas Murdock’s dataset is a 
significant ethnographic work for Africa. Todd relies heavily on historical work and censuses 
from the 1970s but also anthropological work with observations for a 400-year period. The 
extrapolation methods of both Murdock and Todd have been viewed as somewhat extreme, 
for example taking a single village to account for a region or country. Murdock’s observations 
centre on 1920, but include observations for the period 1820–1940. For further information on 
the data, see (Rijpma & Carmichael, 2016). Dilli et al. (2015) also use a classification by Todd to 
measure the impact of various institutions on a historical gender equality index. Family systems 
are one of the institutions they investigate, but they find no significant effects of family systems 
on their historical gender equality index. However, their study differs from ours mainly in the 
measurement of family systems as it follows Todd (Todd and Garrioch 1985), which is geared 
towards explaining differences in political ideologies and emphasises different family system 
221
traits, such as cousin marriage. The family systems classified in our paper are based on Todd 
(1987), which offers a somewhat simplified system originally designed to explain variation in 
literacy ratios. This more specific approach, using family systems and a single outcome variable 
(gender equality in education), may be the reason for the difference in outcomes between the 
study by Dilli et al. and this study. 
c Girl power index = age at marriage minus spousal age gap.
Table A4.2 Marriage patterns using different estimation methods, 1950-2005
 Robust standard errors in parentheses
 Standard errors are clustered
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MODEL (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Female to male ratio in average years of schooling
Random effects Pooled OLS Fixed effects 2SLS
Patrilineal nuclear 0.0101
(0.0404)
0.00194
(0.0179)
- -0.0147 
(0.0240)
Patrilineal extended (Ref.) (Ref.) - (Ref.)
Patrilineal stem 0.0830
(0.0702)
0.0173
(0.0351)
- 0.0206
(0.0348)
Patrilineal polygamous 0.0776
(0.0604)
0.0618
(0.0398)
- 0.0341
(0.0447)
Matrilineal nuclear 0.126***
(0.0426)
0.138***
(0.0317)
- 0.0460
(0.0468)
Matrilineal extended -0.0441
(0.0714)
-0.122***
(0.0436)
- -0.177***
(0.0557)
Matrilineal polygamous 0.108**
(0.0529)
0.125***
(0.0410)
- 0.0482
(0.0575)
Bilateral nuclear 0.117**
(0.0572)
0.101***
(0.0225)
- 0.0874***
(0.0256)
Bilateral extended 0.0549
(0.0921)
0.0610
(0.0430)
- 0.00866
(0.0407)
Girl power index (t-1) 0.0146***
(0.00307)
0.0167***
(0.00353)
0.0117***
(0.00326)
0.0244***
(0.00303)
Constant 0.326***
(0.126)
-0.292***
(0.102)
0.414***
(0.117)
0.364***
(0.0780)
Observations 435 435 435 373
R-squared 0.755 0.574 0.729
Number of countries 86 86 86
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    Table A4.3 Standardised coefficients of family systems, 1950-2005
VARIABLES (1)
Female to male ratio in average years of schooling
Patrilineal extended (Ref.)
Patrilineal nuclear 0.0401
(0.161)
Patrilineal stem 0.330
(0.280)
Patrilineal polygamous 0.309
(0.240)
Matrilineal nuclear 0.500***
(0.169)
Matrilineal extended -0.176
(0.284)
Matrilineal polygamous 0.430**
(0.211)
Bilateral nuclear 0.466**
(0.227)
Bilateral extended 0.219
(0.366)
Girl power index 0.238***
(0.0500)
Log GDP per capita 0.114*
(0.0655)
Female labour force 
Participation rate 
-0.00441
(0.0326)
Public expenditure 
on education (t-1)
-0.0791**
(0.0332)
Catholic (Ref.)
Muslim 0.153
(0.119)
Hindu -0.268
(0.508)
Other 0.225**
(0.100)
Constant 0.0858
(0.205)
Observations 435
Number of countries 86
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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                         Table A4.4 Family systems for 2000 
(1)
VARIABLES Ratio
Patrilineal nuclear 0.0212
(0.0396)
Patrilineal extended (Ref.)
Patrilineal stem 0.0225
(0.0720)
Patrilineal polygamous -0.0522
(0.121)
Matrilineal nuclear -0.0632
(0.0538)
Matrilineal extended -0.167***
(0.0501)
Matrilineal polygamous 0.0107
(0.0858)
Bilateral nuclear 0.0814**
(0.0361)
Bilateral extended 0.128
(0.0839)
Girl power index 0.0198**
(0.00910)
Log GDP per capita 0.0263
(0.0372)
Female labour force
participation rate
0.00134
(0.00126)
Public expenditure
on education (t-1)
-0.0219
(0.0179)
Catholic (Ref.)
Muslim -0.128**
(0.0599)
Hindu -0.288***
(0.0800)
Other 0.00190
(0.0345)
Constant 0.344
(0.247)
Observations 62
R-squared 0.640
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix to chapter 5
Table A5.1 The List of the Names of Indian States over Time
1881 1961 2011 Zones
Ajmere Andaman and Nicobar Islands
Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands East 
Assam Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh South
Baroda Assam Arunachal Pradesh East
Bengal Bihar Assam East
Berar Dadra and Nagar Haveli Bihar East
Bombay Delhi Chandigarh North
Burmah Goa, Daman and Diu Chhattisgarh East / Central
Central India Gujarat Dadra and Nagar Haveli West
Central Provinces Himachal Pradesh Daman and Diu West
Central Provinces Jammu and Kashmir Delhi North
Cochin Kerala Goa South
Coorg Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Gujarat West
Do. Madhya Pradesh Haryana North
Hydrabad Madras Himachal Pradesh North
Madras Maharashtra Jammu and Kashmir North
Mysore Manipur Jharkhand East / Central
N.-W. Provinces Mysore Karnataka South
N.-W. Provinces Nagaland Kerala South
Punjab North-East Frontier Agency * Lakshadweep South
Punjab Orissa Madhya Pradesh Central
Rajputana Pondicherry Maharashtra West / Central
Rajastan Meghalaya East
Sikkim Mizoram East
Tripura Nagaland East
Uttar Pradesh Orissa East
West Bengal Puducherry East
Punjab South
Rajasthan North
Sikkim North
Tamil Nadu East
Tripura South
Uttar Pradesh East
Uttarakhand Central
West Bengal North
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A5.2 OLS Results on Determinant of Gender Equality in 1880, 1960, and 2000
Panel A: 1880
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sex ratios 
0-10
Spousal 
Age Gap
Female 
SMAM
Literacy 
ratios
Female 
literacy
Urbanisation -0.006*
(0.003)
0.002
(0.005)
0.124*
(0.060)
0.022*
(0.011)
0.011*
(0.005)
CFA 0.040
(0.044)
0.144*
(0.066)
6.362***
(1.010)
0.239
(0.155)
0.115
(0.077)
Mixed Rule 0.035
(0.035)
0.002
(0.071)
-0.246
(0.896)
-0.077
(0.084)
-0.027
(0.043)
Native Rule 0.010
(0.036)
0.022
(0.064)
0.959
(0.899)
-0.024
(0.091)
-0.003
(0.043)
Hindu1901 0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.029
(0.019)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.001)
Muslim1901 -0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
0.021
(0.022)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.001)
Dalit 0.000
(0.003)
0.006
(0.005)
0.124
(0.068)
0.003
(0.008)
0.001
(0.004)
Constant 0.992***
(0.069)
0.520***
(0.111)
8.556***
(1.520)
-0.076
(0.139)
-0.057
(0.066)
Observations 16 16 16 16 16
R-squared 0.659 0.452 0.873 0.669 0.667
Notes: *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.10 (two tailed t-test), ^p<.10 (one-sided t-test). 
Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses
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